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One for All—SDG 17 as a Driver to Achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals
by Georg von Schnurbein 
 One for all! The first part of the famous musketeer motto seems to fit perfectly 
with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17, “Partnerships for the Goals”. While 
the sixteen goals before are directed towards concrete areas of action, SDG 17 
serves as a convener and facilitator for all the other goals. This article offers a short 
introduction to SDG 17. In particular, it opens up a discussion on how different 
combinations of partnerships should be embedded in order to achieve the targets 
of SDG 17. Based on a literature review and the following chapter of this volume, 
we formulate implications for research and practice on the diversity of multi-
stakeholder partnerships, the necessity of overarching norms, the importance of 
evaluation, and the value of trust and willingness to make partnerships work.
Collectively Addressing SDGs to Change an Industry:  
The Case of the Water Revolution Foundation
by Lonneke Roza and Lucas Meijs
 Sustainable Development Goal 17 (Partnerships) concerns collaborative 
efforts between companies and societal actors. One potential collaborative effort 
that is often overlooked involves companies that join together to form a civil 
society organization, based on a common goal of creating positive social change 
through a non-commercial strategy. Such forms of collaboration for the purpose 
of creating positive social change are needed, as traditional ways of addressing 
grand challenges have proven insufficient. In this chapter, we draw on a single 
case study to discuss a particular form of partnership among companies within a 
specific industry. The partnership is formalized as an industry foundation aimed 
at creating positive social change. Hence, we examine the specific dynamics of such 
an industry foundation. This industry foundation uses collective power to leverage 
resources from the market sector and invest them across sectors in NGOs and social 
enterprises that can help to transform the entire industry. Such foundations can 
play an important role in helping companies align themselves to the Sustainable 
xii
Development Goals. Based on this case, we draw three main conclusions. First, 
industry foundations can be differentiated from other non-commercial structures 
emerging from companies (e.g., corporate foundations, collective corporate 
foundations, industry associations, and multi-stakeholder initiatives) by shifting 
toward a collective of stakeholders within a particular industry, instead of around 
a particular social issue. Second, industry foundations face challenges with regard 
to legitimizing their public benefit, as they are vulnerable to questions concerning 
whether they are truly operating to the public benefit or whether they are actually 
private interests in disguise. Third, one major potential of industry foundations is 
that those involved in them are part of the industry—they know the possibilities 
and limitations of the industry, and they are trusted by others within that industry. 
This type of foundation can thus serve as a “coalition of the willing”, by bringing 
together front-runners who can actually accelerate change within an industry.
Building Strong Partnership for SDGs: Analyzing Participation of 
Nigerian Stakeholders
by Okechukwu Enechi and Philipp Pattberg
 The concept of multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) is promoted as one of 
the key tools for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG 17 
emphasizes the critical importance of partnerships for sustainable development, 
based on the assumption that partnerships will mobilize a wide range of 
stakeholders in the sharing of knowledge, expertise, technology, and additional 
resources towards achieving the global development agenda. However, studies 
have shown that global multi-stakeholder partnerships are challenged by 
unbalanced participation, particularly the limited participation of stakeholders 
from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This lack of inclusiveness and participation often 
leads to incoherence in agenda-setting, contested decision-making processes, and 
suboptimal outcomes of partnerships. Yet, developing strong partnerships for the 
SDGs requires increased participation, inclusiveness, and diversity that enhances 
the role and influence of partnerships towards achieving the SDGs. Consequently, 
research needs to urgently explore how multi-stakeholder partnerships can 
achieve increased participation and inclusiveness by mobilizing underrepresented 
stakeholders. Against this challenge, this chapter analyzes inclusiveness and 
representation in MSPs related to stakeholders from the SSA region. Using Nigeria 
as a case study, we explore the participation of Nigerian stakeholders in MSPs, 
focusing on obstacles for increased participation and inclusiveness. The chapter is 
xiii
organized as follows: first, we review the Partnerships for SDGs online platform 
(hosted by the United Nations), focusing on multi-stakeholder partnerships’ self-
reported implementation in Nigeria. Second, using survey data on SSA partnerships, 
we analyze the factors hindering participation in partnerships. Finally, this chapter 
discusses the impacts of limited participation and inclusiveness on partnerships 
concerning agenda-setting, decision-making process, and outcomes. The chapter 
concludes that an improved understanding of participation in multi-stakeholder 
partnerships will offer an opportunity for reflection, in the SSA context, required 
for building strong and effective partnerships for the SDGs.
Institutional and Policy Framework in the Governance  
of Capture Fisheries and Its Bearing on Co-Management:  
Experiences from Zambia
by Francis M. Chama and Jacob Mwitwa
 Recent scientific reports highlight the urgent need for transformations to 
achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and long-term sustainability. 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the influence that institutional and 
policy frameworks have on co-management partnerships in poor communities 
like Lake Bangweulu open fisheries in Zambia. This chapter is based on field 
research that aims to generate information for sustainable fisheries management, 
through strong partnerships in the form of co-management. The research took a 
qualitative and quantitative approach to explore the institutional frameworks 
and the appropriateness of the fisheries policy for co-management. Data were 
obtained through observation, surveys, and documentation. The findings show 
that the involvement of fishing communities in the management of the fisheries at 
all levels, from policymaking to implementation, would lead to greater awareness 
and management compliance by resource users. However, policy and management 
strategies should focus on community development rather than just conservation. 
A policy based on conservation is seen as not designed to improve on local 
livelihood, but conserves resources for the benefit of facilitating institutions. Strong 
partnerships that take a holistic approach in the governance and management of 
fisheries are critical in achieving the SDG 17. The study suggests how institutional 
and policy frameworks can both facilitate and constrain fisheries co-management. 
Presented here are the normative criteria from which to evaluate and improve 
partnerships in co-management.
xiv
Reflecting on the Role of Academia–Private Sector Partnerships in 
Moving Forward with the SDGs
by Annmarie Ryan and Christian Hauser
 Partnerships are enshrined as an integral mechanism for the achievement of 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals. However, despite the apparent prominence 
of partnerships in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it is interesting to 
note that, in SDG 17, only two sub-targets correspond to the interaction between 
partners. Furthermore, while partnerships between academia and other sectors 
are on the rise, there is a lack of relevant conceptual framework to practice and 
support impactful partnership development. In the present essay, we advocate a 
process perspective and describe how higher education institutions (HEIs) can 
engage in partnerships for sustainable development in which knowledge, expertise, 
technology and financial resources are mobilized and shared. Using examples 
from the UN Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME) Champion 
schools, this essay addresses the lack of conceptual framework by offering a 
two-dimensional framework, described as the partnership sweet spot (PSS), as a 
guideline to enable HEIs to locate and position their current or desired partnership 
activities. By gaining a greater understanding of the status quo of the partnerships, 
we suggest that HEIs can use this information to work towards the PSS located 
at the center of the proposed model. This PSS is where faculties are engaged and 
drive partnerships that align with their teaching and research interests, but are 
supported, enabled and equipped by management to do so. Furthermore, we 
identify that, while the individual school agenda must be served, this should be 
done in a manner that meaningfully addresses the SDG-related challenges of the 
wider society, and that the school provides a framework to measure or reflect on the 
impact of their partnership activities.
Achieving the Global 2030 Agenda: What Role for Voluntary 
Sustainability Standards?
by Axel Marx and Charline Depoorter
 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17 calls for strengthening implementation 
means and revitalizing global partnerships for these goals. In this sense, the 2030 
Agenda explicitly recognises the importance of the private sector to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Among private actors, Voluntary Sustainability 
Standards (VSS) can potentially play an important role in governing sustainable 
xv
development. With regard to SDG 17, VSS are relevant implementation means for 
the SDGs, as they share similar objectives. They also contribute to revitalising 
partnerships for these goals by linking the Global South to the Global North 
through global value chains. The objective of this chapter is to present the potential 
contribution that VSS can make in achieving the SDGs. We first introduce VSS and 
how they operate, and provide some leading examples of VSS. We then discuss 
how VSS are linked to the SDGs. Next, key developments in the landscape of VSS 
are identified. Lastly, we show that, despite their growing number and increasing 
complementarity to public governance instruments, VSS face challenges in terms of 
credibility, effectiveness, and cooperation.
Working Together: A Logical Thing?
by Alice Hengevoss and Nicholas Arnold
 Cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs) are quite broadly viewed as 
important mechanism to successfully address pressing societal challenges, as the 
combined efforts of actors from different sectors can lead to innovative solutions 
and leveraging capacities and reach. However, the varying institutional logics of 
different actors may also make such partnerships challenging and prone to conflict 
and failure. In this chapter, we ask how the existence of different institutional 
logics can encourage and challenge the emergence and functioning of CSSPs. We 
address this question by discussing drivers, opportunities and challenges related to 
CSSPs. Based on a literature review and a literature-based case study of the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), we suggest that different institutional logics should not 
be seen as insurmountable obstacles for the implementation of successful CSSPs. 
Rather, they are important drivers of such endeavors and an important prerequisite 
for value-creation within these cross-sectoral efforts. However, caution with 
respect to over-optimistic calls for such partnerships is advised. Even the FSC with 
its comprehensive governance-mechanisms has experienced significant challenges, 
and has only been able to meet its objectives to a limited degree.
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A Conceptual Overview of How and Why to Evaluate Partnership
by Oto Potluka
 Partnerships have a great potential to positively contribute to policymaking 
and policy implementation when they are properly implemented. The current 
practice shows, that in Sustainability Development Goal No. 17 (SDG17), monitoring 
over evaluation prevails, and evaluations are rare. The existence of monitoring 
indicators under the SDG17 neither says anything about the quality of partnerships 
established and implemented, nor about their achievements. This chapter is based 
on literature review to add to the knowledge on why and how to evaluate SDG17, 
and partnerships generally. For that reason, we take the EU cohesion policy and 
public-private partnerships, as examples of policies in which partnership is a 
standard tool, to provide insights from project evaluation research and challenges 
of implementing SDG17. The novelty of the contribution is in the building of an 
evaluation framework. The evaluation framework approach is based on seven 
evaluation criteria: (1) accountability and legitimacy; (2) improving quality and 
performance; (3) planning improvements; (4) building capacity; (5) learning; (6) 
ownership among program participants; and (7) empowerment—together with 
defining characteristics of functioning partnerships—(1) common goals; (2) mutual 
benefits; (3) long-term relationship; (4) acceptance of cooperation; (5) the contribution 
of each partner; (6) synergistic effects; and (7) joint decision-making. Moreover, 
the framework also applies general evaluation criteria—relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, impacts, and sustainability.
Cross-Sector Partnerships for Implementing Community Climate 
Action Plans: Structural features, Partner Outcomes and Plan 
Outcomes
by Krista Wong, Amelia Clarke and Eduardo Ordonez-Ponce
 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17, target 17.17 aims to “encourage and 
promote effective public, public-private, and civil society partnerships, building 
on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships.” This research 
on collaborative strategic management and cross-sector partnerships studies 
structural features and outcomes in the context of climate action plans in Canadian 
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cities. Its purpose is to assess the structural features of a partnership during 
plan implementation, and the related plan- and partner-centric outcomes. Four 
Partners for Climate Protection member municipalities were studied and their 
implementation structures, plan outcomes, and partner outcomes qualitatively 
assessed. Findings confirm that five implementation structural features are crucial 
for enabling the achievement of climate mitigation targets, and that partnership 
design affects partner outcomes, including a new outcome of ‘moral support’. This 
study fills theoretical gaps on the structural features of cross-sector partnerships 
that are aiming to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and energy usage in 
cities, and allows for additional insight into partner outcomes by participating in 
cross-sector partnerships.

One for All—SDG 17 as a Driver to Achieve
the Sustainable Development Goals
Georg von Schnurbein
1. Introduction
One for all! The first part of the famous musketeer motto seems to fit perfectly
with the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17, “Partnerships for the Goals”.
While the sixteen goals before are directed towards concrete areas of action, SDG 17
serves as a convener and facilitator for all the other goals. With the establishment of
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2001, collaboration was seen as an
important driver to attain these goals (Goal 8). With the SDGs, this approach was
accentuated. Before 2015, 6203 partnerships were registered on the UN Partnership
Platform. From 2015–2018 (latest figures available), a total of 7924 partnerships were
registered. Thus, the number of partnerships for the SDGs has already outnumbered
the partnerships before them. This article offers a short introduction to SDG 17.
In particular, it opens up a discussion on how different combinations of partnerships
should be embedded in order to achieve the targets of SDG 17.
In this article, we will provide a theoretical foundation of collaboration building
for co-creation and co-production. Additionally, we will present the progress of
SGD 17 so far. Finally, we will discuss several propositions for future development
that are informed by the following chapters of this volume.
2. Collaboration through Co-Creation and Co-Production
In the analysis of the MDGs, the division of the world into donors and recipients
of assistance was accentuated as one of the limitations to success, although a global
partnership was proclaimed as one of eight goals (Wysokińska 2017). Hence, one of
the major differences between the MDGs and the SGDs is the universal nature of the
latter without differentiation and the full inclusion of all areas of society, including
state, market, and civil society. From a theoretical perspective, the MDGs’ failure can
be explained by a wrong, albeit unilateral, perception of partnership.
The concept of co-production is a helpful starting point to build a theoretical
foundation for partnerships for the SDGs. The concept was developed in the field of
public service provision as attempt to describe the inclusion of ordinary citizens in
the delivery of public services (Brudney and England 1983). Today, the idea of citizen
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involvement goes beyond mere production and includes production topics such as
governance, creation and the management of public services (Pestoff et al. 2006).
Joshi and Moore (2004) define institutionalized co-production as “the provision of
public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through a regular long-term
relationship between state agencies and organized groups of citizens, where both
make substantial resource contributions”. Hence, co-production entails long-term
relationships between different types of actors, and resources are provided by all
parties involved.
This definition is very helpful to transfer the idea of co-production onto the
global partnership for SGDs, where partnerships between state, business and civil
society are sought to provide financial resources, access to technology, increase
capacities, support global trade and build on system development.
Moreover, further aspects on co-production can be derived from the literature.
Osborne et al. (2016) postulate that co-production is oriented towards meeting
the needs of individuals or the society at large and towards building capacities to
resolve future challenges. By emphasizing the “service” aspect of co-production,
they implement the idea of value co-creation. Hence, every combined effort for public
service provision, governance, design, management or the production of service
creates a value for and has an impact on society.
Another aspect of co-production is the question of voluntary or involuntary
contribution. Initially, the participation of citizens in co-production was defined as a
voluntary cooperative action (Brudney and England 1983). Nowadays, co-production
has gained major attention in public reforms and, thus, is often installed as the
only option. Citizens may become obliged to participate in public service provision
(Lindenmeier et al. 2019). Similar effects can be observed in the development and the
implementation of the SDGs.
Finally, coproduction is a universal concept to address public service provision.
The previous literature investigates the use of co-production in areas such as
healthcare (Vooberg et al. 2015), agriculture (Carolan 2006), environment protection
(Kasymova and Gaynor 2014), urban regeneration (Carter 2013), natural resource
management (Maynard 2015), or civic engagement (Clark et al. 2013). One may find
research on co-production for every different SDG.
3. Content and Progress of SDG 17
The aim of SDG 17 is formulated as “Strengthen the means of implementation and
revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development”. In essence, five areas
of activity are covered by this goal: finance, information and communications
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technology (ICT), capacity building, trade, and systemic issues. Table 1 provides an
overview of the related targets and indicators. The latest progress report is available
for 2019 (UN 2019). The report names positive development in the area of technology,
especially in terms of access to the internet. At the end of 2018, more than half of
the global population had access to the internet. However, finance and trade remain
challenging targets for the SGDs. In finance, official development aid (ODA) net flows
reached up to USD 149 billion in 2018, a decrease of 2.7 per cent in real terms compared
to the year before. On the contrary, personal remittances to low- and middle-income
countries reached an all-time high of USD 550 billion. No special mention is found
in the report on donations and private grant-making. However, data on private
donations for development aid are scarce. A survey by the Organization for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in 2018 reported annual donations of USD
7.9 billion by the largest grant-making foundations, mainly from the United States
(OECD 2018). In Europe, for instance, private donations for development aid stem
typically from individuals, not foundations. Hence, data availability is even lower.
In terms of trade, the share of the merchandise of the least developed countries
in world merchandise remains below 1 percent. This slow growth threatens the
expected targets for 2020. Additionally, tariffs still cause barriers for worldwide trade
and global trade is threatened by tensions among the largest economies (UN 2019).
The UN progress report further elaborates that ODA for capacity building has
been stagnating since 2010 at 14 per cent of total sector-allocable aid, mainly in
Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia
(UN 2019).
A further important target for SDG 17 is the improvement of multi-stakeholder
partnerships. In 2018, progress on multi-stakeholder partnerships was reported by
51 of 114 countries, leading, for instance, to better public financial management and
an increase in contributions by civil society and the private sector (UN 2019).
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Table 1. Targets formulated for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17, Partnerships
for the Goals (Source: UN 2017).
Targets
Finance
17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support
to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other
revenue collection
17.2 Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance
commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve
the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to
0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are
encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI
to least developed countries
17.3 Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from
multiple sources
17.4 Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through
coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt
restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor
countries to reduce debt distress
17.5 Adopt and implement investment promotion regimes for least developed countries
Technology
17.6 Enhance North–South, South–South and triangular regional and international
cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance
knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved
coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level,
and through a global technology facilitation mechanism
17.7 Promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally
sound technologies to developing countries on favorable terms, including on
concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed
17.8 Fully operationalize the technology bank and science, technology and innovation
capacity-building mechanism for least developed countries by 2017 and enhance the
use of enabling technology, in particular information and
communications technology
Capacity-Building
17.9 Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted
capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all






17.10 Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable
multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through
the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda
17.11 Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view
to doubling the least developed countries’ share of global exports by 2020
17.12 Realize timely implementation of duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting
basis for all least developed countries, consistent with World Trade Organization
decisions, including by ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to
imports from least developed countries are transparent and simple, and contribute to
facilitating market access
Systemic Issues
17.13 Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and
policy coherence
17.14 Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development
17.15 Respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement
policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development
17.16 Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by
multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise,
technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable
development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries
17.17 Encourage and promote effective public, public–private and civil society
partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships
17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for
least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase
significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated
by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic
location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts
17.19 By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on
sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support
statistical capacity-building in developing countries
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4. Research and Practical Implications on SDG 17
In the following chapters of the volume, different types of multi-stakeholder
partnerships are the focus of the research. This may be surprising as the core
focus of SDG 17 is financial and ICT topics. However, the goal itself targets strong
partnerships, which should not only be understood as partnerships between states,
but also between different social actors. The question then arises as to how different
actors from the public and private sectors and civil society can cooperate in order to
strengthen and achieve the targets of the SDGs. Hence, building on the outcomes of
the following chapters, we posit the following implications for future research and
practical transition.
4.1. Exploitation of the Diversity of Cross-Sector Collaboration
The dominant logic of cross-sector collaboration is a public–private partnership
(PPP). At its core, this approach describes “long-term collaborative relationships
between one or more private actors and public bodies that combine public sector
management or oversight with a private partner’s resources and competencies for
a direct provision of a public good or service” (Kivleniece and Quelin 2012, p. 273).
The advantages of PPPs in the context of the SDGs are their potential to overcome
massive infrastructure gaps and the fact that they can be arranged as hybrid constructs
to create social value beyond service provision (Berrone et al. 2019). However, as the
chapters in this volume show, there are more variations to the idea of multi-stakeholder
partnerships. Roza and Meijs (2020) elaborate on the case study of a collective
corporate foundation that transitions corporate resources to social enterprises and
nonprofits. Although no public actor is involved, this case study supports the idea
of co-production. Ryan and Hauser (2020) show examples of academia–private
sector collaborations for the SGDs. Pattberg and Enechi (2020) highlight the potential
of bottom-up governance and inclusiveness. In particular, local actors should be
better included in partnerships. Chama and Mwitwa (2020) present a case study
on co-management through the involvement of communities. In addition to the
examples mentioned in the chapters, one can think about new forms of impact
investing, such as conditional conversion models or layered funding that could
increase the financial resources to achieve the SDGs (Hebb 2013). Another stream of
innovation could be generated through a further analysis of hybrid organizations
(Billis 2010). Hence, reaching the targets of the SGDs requires an intensified search
for different and innovative forms of cross-sector collaboration. This search has to be
both research-based and informed by practical experience.
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4.2. Develop and Demand Overarching Standards and Rules
A constant critique of multi-stakeholder partnerships—especially when partners
from different parts of the world are involved—is the unbalanced levels of norms or
regulations. While the political debate about standards envisions more regulation
based on legal requirements, Marx and Depoorter (2020) discuss another option,
voluntary sustainability standards (VSS). These standards are especially promising
to realize another target of SDG 17, the promotion of a non-discriminatory and
equitable multilateral trading system. Existing VSS cover the topics of several
SGDs. However, as the authors show, VSS face challenges in terms of legitimacy,
effectiveness and coordination that need to be solved in the near future. One of
the most well-known VSS, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), is the focus of an
analysis in the chapter by Hengevoss and Arnold (2020). By applying institutional
logics theory, they highlight that implicit rules play an important role in both
hindering and succeeding in collaborative processes. Hence, for the success of the
SDGs, it is necessary to not only provide targets and indicators, but also common
standards of regulation and implementation. The debate on VSS highlights different
perceptions of co-creation and co-production. While the co-creation of VSS is usually
successful, co-production in the realization phase is much more difficult. Thus, we
call for the further advancement of procedures of co-production, so that VSS are more
frequently used as standard operating procedures than regulations and documents
of control.
4.3. Engage in Comprehensive Evaluation of Partnerships
It is no secret that results—even hard figures—are always in need of interpretation.
Potluka (2020) highlights different purposes of evaluation, such as accountability, quality
improvement, capacity building, and learning. The last two purposes are of special
interest in regard to SGD 17. Capacity building can only happen through learning and
knowledge exchange, be it North–South, South–South or cross-sector collaboration. In his
analysis, Potluka (2020) shows that most evaluation studies are concentrated on issues of
accountability and performance measurement. As a further improvement, they should
incorporate a wider range of purposes, especially learning and empowerment.
4.4. Build on Trust and Willingness to Achieve Progress
Several chapters in this volume discuss the power relationships in
multi-stakeholder partnerships (Chama and Mwitwa 2020; Pattberg and Enechi 2020;
Hengevoss and Arnold 2020). Chama and Mwitwa (2020) analyze the management
of fisheries and emphasize that management strategies should be directed towards
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community development rather than conservation. Although the SDGs entail
many aspects of preservation (of nature, for instance), they proclaim an idea of
progress and development, especially for the less developed areas of the world.
Wong et al. (2020) highlight that engagement is one of the crucial aspects for successful
multi-stakeholder partnerships. They show how participating organizations and
individuals profit from outcomes generated by other partners. Hence, further analysis
on trust-building activities in the development of multi-stakeholder partnerships is
needed (Sloan and Oliver 2013). A solution may be found in adopting approaches of
co-production that were developed to empower citizens and to build trust between
public service agencies and citizens (Brudney and England 1983).
5. Conclusions
A major take-away of the MDGs is that collaboration is crucial for the success
of the SDGs. Although the figures report a strong increase in partnerships for
the SDGs, the situation remains critical. First, many partnerships do not achieve
their aspired targets and fall short in becoming strong, sustainable partnerships.
Second, the hurdles to build and install partnerships—especially cross-sector
partnerships—remain high and hinder further development. Third, evaluations
on the outcomes of partnerships are difficult, as real change often happens with a
larger time lag. However, the chapters in this volume discuss several promising
approaches and offer theoretical analysis for the future development of partnerships
for the SDGs. In this sense, we are convinced that this collection of research will help
to achieve the SDGs through increased partnerships and more financial resources,
better access to technology, improved trade systems, and an increase in resources for
capacity building.
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Collectively Addressing SDGs to Change an
Industry: The Case of the Water
Revolution Foundation
Lonneke Roza and Lucas Meijs
1. Introduction
In our efforts to reach the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and resolve
our grand challenges, the world faces a funding gap of $2.5 trillion each year1—and
we will obviously never have enough financial resources to fill this gap. We must,
therefore, find innovative ways of addressing our grand challenges, with “all hands
on deck.” Companies can play a pivotal role in this regard (George et al. 2016).
One way in which companies can help is by making their core business practices
more sustainable and inclusive in several respects (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund
2013; Stubbs and Cocklin 2008). The increasing number of companies that are
actively committing to being sustainable and inclusive is evidenced in a variety of
developments, including the rise of social entrepreneurship (Santos 2012), social
intrapreneurship (Geradts and Bocken 2019), the B-Corp movement (Lahneman et al.
2019), and inclusive business models (Lashitew et al. 2019). The answer does not
rest exclusively in the market (Eikenberry 2009) or in the government; our grand
challenges are far too complex. They call for cross-sector partnerships, hence SDG 17.
Given the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the grand challenges facing
society (e.g., providing healthcare, stopping climate change, and producing clean
energy), they should be “plausibly addressed through coordinated and collaborative
effort” (George et al. 2016, p. 1880). Such efforts can be informed by the existing body
of management and business literature on within-industry collaborations aimed at
creating more sustainable and inclusive supply chains (Allaoui et al. 2019), as well as
by literature on cross-sector partnerships (e.g., Austin and Seitanidi 2012a, 2012b).
One potential collaborative effort that has tended to be overlooked, however, involves
companies seeking to establish mutual partnerships in order to create positive social
change,2 based on a non-commercial strategy. In this chapter, we examine a relatively
1 https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/dsgsm1340.doc.htm (accessed on 19 July 2020).
2 By referring to social change, we refer to both social and environmental aspects.
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new form of multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at achieving the SDGs: the industry
foundation. An industry foundation draws on collective power to leverage resources
from the market sector within a particular industry, and to invest them across sectors
in NGOs and social enterprises, that can help to create positive social change through
the transformation of the entire industry. In this chapter, we examine and discuss the
specific dynamics of industry foundations created by companies.
Positive social change refers to “the process of transforming patterns of
thought, behavior, social relationships, institutions, and social structure to generate
beneficial outcomes for individuals, communities, organizations, society, and/or
the environment, beyond the benefits for the instigators of such transformation”
(Stephan et al. 2016, p. 1252). In recent decades, scholars have investigated the
concept of corporate philanthropy (among others), in order to support the efforts of
companies to create positive social change (for reviews, see Gautier and Pache 2015;
Liket and Simaens 2015). To date, such work has been the subject of controversy.
This is because, while some see corporate philanthropy as a gesture from companies
seeking to invest in the public good, others tend to regard it as self-serving and
driven more by commercial interest than by the desire to serve the public good
(Bertrand et al. 2018). It is at this point that formal organizational structures come
into play. Such structures can ensure that the benefits of such collaborative efforts are
indeed directed toward the public good, in the pursuit of goals that transcend the
direct interests of the instigators. The corporate foundation is one example of such
an organizational structure (Herlin and Pedersen 2013; Roza et al. 2020).
A corporate foundation is a separate legal entity that is formally related to a
company, but that has a public-benefit mission. It is either the owner of the company
or an affiliate established by the company (Bothello et al. 2020; Pedrini and Minciullo
2011; Westhues and Einwiller 2006). Even though such foundations are currently
operating around the globe, and despite the fact that their role in the social sector
is expanding, corporate foundations have yet to receive much scholarly attention
(Pedrini and Minciullo 2011; Roza et al. 2020; Westhues and Einwiller 2006). Even less
attention has been paid to situations in which companies join forces to establish a
collective foundation with the aim of creating positive social change (e.g., within
a specific geographical area) (Maas 2020). This chapter explores why and how
companies work collectively to create positive social change. This will contribute
to the debate on SDG 17, which is sharply focused on cross-sector partnerships
(business and civil society or business and government), with less attention paid
to the joint creation of entities within the civil society (i.e., businesses creating civil
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society). The primary purpose of this chapter is to explain issues that are specifically
related to civil society organizations that are at arms’ lengths of the corporate world.
Our discussion makes at least three contributions to the current body of literature.
First, we provide an initial description of a collaborative governance structure aimed
at creating positive social change. Second, we describe the motivations, processes,
and conditions needed in order to establish and implement an industry foundation
as a force for positive social change. Finally, we open a discussion concerning what
can and cannot be regarded as public benefit, against the backdrop of one specific
industry foundation, whose objective is to increase the sustainability of the corporate
industry. We also open a discussion concerning what various stakeholders might
perceive as the responsibility of individual companies, of industry associations, and of
public benefit organizations.
To this end, we contextualize collective corporate philanthropy efforts in the form
of an industry foundation. We define this type of foundation as a non-commercial
investment with which companies seek to address grand challenges and, potentially, to
change industry standards. We then explore why and how companies might use this
approach, based on a case study of the “Water Revolution Foundation.” This non-profit,
science-driven organization is a collaborative effort supported by a number of partner
companies (including Abeking and Rasmussen, Alexseal, Amels|Damen, Benetti,
De Koning Groep, Feadship, Heesen, Lürssen, MB92 Group and Rybovich) within
the international superyacht industry. Its objective is to make the industry more
sustainable. We conclude the chapter by formulating lessons that can be learned from
this case, and highlighting implications for managerial research and practice.
2. Non-Commercial Strategies to Create Positive Social Change
Corporate philanthropy is the most commonly implemented non-commercial
strategy for creating positive social change in large multinational, as well as in small
and medium-sized, companies throughout the world (Roza 2016). It consists of the
voluntary act of making corporate resources available “without any direct commercial
benefit, to one or more organizations whose core purpose is to benefit the community’s
welfare” (Madden et al. 2006, p. 49). Companies are increasingly allocating resources
to corporate philanthropy (Campbell et al. 2002). In both the United States and Europe,
corporate giving amounts to more than 20 billion USD(Giving USA 2019; Giving
in Europe 2017). This amount is expected to continue increasing as investments in
corporate philanthropy have been rising since 2007 (Charitable Aid Foundation 2014).
These two regions, nevertheless, differ with regard to the relative importance of the
contributions. Whereas giving by companies is relatively low compared to other
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forms of giving in the United States (accounting for only 5% of total giving), it is
relatively high in Europe (accounting for 25% of total giving).3
Despite differences in the relative proportions of total giving across different
regions, the activities that are considered to be part of corporate philanthropy
are changing throughout the world. For example, corporate philanthropy has
traditionally been manifested in donations of time, money, or means for the public
good. At present, however, corporate philanthropy is also understood to include
other corporate resources, including core assets and the provision of access to
corporate stakeholders, including customers, corporate partners, and the broader
public, to which companies have access (e.g., through their media outlets) (Meijs and
Voort 2004). While corporate philanthropy was once dominated by grant-making,
companies are increasingly becoming engaged in venture philanthropy, including
the application of tailored or hybrid financing, non-financial support, and impact
management (Buckland et al. 2013).
In addition to the changes outlined above, the act of corporate philanthropy is
undergoing changes in terms of the governance structures that companies choose
in order to channel their corporate philanthropy, as they become increasingly
aware of the importance of creating social impact (Alhouti et al. 2016). Companies
are increasingly establishing separate legal entities (e.g., foundations) instead of
in-house programs, in order to safeguard their social-impact ambitions and to
separate their corporate philanthropy from their day-to-day business, given the
inherently different interests of these aspects (social versus commercial). Corporate
philanthropy can nevertheless be closely aligned to what a company does or
considers important (Bethmann and Schnurbein 2020; European Venture Philanthropy
Association 2019; Heitmann et al. 2020). By having a public benefit purpose with no
direct commercial goals, corporate philanthropy—particularly as expressed through
legal entities like corporate foundations—can be distinguished from other forms
of business–society involvement (e.g., corporate sponsorship or corporate social
responsibility), which clearly entail social investments, with a direct, inherently
commercial goal.
Managing corporate foundations to create positive social change is not easy.
The governance structure poses a range of challenges, including: (1) the reason and
purpose for which the foundation exists (i.e., commercial or social); (2) the actors
3 The figures from Europe and the United States are not entirely comparable, as the definition and
measurement of giving differ across studies. They nevertheless provide a good indication of the relative
size of this sub-sector within the broader universe of philanthropy.
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who actually govern the foundation, and the logics by which they make decisions
(i.e., philanthropic or commercial); and (3) the entities to which the foundation is
accountable and for what reason (i.e., the company or society, and for business goals
or social impact) (Renz et al. 2020). In light of such fundamental governance questions,
the management of a foundation established by a single company or entrepreneur
is challenging enough. The situation becomes even more difficult for foundations
involving multiple partners, each with unique motivations, interests, logic, and so
forth. One example of such a complex structure occurs when companies jointly
establish a “collective corporate foundation”. Maas (2020) studied this phenomenon
within the Port of Rotterdam (Netherlands), in which more than 70 companies
from various industries, but within the same geographical area, converge their
philanthropic giving, with the aim of developing that region. According to Maas,
the decision to participate in such a partnership implies the following for a company:
(1) loss of control, (2) loss of involvement, and (3) fewer individual organizational
benefits (Maas 2020). These elements are usually regarded as important factors
for developing regular corporate foundations or philanthropic programs within a
particular company. The situation could be even more challenging if the partners are
also competitors.
In addition to these challenges, collective involvement in the creation of positive
social change could potentially have multiple societal benefits as well. In addition to
its direct investments in social innovations, the foundation must have an implicit or
explicit potential to persuade the companies that are involved in the foundation to
become more inclusive and/or sustainable. While these characteristics clearly increase
the complexity of managing such organizations, they also hold a vast potential for
generating positive social change.
It is important to investigate these specific forms of collaboration aimed at
creating positive social change, as traditional ways of addressing grand challenges
have proven insufficient. The adoption of such non-commercial strategies by
companies is of particular interest, given the need to look beyond market-based
solutions in order to maximize the possibility of investing in solutions to grand
challenges. As noted before, this chapter focuses on industry foundations, which can
play an important role in helping companies within the same industry to align
themselves to the Sustainable Development Goals. This is because industry
foundations are more focused, decisive, and involve greater readiness for immediate
action than do industry associations, which must represent the interests of a much
broader membership (Watkins et al. 2015), despite their role as enablers (Dalziel 2006)
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and regulators (Vogel 2010) of innovation. Later in this chapter we illustrate the
potential and complexity of an industry foundation.
3. Method and Data
The research on which this chapter is based draws on a single instrumental
case study (Stake 1995), which is used to illustrate the phenomenon at hand by
applying concepts from theory (Yin 2011). We applied a qualitative method, in order
to arrive at an in-depth description and explanation. The case focuses on the Water
Revolution Foundation, which provides an example of a specific manifestation of
a non-commercial collaborative strategy aimed at creating positive social change.
The foundation aims to transform the global superyacht industry to make it more
sustainable and to preserve marine life (SDG 14). This objective is manifested in
activities relating to three focal areas: “promoting new technology and empowering
innovation; pro-actively creating the industry’s own sustainability agenda, going
beyond legislative requirements; and reinvesting in ocean conservation.”4 For our
study, we adopted an approach combining a dialogic qualitative interview design with
member validation (Harvey 2015; Charmaz 2006). Interviews were semi-structured,
including topics such as motives, establishment of the foundation, governance,
management and decision-making processes and a future outlook. We started by
interviewing the managing director (September 2019, by telephone, about 90 min),
and familiarizing ourselves with the case by studying the website, the annual report,
and the internal documentation shared with us by the managing director. To improve
our understanding of the case, we held a follow-up interview with the managing
director (October 2019, by telephone, about 60 min). For the purpose of member
validation (Charmaz 2006), we held a third conversation with the managing director
(November 2019, by telephone, 30 min, as well as by e-mail), in order to verify that
the facts presented in the case provided a faithful reflection of reality.
4. Results
The Case: Water Revolution Foundation
All around the globe, people within the same industry come together at
conferences (see e.g., Van Waarden 1992), meeting for coffee to share ideas
about joining forces, to set aside their mutual competition in order to collaborate
4 https://waterrevolutionfoundation.org/our-plans/ (accessed on 19 July 2020).
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on improving the industry and society. Popular ways of pursuing such goals
include partnerships (within or across sectors), and the creation of alliances and
coalitions. Examples include the Rainforest Alliance5 and the Palm Oil Transparency
Coalition6 (see also Nikoloyuk et al. 2010), which focus on advancing the industry’s
contributions to the Sustainable Development Goals. Industry foundations constitute
a more permanent form of serving both the industry and the broader community.
Examples include the industry foundations established in the entertainment industry,7
the insurance industry,8) and—more recently—the superyacht industry.
Around 2015, an Italian sustainability scholar became involved with the Italian
superyacht builder Viareggio SuperYachts (VSY). As the first sustainability manager
within the superyacht industry, she proposed developing a sustainability measurement
tool that could calculate the footprint of superyachts, both existing and in the design
or construction phase. As an academic, her intention was to develop this tool not
only for this specific organization, but also for the public domain. The tool would,
thus, ultimately not be able to enhance the competitive advantage of the company
within which it was developed. It would nevertheless serve an industry which, as a
whole, was in need of a transition toward more sustainable practices. This would
enable the superyacht industry to become a leader within the broader maritime sector.
As she began to develop the instrument, she met with other actors in the industry
(e.g., competitors, suppliers) at conferences and, more specifically, at the meetings
of the Superyacht Builders Association. In early 2017, the secretariat of the industry
association brought together a select group of like-minded, forward-thinking industry
leaders who were eager to develop disruptive sustainable innovations for the industry
as a whole. They saw two major opportunities. First, such innovations could help
the industry to respond to institutional pressures and changes in the market that
are demanding greater environmental sustainability. Second, such initiatives could
enable the industry to take a leading role in preserving marine life (SDG 14), thereby
preserving the primary reason for their customers to own superyachts.
At the same time, when considering how to respond to these opportunities,
the industry leaders arrived at three realizations. First, change cannot happen
through individual organizational efforts alone; the entire industry must hold itself
accountable for increasing the sustainability of its practices. Second, creating this
5 https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/ (accessed on 19 July 2020).
6 https://www.palmoiltransparency.org/about/ (accessed on 19 July 2020).
7 https://www.eifoundation.org/ (accessed on 19 July 2020).
8 https://www.iicf.org/ (accessed on 19 July 2020).
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change would be unlikely to occur at the needed pace if the efforts were organized
through sustainability committees within the industry association. Given the inherent
nature of an association, change efforts organized in this manner would most probably
be defined by the members with the most conservative notions, regarding the shift to
more sustainable practices. A simpler governance construction was needed. Third,
the ideas and ambitions that the industry leaders held with regard to changing the
industry standards toward greater sustainability would also need broader support
from other industry stakeholders (e.g., governments, NGOs, consumers), in addition
to the members of the association.
The bold ambitions of some industry leaders and the realization that achieving
these ambitions and changing the industry standards would require joint efforts
led to the establishment of the Water Revolution Foundation. In addition to the
founders, the first anchor partners included nine leading companies within the
industry: Abeking and Rasmussen, Alexseal, Amels|Damen, Benetti, Feadship,
Heesen, Lürssen, MB92, and Rybovich. The members of this “coalition of the willing”
shared the belief that a change in course was needed in order to take better care of
the planet, while guaranteeing the future of the industry.
The founders presented their ideas for a new industry foundation at an annual
industry forum in November 2018. In their presentation, they formalized their
commitment with the notary, who was waiting outside the room with the statutes
and by-laws. This marked the official birth of the Water Revolution Foundation.
The foundation’s mission is “to drive sustainability in the superyacht industry
through collaboration and innovation and leading the way to neutralise its ecological
footprint and preserve the world’s precious oceans.”(Water Revolotion Foundation
2019) The founders consider this mission necessary, as “the superyacht industry
uses valuable resources and has an environmental impact. We [as actors in the
superyacht industry] have both an obligation and an opportunity to reduce our
footprint and future-proof our industry.” The Water Revolution Foundation focuses
on sustainability, with the goal of enabling their customers to “discover 71% of
the planet, free from restrictions and environmental impact.” The figure to which
this statement refers is the amount of the Earth’s surface that is covered by oceans.
The foundation thus aims to serve as a platform for closer collaboration within the
superyacht industry, in order to accomplish the necessary shift together. The founders
further claim that the superyacht industry is in a good position to influence the
wider maritime industry, fulfilling an innovative role similar to that of Formula
1 in the auto industry. In addition, the superyacht industry has many affluent
customers, who could potentially become influential powers for positive social
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change, as new technologies can allow superyachts to become prototypes—and even
mini-laboratories—supporting research aimed at preserving marine life.
Based on the joint investment of several players within the industry, the founders
planned a three-year budget. For 2019, they allocated 250,000 EUR, increasing to
300,000 EUR in 2020 and to 500,000 EUR in 2021. The following pillars of investment
were adopted:
1. Technology: “Promoting new technology and empowering innovation to
achieve a lighter footprint for the superyachting industry.” The foundation is
currently supporting the development of the aforementioned science-based
tool for assessing the social and environmental impact of yachts. This tool
will help those active within the superyacht industry to make more informed
decisions in the design and construction of superyachts and to report on
measurable progress.
2. Policy: “Pro-actively create the industry’s own agenda, beyond legislative
developments, initiating progressive steps and actively being part of
international and cross-industry worktables.” The foundation collects and
promotes sustainable solutions by sharing information and best practices.
These efforts aim to establish a new industry culture of open-source sustainability.
In this light, the foundation seeks to develop and operate an educational program
on sustainability, customized primarily to the superyacht industry. In this way,
they hope to educate professionals within the industry about sustainability,
thereby making sustainability as accessible as possible, while encouraging and
facilitating change.
3. Conservation: “Looking after nature for ecosystems’ vitality, human well-being
and yachting habitats.” This pillar involves taking responsibility for protecting
the beautiful oceans and improving the planet’s well-being. The foundation
plans to play an active role in advising industry players on where they should
invest their philanthropic resources in order to support the ecosystems of
marine life.
After establishing the foundation, the board of directors fine-tuned its governance
and organization. To the founders, it was important to have an industry-wide
representation on the board, in order to ensure the foundation’s legitimacy and
influence in every aspect of the industry. The initiating sustainability scientist and
a non-profit financial expert were also on the board, given the foundation’s aim
to increase the sustainability of the superyacht industry. In 2019, the foundation
had three main organizational bodies. At the time of writing, the board of directors
consisted of seven members (two superyacht builders, a refit shipyard, a designer,
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a sustainability scientist, an industry media expert, a financial expert, and a non-profit
expert). In addition, there was a scientific board that consists of various experts in
the areas of sustainability, marine biology and ocean conservation, innovation and
technology, and economics. The scientific board advised the board of directors and
foundation partners accordingly. The two boards were supported by a secretariat,
which was headed by the executive director.
Another decision was to apply for the status of a public benefit organization
(PBO; in Dutch: ANBI), with an officially recognized charitable status with the tax
authority in the Netherlands. This decision made it necessary for the managing
director—one of the original founding board members—to resign from the board,
as the regulations for such organizations require distance between the agent and
the principal.
5. Discussion
The case of the Water Revolution Foundation provides an illustration of a
contemporary development in which companies enter partnerships with each
other in new organizational forms within civil society in order to address grand
challenges. In addition to the more traditional industry associations, industry
foundations embrace specific—perhaps even novel—collective organizational
governance structures that enable more progressive action. As demonstrated by the
case study, industry foundations can potentially play a variety of roles in creating
positive social change. For example, the foundation form enables self-selected
companies from the same industry to join forces to address less optimal social and
environmental conditions within the industry (thereby making it more sustainable).
In addition, a foundation enables its members to address issues that could create
a more favorable context for the industry (e.g., ocean conservation), which might
not have been recognized by all of the industry members in the association. Finally,
an industry foundation can address or resolve issues created by the industry (e.g.,
the consequences of carbon emissions) on a larger scale than would be possible for
an individual corporate foundation.
5.1. A Specific Species?
The industry-level origins and perspectives of industry foundations differentiate
them from corporate foundations (Roza et al. 2020) and other collective or
corporate arrangements (Maas 2020; Roza et al. 2020), multi-stakeholder initiatives
(Dentoni et al. 2018), and non-public-benefit industry associations (Watkins et al.
2015). In contrast to single-donor corporate foundations, industry foundations have
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multiple donors and participants, each with unique individual motivations and
interests, but committed to a collective goal (in our case, increasing the sustainability
of the superyacht industry). This characteristic serves to limit the risk that such
foundations will focus primarily on serving the donors, as is sometimes the case with
regular corporate foundations or partnerships. In theory, an industry foundation
could also enjoy greater power and legitimacy within the industry, as they do not
advance any individual interests—a common source of criticism concerning corporate
foundations (Herlin and Pedersen 2013; Roza et al. 2020).
Industry foundations (or at least the Water Revolution Foundation) also differ
from collective corporate foundations and collective business efforts aimed at certain
geographical areas (Maas 2020). Such collective corporate foundations are closer to
community foundations, especially when their decision-making power is allocated to
the local community (through the composition of their governing boards). The Water
Revolution Foundation does not have the objective of supporting social issues within
a particular geographical area. Instead, it aims to effect change within a particular
industry (in this case, as a niche industry). The board members represent the industry
and the funders, with the voice of the community (i.e., the social issue at hand) being
incorporated through an advisory board.
Given the representation of multiple actors in the organization, industry
foundations can be regarded as multi-stakeholder initiatives. They do not usually
constitute cross-sector initiatives, however, as they are not actually separate from
the corporate world and have no previous existence as civil society organizations.
In addition, industry foundations include only actors who are directly involved in
the industry (and thus not those who might be affected). Nevertheless, the Water
Revolution Foundation does engage in cross-sector partnerships with educational
institutions, academic institutions, and non-profit organizations (for a review on
cross-sector partnerships, see Austin and Seitanidi 2012a, 2012b). Like any foundation,
therefore, industry foundations should be scrutinized with regard to the extent to
which they serve a public mission (instead of a private membership mission, as is
the case with industry associations). Such scrutiny should thus focus on whether
the day-to-day operations of industry foundations serve this mission, instead of the
donors. Given that only the industry is represented in the highest decision-making
body of an industry foundation, it should be closely monitored in order to ensure that
its focus remains fixed on creating positive social change that is inherently beyond
the interests of the instigators of such transformation (Stephan et al. 2016).
Finally, the Water Revolution Foundation explicitly positions itself as independent
of the industry association. Even more specifically, it was established as a direct response
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to the limits of the industry association. In this regard, the industry association is
intended to support the interests of its full membership, and not all of these members
would be eager to accelerate the pace at which the industry is increasing its sustainability.
Such differences could increase the costs or complexity of the processes for some who
are not yet ready for change. At the same time, however, the case highlights many
similarities between the goals of the foundation and the association. This could be
a source of confusion concerning the role of the foundation from the perspective of
stakeholders (e.g., governments, NGOs, customers, and the general public). Who should
be addressed for what? Is there a hidden agenda? Why is the industry foundation not
part of the industry association, given that they both support the same industry?
5.2. Public, Private or Limited Benefit?
The Water Revolution Foundation’s application for the status of a public benefit
organization illustrates another characteristic that distinguishes industry foundations
from industry associations, which are based on non-public-benefit purposes. The aims
of industry foundations are nevertheless similar to those of individual corporate
foundations (Roza et al. 2020). Given that public benefit organizations have a special
tax status in many countries, their funders receive tax exemptions. It is therefore
becoming increasingly important for the Water Revolution Foundation to explain
the actual public benefits of changing industry standards. One potential question of
critics might concern why taxpayers should support a foundation that contributes
to increasing the sustainability of a commercial industry, given that such a mission
would not be tax deductible for donors when adopted by the industry association
or one of its member companies. The extent of overlap between the goals of the
foundation and those of the industry association could arguably make it more difficult
for the foundation to claim that its goal is public instead of private (i.e., for members
of the association). Relevant questions in this regard concern why a public benefit
organization is needed and why its goals are not the responsibility of the industry
association or the individual companies, given that any efforts to achieve these goals
will ultimately support their much-needed transition toward sustainability.
Understanding the nuances discussed above requires a refined perspective on
social impact, private benefit, and public benefit. The goal of changing industry
standards is intended to challenge and transform the current system and to accelerate
the process of change. The foundation firmly believes that the industry’s logical
connection with and contribution to marine life will continue to be absent without
changes to the current practices within the commercial industry. Even if the
foundation were to invest in NGOs, unless the business practices within the
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industry are changed, such investments would have to swim against the current
of unsustainable practices, thus being unlikely to result in any positive sustainable
social change. Like other public benefit organizations (e.g., the C&A Foundation
and Fashion for Good in the apparel industry), the Water Revolution Foundation
acknowledges the importance of creating social impact—and thus public benefit—by
changing how the market sector works and by eventually sharing such knowledge
and solutions with other maritime industries.
To this end, the foundation has designed a vision, mission, and goal that go
beyond the interest of the industry itself, thereby aiming to create positive social change
(Stephan et al. 2016). Such a public benefit mission could enable the foundation to be a
vehicle for introducing sustainability into the sector. As a public benefit organization
supported by key players within the industry, the foundation is regarded as a credible
and legitimate partner within the transition toward sustainability. The foundation
can use this position to influence both the committed organizations and all actors
involved in the industry. For example, the measurement tool and the database will
be available through open access, and thus freely accessible to the public domain,
and not exclusively to the foundation’s funding partners. It is in this regard—the use
of a public benefit foundation to invest long-term (i.e., “patient”) philanthropic capital
to develop a tool that will become publicly available—that the construction fits within
the norms of the philanthropic sector. The challenge for the foundation is to keep this
public benefit at heart, and not to fall into mission drift and take on the mantle of the
industry association by shifting the primary focus to the interests of the industry.
This study describes a specific collective arrangement between companies
within a single niche industry aimed at creating positive social change. It is obviously
subject to several limitations, which in turn suggest avenues for future research.
First, although the method of data collection was appropriate to the purpose of
the study, it could also have been informed by third parties. Second, because
the Water Revolution Foundation is relatively new, while the creation of positive
social change requires long-term commitment, it is difficult to say whether the
foundation will eventually lead to success. It would therefore be interesting to follow
the case closely over the coming years to gain a deeper understanding of these
organizational structures and their contribution to positive social change and the
SDGs, in addition to assessing whether it is actually a promising partnership for
development. It would also be interesting to identify any conflicts that might arise
among the various stakeholders, in addition to tracking the foundation’s impact on
its founding companies and the industry at large. This could also provide insight into
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developments in governance, stakeholder perceptions on the role and functioning of
such foundations, and—more broadly—on how we regard social impact.
6. Conclusions
The resolution of grand challenges and the achievement of the Sustainable
Development Goals requires new and innovative collective collaborative arrangements
and partnerships (SDG 17). This chapter highlights one potentially promising collective
arrangement that is emerging as a way to address grand challenges; the industry
foundation. Our analysis of the single case of the Water Revolution Foundation
leads to three main conclusions. First, an industry foundation differs from other
non-commercial structures rooted in companies (e.g., philanthropy departments,
corporate foundations, collective corporate foundations, industry associations, and
multi-stakeholder initiatives). Second, the challenges faced by industry foundations are
comparable to those faced by corporate foundations with regard to legitimizing their
public benefit, as questions could arise concerning the extent to which it exists truly for
the public benefit or whether it serves a private interest in disguise (as is quite overt
within the industry association). Third, one major potential of an industry foundation
is that the actors involved are part of the industry: they know the possibilities and
limitations of the industry and are trusted by others within the industry. This type of
non-commercial activity or foundation could serve as a “coalition of the willing” by
bringing together front-runners who can actually accelerate change within an industry.
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Building Strong Partnership for SDGs:
Analyzing Participation of
Nigerian Stakeholders
Okechukwu Enechi and Philipp Pattberg
1. Introduction
The United Nations 2030 Agenda for sustainable development constitutes
the blueprint for peace, prosperity, and a healthy planet, and the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) provide the necessary guidance in terms of targets
and indicators. SDG 17 emphasizes the critical importance of partnerships for
sustainable development, based on the assumption that partnerships will mobilize
a wide range of stakeholders in the sharing of knowledge, expertise, technology,
and resources towards achieving the global agenda. Multi-stakeholder partnerships
(MSPs), since their emergence in the sphere of global public policy making, influence
sustainability governance towards achieving sustainable development. In over two
decades, partnerships have emerged not just as actors in sustainability governance
but agents with the “ability to prescribe and obtain the consent of the governed”
(Biermann et al. 2009). The concept of MSPs is often advocated as one of the
most participatory and effective mechanisms available to enhance sustainability
governance (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016; Pattberg et al. 2019). However, empirical
studies have shown that partnership arrangements are often unable to deliver
on their goals (Beirmann et al. 2012) and are challenged by lack of participation
and inclusiveness, possibly resulting in unbalanced representation, in particular
in the Global South. The region of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is no exception.
Limited inclusiveness often results in incoherence in agenda-setting, contested
decision-making processes, and suboptimal (and sometimes no) outcomes of
partnership initiatives (Compagnon 2012; Gereke and Bruhl 2019; Read et al. 2019).
Yet, transitioning to strong partnerships for achieving the SDG 17 requires increased
participation and inclusiveness that enhances the role and influence of partnerships
towards achieving the SDGs. Participation and inclusive criteria in the design and
governance of partnerships guarantee that local context and specific sustainability
priorities are taken into account. In addition, participation and inclusiveness increase
legitimacy, optimism for effective outcome and confidence of achieving domestic
resource mobilization required for the localization of the implementation of the global
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agenda. Consequently, research needs to urgently explore how multi-stakeholder
partnerships can achieve increased participation and inclusiveness by mobilizing
underrepresented stakeholders. Against this background, this chapter analyzes
inclusiveness and representation related to stakeholders from the SSA region.
Using Nigeria as a case study, we explore participation of Nigerian stakeholders
in multi-stakeholder partnerships, focusing on perceived obstacles to participation
and inclusiveness.
Over 150 stakeholders comprising nation-states, subnational actors,
non-governmental organizations (NGO), businesses, and academics participate
in the 134 multi-stakeholder partnerships registered, as of 15 December 2019, on the
Partnerships for SDGs online platform, self-reporting implementation in Nigeria.1
In analyzing the participation and inclusiveness of MSPs in Nigeria,
we formulated three key questions: Is the participation of stakeholders in partnerships
spread or skewed? Is stakeholders’ participation in partnerships participatory and
inclusive? And finally, is the participation of local/regional stakeholders adding
value to the agenda-setting and decision-making process?
The chapter is organized as follows: first, we will review the Partnerships
for SDGs online platform, focusing on MSPs implemented in Nigeria. Second,
using survey data on SSA partnerships, we analyze the perceived factors hindering
participation in MSPs. Finally, the chapter discusses the impacts of limited
participation on partnerships in relation to agenda-setting, decision-making
processes, and outcomes. Understanding Nigerian stakeholder participation in
multi-stakeholder partnerships will offer an opportunity for the reflection required
for building strong and effective partnerships for the SDGs.
2. The Concepts of Participation and Inclusiveness
The United Nations, in adopting the SDGs in 2015, stressed that its successful
achievement is dependent on adoption of an inclusive and participatory approach
in implementation. Inclusiveness and participation are regarded as key features
of pluralism. Participatory and inclusive structures tend to facilitate decision
making, implementation, and acceptance as well as ensuring transparency
and accountability (Glass and Newig 2019). These concepts are viewed as core
criteria towards establishing the legitimacy of decision-making processes that
have collective impact. Inclusiveness and participation are viewed from two
1 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships (accessed on 29 July 2020).
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dimensions. While inclusiveness connotes involvement in a process, participation
is understood as the ability of the participants to make inputs to policies
(Quick and Feldman 2011). Inclusiveness and participation, therefore, are tools
directed at mobilizing affected stakeholders to be represented in the decision-making
process (Backstrand et al. 2012). By this means, accelerating a bottom-up governance
approach in the implementation of the SDGs is also stressed in the SDGs
declaration. Bottom-up governance approaches, characterized by inclusion and
participation of stakeholders, are only effective when they are accepted by all
stakeholders with measurable representation in decision-making (Kelly et al. 2016).
However, while inclusiveness and participation tend to increase the legitimacy of
a decision-making process, the effects of inclusiveness and participation criteria
on effectiveness vary (Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2013). This is as a result of several
factors, including: types of stakeholders participating, pattern of participation,
and under or over representation of stakeholders in the decision-making process
(Malex et al. 2019; Backstrand et al. 2012). Therefore, satisfying these criteria requires
determination of several factors, including type of stakeholders and level of
participation that would add value with positive effect on agenda-setting and
outcome (Schmalzbauer and Visbeck 2016). However, despite the UN declaration on
the implementation of SDGs through multi-stakeholder partnerships via an inclusive
and participatory approach, the SSA region is underrepresented in partnerships
(Backstrand et al. 2012). Therefore, our study on partnership, focusing on the
SSA, will analyze issues of limited participation and inclusiveness; we will also
suggest paths towards increased participation of the region in partnerships, thereby
accelerating the achievement of SDG 17.
3. Multi-Stakeholder Partnership: Definitions and Meaning
The concept of partnership denotes interactions of both state and non-state
actors that is voluntary and collaborative, as well as sharing risks, resources,
and responsibility (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016). The social science literature
describes public–private partnership or multi-stakeholder partnership as a platform
for the interaction of the public and private sphere to provide collective public goods
and services (Schaferhoff et al. 2009). Specifically, it is understood as an opportunity
for non-state and state actors, including businesses, NGOs, academics as well as
subnational actors such as municipalities, cities, and regions to contribute towards
achieving global sustainable development goals (Pattberg and Stripple 2008). Through
the provision of voluntary commitments alongside the state, partnerships have been
identified as a significant part of the global sustainability governance architecture,
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particularly in the implementation of the SDGs. Regarding definition, there is no
universally accepted definition of multi-stakeholder partnership. However, available
definitions of partnership have centered on criteria related to actors, functionality,
institutionalization, transnationalism, voluntariness, shared risks and responsibilities,
goals, collective goods, governance, among others (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016).
Partnerships for sustainable development provide governance functions—producing
and/or distributing collective goods and services. Therefore, the concept is described
as an institutionalized collaboration between the private and public actors aimed at
providing collective goods (Schaferhoff et al. 2009).
4. Methods and Material
4.1. Methods
For this study, we analyzed data from the Partnerships for SDGs online platform
and conducted a survey of stakeholders participating in partnerships in Nigeria.
First, we started with the overall universe of cases, the more than 5000 partnerships
registered on the Partnerships for SDGs online platform (as of 2020), and subsequently,
filtered for partnerships indicating activities in Nigeria, which resulted in a
total of 134 cases. We, then, categorized the MSPs into having either a primary
global or national focus. We relied on the scope of membership and geographic
implementation as criteria for the categorization. For example, a partnership
with transnational membership and implementation is categorized as globally
focused, while a partnership with national membership and implementation scope is
categorized as nationally focused. We consequently identified more than 150 unique
stakeholders, including NGOs, academics, federal agencies, subnational agencies,
and business actors.
Second, the data for analysis of the perceived constraints are sourced from a
broader international survey on MSPs, with a special focus on the SSA region,
aimed at identifying the regional actors participating in MSPs, their level of
participation, their motives, and potential impacts. The survey was based on the
SurveyMonkey online survey tool and analyzed 36 Nigeria respondents’ responses.
While 120 Nigerian stakeholders identified from the online platform participated
in the broader survey, 36 (response rate 30%) reacted to the survey question on
perceived obstacles to participation in partnership for the SDGs. Categories of
stakeholders that responded to the survey are members of the Non-governmental
Organization (NGO), Business, Business Association, Academic (Research institutes),
and National government agencies. The core criterion to participate in the survey
was that respondents were geographically located in SSA. Among other things,
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the survey asked respondents to rank on a scale from 1 to 4 (1—Most Hindering
Factor; 2—More Hindering Factor; 3—Hindering Factor; 4—Less Hindering Factor)
what they perceived as hindering factors that constrain stakeholder participation
in partnerships.
Using the Partnerships for SDGs online platform has its limitations, as the
number of partnerships on the platform changes on daily basis. Therefore, the study
relied on data available on the online platform as of 15 December 2019. In addition,
the platform does not verify the authenticity of the multi-stakeholder arrangement
registered on the platform. However, the platform has become a starting point for
measuring stakeholder participation in the implementation of the SDGs.
4.2. Partnerships for SDGs Online Platform
The Partnerships for SDGs online platform was created to register voluntary
commitments and MSPs in support of implementing the SDGs. The Partnerships
for SDGs online platform is a UN global registry of voluntary commitments and
multi-stakeholder partnerships, managed by the UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (DSDG/DESA). The platform is also expected to facilitate knowledge
and expertise sharing among stakeholders and partnerships. Actors interested
in registering partnerships or voluntary commitments are expected to satisfy the
SMART criteria. The SMART criteria require that the registered initiative should
be specific, measurable, achievable, resource-based, and time-bound. Aligning the
MSP initiatives registered on the platform to the SMART criteria requires that
initiatives are directed at contributing to achieving goals and targets with measurable
indicators. It also requires that registered initiatives are achievable with attainable
goals, secured resources, and time-specific deliverables. Generally, the platform has
emerged as one of the key tools in monitoring and tracking SDG 17 implementation.
The Partnerships for SDGs online platform visualizes an improved number of
partnerships commitments linked to achieving the global goals, particularly in the
SSA region.
Globally, over 5000 partnership commitments are registered on the platform as
of 15 December 2019, focused on achieving one or several goals of the SDGs. Out of
this, 171 indicated implemented activities in Kenya, 127 indicated implementing
in South Africa, and 134 indicated implemention in Nigeria. This is an increase
of 11 partnerships registered on the online platform (approx. 9% increase in number
of partnership commitments) from 123 in May 2018, self-reporting implementation
in Nigeria. Figure 1 above shows the distribution of MSPs that self-reported
implementation in sub-Saharan African countries. Nigeria is strategic in the
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achievement of the SDG in the sub-Saharan African region. With its current growth
rate and sustainable development challenges, implementation of Agenda 2030 in
Nigeria will have effects on the SSA region as a whole, hence, the selection of Nigeria
as a case study for this study.
Figure 1. Multi-Stakeholders Partnerships Implementation by SSA Countries. Data
sourced from Partnerships for SDGs online platform (https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/partnerships).
As presented in Figure 2, the 134 partnerships implemented in Nigeria comprised
of initiatives linked to one or more of the SDGs. SDG 5 (39) has the highest number of
multi-stakeholder partnerships, followed by SDG 4 (33), SSDG 3 (32), and SDG 1 (31).
SDG 17, which is on strengthening partnerships for the implementation of the global
agenda, has 31 partnership commitments. SDG 10 (8) has attracted the lowest
number of partnerships. In short, partnerships may favor implementation of one
goal over others. For instance, more partnerships are focused on addressing SDG 5
(achieving gender equality and empower all women and girls) than partnerships
linking their actions to addressing SDG 10 (reduce inequality within and among
countries). While Nigeria continues to highlight the importance of implementing
innovative initiatives in its energy sector and solving cross cutting environmental,
social, and economic issues, only 16 partnerships currently indicate that their actions
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are focused on SDG 7 (ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all).
However, a visualization of the number of multi-stakeholder partnerships on
the platform tends to suggest increased optimism and hope of accelerating the
implementation of the global sustainability agenda (Chan et al. 2019). Observing all
shades of partnership arrangements on the platform suggests the involvement of
all stakeholders, thereby increasing the optimism of bridging implementation gaps
and addressing democratic deficits in sustainability governance process, particularly
satisfying the criteria of representative, participatory, and inclusiveness norms
(Pattberg and Widerberg 2016). Yet, are the arrangements focusing on Nigeria
inclusive and participatory?
Figure 2. MSP Initiatives by SDGs (Partnerships for SDGs online Platform—data
sourced from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships).
4.3. Case Study Context—Nigeria
Nigeria is situated in Western Africa and is the largest economy in the SSA
region, with an estimated GDP of 376.284 billion US Dollars. The country is the largest
producer of crude oil in Africa and the sixth largest producer in the world, making it
a key member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Nigeria has an estimated population of about 200 million with a projection that the
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population will practically double in 2050 to about 411 million. With this projected
population, Nigeria would be the third most populous country in 2050, behind India
and China. Regarding political structure, Nigeria is divided into 37 subnational
entities (states) and 774 local governments. Despite its position in the region, Nigeria is
confronted with several sustainable development challenges. For example, Nigeria is
confronted with sustainable development issues such as high poverty rate, high youth
unemployment, irregular migration, low access to electricity (with only 54.4% of
population having access nationally and only 1 in 4 persons connected to the grid in
the rural areas), and environmental degradation arising from exploitation of fossil fuel
(OSSAP-SDGs 2017; SEforALL n.d.; The World Bank n.d.). Nigeria’s environmental
sustainability challenges are diverse and varied, ranging from intense flooding as a
result of a rise in sea level in Lagos and other cities in the southern and north central
regions; desertification rampaging the northern part of the country; the shrinking
of Lake Chad in the northeast region of the country. These challenges are causing
human insecurity in the form of loss of livelihood, dwindling agricultural production,
and in some instances, dangerous tensions and armed conflicts arising from climate
change-induced migration. Like other sub-Saharan African countries, Nigeria suffers
from resource constraints, weak institutional capacities, infrastructural deficits, and is
fraught with a fragile socio-political environment that is hindering efforts towards
tackling these problems. Nigeria, like other countries in the SSA, is active in the
implementation of the SDGs and incorporated them into its national policies and
strategies. For example, Nigeria has, since the inception of the SDG, embarked on
policy reforms aimed at harmonization and integration of SDGs into its development
plan at the national level. Nigeria presented its national voluntary review (NVR) in
2017 and 2020, detailing SDG implementation progress; Nigeria has also developed
a homegrown analytical framework, Integrated Sustainable Development Goals
(iSDG), for assessing policymaking impact on the SDGs. In recognition of the
importance of partnership in the implementation of the SDGs and to accelerate
achieving SDG 17, Nigeria’s National Strategy provides an institutional framework
for engaging stakeholders, through Private Sector Group on SDGs, Development
Partners on SDGs, and Civil Society Advisory Group on SDGs (OSSAP-SDGs 2017).
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5. Results
5.1. Analysis of Stakeholder Participation in Partnerships
5.1.1. Stakeholder Participation: Spread or Skewed?
In total, 134 out of over 5000 partnerships and commitments registered on the
Partnerships for SDGs platform self-reported that they are implementing (some of)
their activities in Nigeria. The activities differ in terms of their composition of
actors, focus of initiative, and geographical scope of implementation. While some
of the partnerships are global in character (i.e., transnational membership and
implementation scope), others are national in character with national membership
and scope of implementation. As presented in Figure 3, 45% of the MSPs that
self-report implementing (some of) their activities in Nigeria are nationally focused,
while 55% are globally focused. A simple view of the different multi-stakeholder
partnerships registered on the platform, without any systematic scrutiny, suggests
improved participation and inclusiveness of stakeholders. Against this background,
it may be concluded that we are witnessing, in fact, a bottom-up governance
approach, as envisioned in SDG 17. However, our critical analysis of the data
suggests that membership of most of the multi-stakeholder partnerships on the
platform does not represent a spread in participation but that membership remains
skewed. First, in terms of spread, analysis of the data shows that the membership of
global focused partnerships is dominated by stakeholders from the Global North.
Second, the nationally focused partnerships are dominated by non-government
organization with limited membership of stakeholders at the subnational and local
level. In addition, the nationally focused partnerships have no clearly defined
governance structure, required for coordination and policy influencing. Generally,
our review of the membership of partnerships implemented in Nigeria indicates
unbalance. Yet, proponents of multi-stakeholder partnerships in policy making
have often pointed at the number of partnerships on the platform as an indication
of inclusion and participation. However, numbers alone do not translate into an
inclusive and participatory partnership, thereby posing fundamental governance
risk to policy makers. For example, skewed participation, rather than strengthening
the capacity of participating stakeholders, may distort equitable distribution of
development and, thereby, strengthen business interests using the partnership
platform (Mert and Chan 2012).
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Figure 3. Implementation scope of MSPs in Nigeria (Partnerships for SDGs online
Platform—Data sourced from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships).
5.1.2. Participation and Inclusivity
Visualizing stakeholder participation shows diverse participation of stakeholders
ranging from state actors to non-state actors, including NGOs, businesses, business
associations, academics, and community development associations. More than
150 stakeholders participate in 134 partnerships registered on the platform and
indicate implementation in Nigeria. While NGOs and the federal government
(through their agencies) dominate membership and leadership of (nationally
focused) partnerships, local government and community level-based actors are,
by and large, absent. All in all, NGOs, nation-state actors, and business are the
dominant participants (88%) in partnerships. In addition, a review of membership of
partnerships shows that globally focused partnerships are dominated by national
actors. Another finding is that participation of subnational actors and academics
is limited, and that local governments are absent from partnerships. Figure 4
below illustrates the distribution of stakeholders’ participation, showing that 43%
are NGOs and 26% are business stakeholders, while 19% are nation-state agencies.
The partnerships that the subnational actors participate in are usually project-specific,
designed, and coordinated by international organizations such as UNDP, UNICEF,
World Bank, etc. This trend does not support the bottom-up sustainability governance
approach as envisaged in the implementation of the SDGs, which stresses participation
and inclusiveness, in the implementation of global Agenda 2030, thereby posing major
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governance risk to the multi-stakeholder partnership arrangements, particularly in
the design of its initiatives. First, the trend makes it difficult to and complicated
in reflecting local priorities into its implementation and decision-making process.
Second, the NGOs participating in most of the nationally focused partnerships
often are constrained by lack of structure, resources, and capacity, thereby posing
an accountability risk. In addition, the lack of participation and inclusiveness, for
instance, may further exacerbate uneven global distribution of knowledge, which
equips stakeholders for quality participation (van der Molen 2018).
Figure 4. Category of Stakeholders Participating in MSPs (Partnerships for SDGs online
Platform—Data sourced from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships).
5.1.3. Quality Participation: Value Added or Rhetoric?
SDG 17 emphasizes that inclusive and participatory stakeholder participation
through partnerships will add value to the implementation process of global goals.
It is assumed that such a scenario will stimulate the bottom-up governance approach,
thereby increasing ownership and acceptance criteria. However, contrary to this
view, in sub-Saharan Africa, participation in and membership of partnerships have
little or no impact on the partnership performance and outcome (Szulecki et al. 2012;
Compagnon 2012; Mawejje 2019). In recognition of this deficit, it is argued that
state actor involvement and leadership of multi-stakeholder partnerships may
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lead to improved performance and outcome, particularly with their democratic
legitimacy and bureaucratic structure. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, there is
no empirical outcome to support this assumption, as state-dominated partnerships
are constrained by several factors, including limited resources and expertise as
well as weak institutions that impede accountability and transparency. Second,
visualization of the Partnerships for SDGs platform shows that even the nationally
focused partnerships, dominated by nation-state actors, may not be creating any
(valuable) outcome. For example, a cursory view of the reporting dashboard
of the platform shows that there are few reports from national focused MSPs
that indicate activities and results. In addition, following initiative registration
on the platform, there is little guarantee that the initiatives have the resources
required for implementation. This often raises questions about the partnerships
and voluntary commitment approach in Nigeria, particularly with the argument
that the approach in the Global South may not deliver on the optimism due to
several factors, including the inadequacy of capacity, resource, and institutional
accountability criteria (Okereke et al. 2018).
5.1.4. Perceived Obstacles: Why Is Participation Limited?
Achieving Goal 17 requires an inclusive and participatory approach towards
implementation of the SDGs. The value of participation is not only measured
in quantitative terms regarding the number of stakeholders participating in
partnerships, but also as the value of such participation. Against this background,
this study identified and ranked stakeholder perceptions on what they consider
obstacles constraining participation in MSPs. The responses identified four key
factors: resources, capacity, knowledge, and governance structure of partnerships.
As depicted in Figure 5, the respondents ranked resources as the biggest obstacle,
followed by capacity, knowledge, and governance structure of partnerships. It is
not surprising that resources are the most frequently perceived obstacle, particularly
as it determines, among others, the cost for effective stakeholder inclusion in
the participation process (Aggraeni et al. 2019). Capacity and knowledge gaps
are perceived as other key obstacles that constrain the effective participation of
stakeholders from the Global South (Szulecki et al. 2012). In an attempt to bridge
this gap, over 80% of the partnerships visualized on the UN platform commit to
capacity and knowledge-based initiatives. Governance structure of partnerships,
including, for example, functioning secretariat, is identified as one of the key
ingredients in achieving effective design and impact making partnerships. However,
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the respondents in this study perceived governance structure of partnerships as a
less constraining factor.
Figure 5. Perceived Obstacles to participation in MSPs (SSA in Partnerships for
SDGs Survey, 2019).
6. Discussion
The concept of multi-stakeholder partnerships is a result of a shift in global
public policy and recognition that the SDGs objectives are best achieved by the design
of a multi-stakeholder approach that integrates non-state actors in the policymaking
and implementation process (Marx 2019). The SDGs implementation is anchored
on the agenda that tends to advance the interest of the most underrepresented
in the society through a multi-stakeholder approach that increases inclusiveness
and participation in governance arrangement and process. However, empirical
studies have highlighted the limitation of partnerships’ performances, particularly in
delivering their commitments. Some studies argue that these limitations vary in type
of partnerships, citing empirical evidence that state-led and dominated partnerships
are more likely to perform at suboptimal levels (Shin et al. 2017). In the case of
sub-Saharan Africa, studies show that suboptimal performance is not restricted to
only state-led partnerships but almost all partnerships, as they have limited or no
output and outcomes (Compagnon 2012). For example, a recent study of global
partnership, EITI, suggested that membership of the sub-Saharan African states
has little or no impact in achieving the network’s key commitments (Mawejje 2019).
Limitations of partnership performances can be traced to the question of participation
and inclusiveness due to several factors, including skewed participation, limited
stakeholder participation, and lack of quality participation.
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First, in quantitative terms, partnership arrangements, often are not inclusive and
participatory enough, lacking the capability to galvanize the underrepresented into
partnership participation with consequences on agenda-setting and decision-making
processes. Both globally and nationally focused partnership arrangements have
limited participation of subnational and local level-based stakeholders. Yet, there is
optimism that subnational and local level-based stakeholders are key platforms
towards achieving a bottom-up governance approach in the implementation of the
SDGs, particularly in achieving localization of SDG implementation. For instance,
the subnational and local level-based stakeholders play a key role in enabling
collaborating arrangement and linkage platforms that facilitate plan for the
achievement of the global sustainability agenda (Jorgensen et al. 2015; Hsu et al. 2019).
Both levels of governance are also considered as places where interventions and
policies for sustainability governance are experimented and developed into scalable
actions (Van der Heijden 2019; Koehler et al. 2018). Setting an agenda for partnership
initiatives, relying on local actions, will offer an opportunity for a bottom-up
governance approach, reflecting local priorities, and demonstrating inclusiveness
and participation. Furthermore, the participation of relevant stakeholders does
not only engender inclusiveness but encourages diverse opinions and inputs in
the agenda-setting and decision-making process, thereby enriching and adding
value to the process. Yet, it is observed that the partnership agenda is often in
conflict with local priorities and needs, with different actors pursuing different
agendas from different perspectives (Gereke and Bruhl 2019). Generally, the study
strengthens the argument that stakeholders of the country, like other stakeholders of
the Global South, are less represented in partnerships, thereby reinforcing the critical
questions of legitimacy, accountability, and transparency of the decision-making
process (Pattberg and Enechi 2009). However, the discussions about the limitations in
inclusiveness and participation should not be restricted to the numerical balancing of
stakeholder participation (Chan et al. 2019). The discussion must be also extended to
building and strengthening of platforms for knowledge exchange, capacity building,
and identification of scalable actions at the local level as well increased discussing
strategies for the realization of local resource mobilization indicators of the SDG 17.
Second, the limited inclusiveness and participation that characterize
multi-stakeholder partnerships often render its decision-making processes contestable
(Chan et al. 2019). This, again, brings to the fore questions regarding the legitimacy,
accountability, and transparency of the partnership decision-making process
(Pattberg and Enechi 2009). For instance, there are concerns that limited inclusiveness
and participation of actors may encourage the hijack of the decision-making process
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by powerful actors and influence decisions that serve narrow interests, thereby
distorting development distribution and increasing inequalities (Okereke 2018;
Pattberg et al. 2019; Pattberg 2010). The perception of the effective decision-making
process of multi-stakeholder partnerships arrangement is strengthened when it
is particularly characterized by diversity and inclusiveness with a measurable
representation of the underrepresented (Kelly et al. 2016). The participation of
Nigeria-based NGOs in multi-stakeholder partnerships, in quantitative terms, raises
the optimism of ameliorating the participatory limitation and ensuring effective
representation in the decision-making process. Particularly, as NGOs are described
as playing the key role of contributing technical capacity support to decentralized
and participatory governance as well providing a grassroots linkage and platform,
where the marginalized and excluded promote their interest and nurture innovation
(Cook et al. 2017; Banks et al. 2015). This assumed role of the NGOs ideally ensures
the emergence of a bottom-up governance approach in the decision-making process.
However, NGOs in the Global South are significantly constrained by several variables,
including lack of resources, knowledge, and capacity to participate in decision making
and deliver on their functions without seeking ‘external’ assistance. Additionally,
in sub-Saharan Africa, poor networking and cooperation among NGOs constrain their
ability to influence the decision-making process (Ariti et al. 2018). Gaps in the societal
awareness and knowledge of sustainable development issues fuel perceptions that also
limit space for participation and inclusiveness. For example, the skewed participation
and limited inclusiveness in the decision-making process often strengthen the
perception among NGOs based in Nigeria that partnership is a Global North affair
(Bansard et al. 2016). Bridging the societal awareness and knowledge gap will
empower stakeholders and enhance quality participation in partnerships.
Third, achieving improved outcomes is one of the major challenges
confronting partnership arrangements, and is more obvious in sub-Saharan Africa
(Compagnon 2012; Beisheim et al. 2014). This phenomenon is, again, traced to
several structural features, including lack of capacity and resources of stakeholders
in the region to effectively participate. In addition, the global partnerships with
the capacity and resources often overlook the locale-specific contextual priorities
and needs in its agenda-setting process, especially in engaging diverse stakeholders
at the local level and utilizing local-level knowledge in the design of partnerships
(Schmalzbauer and Visbeck 2016). Therefore, achieving improved outcomes requires
the creation of an inclusive and participatory space. The burden should not only
be on the stakeholders of the region to voluntarily participate in partnerships but
also the responsibility of the global focused partnerships to put in place some critical
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strategies aimed at galvanizing broad stakeholder participation. First, what is
needed is a deliberate strategy that creates a linkage platform for collaboration
aimed at exchanging knowledge and sharing experiences between nationally
and globally focused partnerships. A collaborative arrangement that enables
representative, participatory, and inclusive interactions would lead to improved
outcomes, accountability, and increased transparency. Second, there is a need for
globally focused partnerships to engage in a bottom-up approach in the design
of its programs through the identification of scalable actions at the local level.
While this may fit into the argument for a meta-governance structure of partnerships
(Pattberg and Widerberg 2016), it also helps in enabling an inclusive and participatory
bottom-up governance approach envisaged in SDG 17.
7. Conclusions
Achieving SDG 17 is a challenging task, particularly as the successful
implementation of this goal transforms the implementation of the entire SDGs.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships are at the center of SDG implementation, and it
is assumed that this approach will address the inclusiveness and participation
deficit in global sustainability governance, thereby achieving the ‘no one is left
behind’ principle of the SDG declaration. However, participation deficits in
multi-stakeholder partnerships persist, particularly in the Global South and the
SSA region. Unbalanced partnerships are less likely to create lasting impact towards
achieving the SDGs and confronting sustainable development challenges in the SSA
region. With the SSA region underrepresented in MSPs, in particular, in partnership
agenda-setting and decision-making processes, SDG implementation is at risk.
Therefore, achieving the implementation of SDG 17 requires deliberate policy
strategies that strengthen partnerships; mobilize stakeholders at different scales
to participate in partnerships; create and enhance linkages, and capacity building
platforms. Furthermore, in recognition of the important role of the subnational
and local level in sustainability governance and their gross limited participation
in partnerships, there should be a deliberate policy strategy targeted at mobilizing
and enabling stakeholders at these levels to participate. This approach would
lead to increased inclusiveness and participation as well as to a more bottom-up
implementation approach. These strategies for enabling inclusive and participatory
partnerships are not exhaustive but are intended to prompt further research on the
subject of partnerships for SDGs implementation and sub-Saharan Africa, especially
with the limited scholarly research focusing on sustainability governance and the
SSA region (Gerlak et al. 2020). Consequently, further research should focus on
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scrutinizing the complexity of unbalanced actor participation, the type of stakeholder
participating, understanding local context and priorities that enable participation
as well the role of the subnational and local level; what are the motivations for
participation; what platform is suitable for galvanizing and mobilizing participation
and how to increase participation and inclusiveness towards the realization of SDG 17.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, P.P. and O.E.; methodology, P.P. and O.E.; formal
analysis, O.E.; data curation, O.E.; writing—original draft preparation, O.E.; writing—review
and editing, P.P.; visualization, O.E.; supervision, P.P. All authors have read and agreed to the
published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
Aggraeni, Mustika, Joyeeta Gupta, and Hebe J. L. M. Verrest. 2019. Cost and Value of
Participation: A systematic literature review. Environmental Science Policy 101: 364–73.
[CrossRef]
Ariti, Adenew Taffa, Jasper van Vliet, and Peter H. Verbung. 2018. What restrains Ethiopian
NGOs to participate in the development of policies for natural resource management.
Environmental Science & Policy 89: 292–99.
Backstrand, Karin, Sabine Campe, Sander Chan, Aysem Mert, and Marco Schaferhoff.
2012. Transnational Public-Private Partnerships. In Global Environmental Governance
Reconsidered. Edited by Frank Biermann and Philipp Pattberg. Cambridge: MIT Press,
pp. 123–48.
Banks, Nicola, David Hulme, and Michael Edwards. 2015. NGOs, States and Donor Revisited:
Still too close for comfort. World Development 66: 707–18. [CrossRef]
Bansard, Jennifer S., Philipp H. Pattberg, and Oscar Widerberg. 2016. Cities to the rescue?
Assessing the performance of transnational municipal networks in global climate
governance. In International Environmental Agreement: Politics, Law and Economics.
Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 1–18.
Beirmann, Frank, Sander Chan, Aysem Mert, and Philipp Pattberg. 2012. The overall effects
of partnerships for sustainable development: More smoke than fire? In Public–Private
Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Emergence, Influence and Legitimacy. Edited by
Philipp Pattberg, Frank Biermann, Sander Chan and Aysem Mert. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, pp. 69–87.
Beisheim, Marianne, Andrea Liese, and Jasmin Lorch. 2014. Introduction: Transnational
Partnerships for Sustainability Development. In Transnational Partnerships: Providing for
Sustainability Development? Edited by Marianne Beisheim and Andrea Liese. London:
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3–16.
45
Biermann, Frank, Michele M. Betsill, Joyeeta Gupta, Kanie Norichika, Diana Liverman,
Heike Schroeder, and Bernd Siebenhuner. 2009. Earth System Governance: People, Places,
and the Planet. Science and Implementation Plan of the Earth System Governance. Earth System
Governance Report 1. Bonn: IHDP.
Chan, Sander, Idil Boran, Harro van Asselt, Gabriela Iacobuta, Navam Niles, Katharine Rietig,
and Michelle Scobie. 2019. Promises and risks of nonstate action in climate and
sustainability governance. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 10. [CrossRef]
Compagnon, Daniel. 2012. Africa’s involvement in partnerships for sustainable development:
Holy grail or business as usual? In Public–Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development:
Emergence, Influence and Legitimacy. Edited by Philipp Pattberg, Frank Biermann,
Sander Chan and Aysem Mert. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 137–62.
Cook, Nathan J., Glenn D. Wright, and Krister P. Andersson. 2017. Local Politics of Forest
Governance: Why NGO Support Can Reduce Local Government Responsiveness.
World Development 92: 203–14. [CrossRef]
Gereke, Marika, and Tanja Bruhl. 2019. Unpacking the unequal representation of Northern and
Southern NGOs in international climate change politics. Third World Quarterly 40: 870–89.
[CrossRef]
Gerlak, Andrea K., Megan Mills-Novoa, Alison Elder, Okechukwu Enechi, Pritee Sharma,
and Kanak Singh. 2020. How Geographies and Issues Matter in ESG–Agency Research.
In Agency in Earth System Governance. Edited by Michele M. Betsill, Tabitha M. Benney
and Andrea K. Gerlak. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 52–62.
Glass, Lisa-Maria, and Jens Newig. 2019. Governance for achieving the Sustainable
Development Goals: How important are participation, policy coherence, reflexitivity,
adapatation and democratic institutions? Earth System Governance 2: 100031. [CrossRef]
Hsu, Angel, John Brandt, Oscar Widerberg, Sander Chan, and Amy Weinfuerter. 2019.
Exploring links between national climate strategies and non state and sub national
climate action in nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Climate Policy 21: 931–51.
[CrossRef]
Jorgensen, Kirsten, Anu Jogesh, and Arabinda Mishra. 2015. Multi-level climate governance
and the role of the sub national level. Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences 12: 235–45.
[CrossRef]
Kalfagianni, Agni, and Philipp Pattberg. 2013. Participation and Inclusiveness in Private rule
making organisation: Does it really matter for effectiveness? Innovation: The European
Journal of Social Science Research 26: 231–50.
Kelly, Keith W., Sue S. Feldman, and Steven D. Gravely. 2016. Engaging and Sustaining
Stakeholders Towards governance. In Health Information Exchange: Navigating and
Managing a Network of Health Information Systems. Edited by Brian Dixon. Oxford:
Elsevier Services, pp. 56–76.
46
Koehler, Johanna, Steve Rayner, Steve Katuva, Patrick Thomson, and Rob Hope.
2018. A cultural theory of drinking water risks, values and institutional change.
Global Environmental Change 50: 268–77. [CrossRef]
Malex, Ziga, Bainka Douw, Jasper van Vliet, Emma H. van Der Zanden, and Peter H. Verburg.
2019. Local Land-use decision making in global context. Environmental Research Letters
14. [CrossRef]
Marx, Axel. 2019. Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Exploring Their
Design and its Impact on Effectiveness. Sustainability 11: 1087. [CrossRef]
Mawejje, Joseph. 2019. Natural resources governance and tax revenue mobilisation in
sub-Saharan Africa: The role of EITI. Resources Policy 62: 176–83. [CrossRef]
Mert, Aysem, and Sander Chan. 2012. The Politics of partnerships for sustainable development.
In Public–Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Emergence, Influence and
Legitimacy. Edited by Philipp Pattberg, Frank Biermann, Sander Chan and Aysem Mert.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 21–43.
Okereke, Chukwumerije. 2018. Equity and Justice in Polycentric Climate Governance.
In Governing Climate Change Polycentricity in Action. Edited by Andrew Jordan,
Dave Huitema, Harro van Asselt and Johanna Forster. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 320–37.
Okereke, Chukwumerije, Vincent Olusegun, and Chima Mordi. 2018. Determinants of
Nigerian Managers’ Environmental Attitude: Africa’s Ubuntu Ethics Versus Global
Capitalism. Thunderbird International Business Review 60: 577–90. [CrossRef]
OSSAP-SDGs. 2017. Implementation of the SDGs: A National Voluntary Review. Abuja: Federal
Republic of Nigeria.
Pattberg, Philipp. 2010. Public–Private Partnerships in Global Climate Governance.
Climate Change 1: 279–87. [CrossRef]
Pattberg, Philipp, and Okechukwu Enechi. 2009. The Business of Transnational Climate
Governance: Legitimate, Accountable and Transparent? St Antony’s International Review
5: 76–98.
Pattberg, Philipp, and Johannes Stripple. 2008. Beyond the public and private divide:
Remapping transnational governance in the 21st century. International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 8: 367–88. [CrossRef]
Pattberg, Philipp, and Oscar Widerberg. 2016. Transnational Multistakeholder Partnerships
for Sustainable Development: Conditions and Success. Ambio 45: 42–51. [CrossRef]
Pattberg, Philipp, Oscar Widerberg, and Marcel T. J. Kok. 2019. Towards a Global Biodiversity
Action Agenda. Global Policy 10: 385–90. [CrossRef]
Quick, Kathryn S., and Martha S. Feldman. 2011. Distinguishing participation and inclusion.
Journal of Planning Education and Research 31: 272–90. [CrossRef]
47
Read, Daniel J., Ramesh G. Mawaskar, and Bilal Habib. 2019. Translating Legitimacy:
Perspective Institutions for human-wildlife coexistence in Central India. Geoforum
101: 38–48. [CrossRef]
Schaferhoff, Marco, Sabine Campe, and Christopher Kaan. 2009. Transnational Public Private
Partnerships in International Relations: Making sense of concepts, research frameworks
and Result. International Studies Review 11: 451–74. [CrossRef]
Schmalzbauer, Bettina, and Martins Visbeck. 2016. The Contribution of Science in implementing
the Sustainable Development Goals. Stuttgart/Kiel: German Committee Future Earth.
SEforALL. n.d. SEforALL in Africa. Available online: https://www.se4all-africa.org/seforall-
in-africa/country-data/nigeria/ (accessed on 23 January 2020).
Shin, Wonkyu, Youngwan Kim, and Hyuk-Sang Sohn. 2017. Do Different Implementing
Partnerships Lead to Different project Outcomes? Evidence from Worldbank Project-level
Evaluation data. World Development 95: 265–84. [CrossRef]
Szulecki, Kacper, Philipp Pattberg, and Frank Biermann. 2012. Partnerships for sustainable
development in the energy sector: Explaining variation in their problem-solving
effectiveness. In Public–Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Emergence,
Influence and Legitimacy. Edited by Philipp Pattberg, Frank Biermann, Sander Chan and
Aysem Mert. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 88–112.
The World Bank. n.d. Access to Electricity (% Population). Available online: https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=NG (accessed on 23 January 2020).
Van der Heijden, Jeroen. 2019. Studying Urban Climate Governance: Where to begin,
what to look for and how to make a meaningful contribution to scholarship and practice.
Earth System Governance 1: 100005. [CrossRef]
van der Molen, Franke. 2018. How knowledge enables governance: The coproduction of
environmental governance capacity. Environmental Science & Policy 87: 18–25.
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open
access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
48
Institutional and Policy Framework in the
Governance of Capture Fisheries and Its
Bearing on Co-Management: Experiences
from Zambia
Francis M. Chama and Jacob Mwitwa
1. Introduction
The management of capture fisheries mainly focuses on the sustainable
production of fish resources (Arthur 2005). It is in line with this strategy that
the concept of fisheries co-management was introduced on open access fisheries
such as Lake Bangweulu fishery. Open access fishing is a condition where access to
fish harvesting on a fishery is unrestricted (OECD 2001), while capture fishing is the
manner in which fish is captured directly from its natural habitat. Co-management
can broadly be defined as a participatory arrangement where management
responsibilities are shared between the government and fishing communities
(Nielsen et al. 2004). It is assumed that effective governance and sustainable
fisheries management can only be achieved through stakeholder participation and
partnerships. Evidence to date indicates that stakeholder’s involvement in fisheries
management can significantly contribute to maintaining or restoring ecological
integrity and community well-being (Til and Banda 2002). However, multi-stakeholder
partnerships in fisheries co-management are challenged by weak institutional and
policy frameworks that fail to improve local livelihoods and achieve sustainable
fisheries management in poor communities.
The chapter explores how failure to establish a strong institutional framework and
supportive policies has led to conflicts between partners and lack of support by some
partners of the co-management initiative. It further examines the appropriateness of a
fisheries policy focused on conservation in a poor fishing community. The information
generated from this research shows how strong partnerships in co-management
can contribute to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 17 (SDG 17),
and how the lack of strong partnerships can lead to its failure. The SDG 17 emphasizes
the critical importance of partnerships for sustainable development, based on the
assumption that partnerships organize a wide range of stakeholders in the sharing
of knowledge, expertise, technology and additional resources towards achieving the
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global development agenda (Kaustuv et al. 2018). There has been confusion around
the means of implementation and how to effectively engage different stakeholders,
in the process of transformation for sustainable development (Horan 2019).
Co-management calls for partnerships between various stakeholders that
would foster effective and sustainable management (Armitage et al. 2007). This
demands for appropriate institutional frameworks with well-defined roles for partners,
and a working relationship between them that interlinks the various partners
(Stewart 2004). However, studies have shown that multi-stakeholder partnerships
are often challenged by the nurturing of a working relationship based on trust,
mutual respect, open communication, and understanding among stakeholders
(Overseas Development Institute 2003), and this can often lead to mistrust and
suspicion between facilitators and local communities. Unless a relationship of
mutual trust between various stakeholders is established and maintained, it is unlikely
that even the simplest co-management regime can survive (Pomeroy et al. 2001).
Partnerships in fisheries co-management are challenged by weak institutional
and policy frameworks that fail to improve local livelihoods and achieve sustainable
fisheries management in poor communities (Njaya 2007). There has been little
information available to help achieve sustainable fisheries management in poor
communities of developing countries, as the introduction of co-management in
some poor communities such as Bangweulu has been looked upon with suspicion
by the local communities, and there has been resistance towards its introduction
and progression. This kind of experience can be viewed as a crisis of governance
(Louisa et al. 2011; Acheson 2006). Therefore, there is a need to establish ways of
nurturing strong partnerships, based on trust, mutual respect, open communication,
and understanding among stakeholders.
The primary objective of the current fisheries policy in Zambia, similar with other
developing countries, is not that of uplifting the living standards of impoverished
fishing communities through appropriate strategies. Its focus is on increasing fish
production and promoting sustainable utilization of fisheries resources, thereby
contributing to the economy through the generation of employment, income and
improved availability of fish (The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative 2004).
With this approach, the focus is too broad with less consideration of local community
development. The consideration of local community development would address
issues of poverty and underdevelopment, by means of extending the potential
benefits of fisheries resources to poor rural fishing communities.
This chapter explores how the failure to establish strong institutional frameworks
and supportive policies can lead to conflicts between partners and lack of support by
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some partners of the co-management initiative, hence posing challenges on achieving
SDGs. It also shows ways in which strong partnerships for sustainable development
can be formed.
The chapter has been divided into six sections. Section one introduces the
research area, while section two covers the conceptual framework, section three the
research methodology that was used, section four presents the findings, section five
discusses the findings, and section six draws conclusions of the chapter.
2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
Co-management can broadly be defined as the sharing of responsibility and
authority between the state and resource-users, but often involves collaboration between
various stakeholders, including different government agencies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), research organizations, private enterprises and civil society
organizations (Louisa et al. 2011; Carlsson and Berkes 2005). While co-management now
attracts widespread attention around the world, its practical implementation frequently
falls short of expectations (Melissa et al. 1999). Lying between two management strategies,
the centralized control and community-based management systems, co-management
covers a broad spectrum of management arrangements. Co-management in itself is
not a single strategy to solve all problems of fisheries management, but provides a
set of alternative management strategies appropriate for certain areas and situations
(Izadian 2005). It is therefore important to have a more comprehensive understanding of
co-management based on the challenges experienced in the actual implementation which
have been experienced in recent years. Understanding this would highlight the suitable
approaches for achieving SDGs through partnership transformation. The main issues
to address are the types of partnerships needed to achieve sustainable management,
and how these partnerships can be enabled and ensured (Horan 2019).
In this study, co-management is conceptualized as a participatory form of
fisheries governance that could be effective through transparency, mutual trust,
accountability and fairness during policy formulation planning, implementation
and sharing of benefits, and should have an effective institutional framework.
Co-management is an arrangement where the power and responsibility to manage
a fisheries resource is shared between user groups, NGOs, traditional authorities
and government (Donda and Njaya 2007). Co-management cannot work effectively
without supportive policies and legislation. According to Pomeroy et al. (2001),
for co-management initiatives to be successful, the basic concern of government
action is to establish supportive legislation, policies and structures. Policies and
legislation need to clearly spell out jurisdictions and control for co-management.
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This would provide legitimacy to property rights and decision-making arrangements
for effective management. It would define and clarify local responsibility and
authority. Not only that, but it would clarify the rights and responsibilities of
partners, support local enforcement and set up accountability mechanisms that
would provide stakeholders with legal rights to organize and make arrangements
related to their needs (Pomeroy et al. 2001). The local communities expect to see a
transparent system, with accountability and immediate benefits if they are to actively
participate in fisheries management (Berkes 2010). These should be observed at
policy formation, planning and implementation levels of fisheries management.
The ideal governance system would only be achieved once good policies are in
place with a supportive legislation. At this point, the objectives should be clear and
acceptable to all stakeholders and all of them ready to support the management efforts.
This would create an enabling environment that would lead to sustainable fisheries
management and, thereby, the attainment of SDG 2, which seeks to end hunger,
achieve food security and improve nutrition, as well as SDG 17, which is aimed at
strengthening the means of implementation and revitalizing the global partnership for
sustainable development. Co-management initiatives in most developing countries
have been supported by international development agencies whose partnerships
need revitalization through successful program outcomes and impacts. It would
also contribute to attaining SDG 15, which is aimed at promoting peaceful and
inclusive societies for sustainable development and building effective, accountable
and inclusive institutions at all levels. Therefore, building strong co-management
partnerships would positively contribute to various SDGs both directly and indirectly.
The research conceptual framework is shown in Figure 1.
While management arrangements made by government agencies often lack
the local knowledge and experience of fishers and other user groups, these groups
often lack the scientific and legislative knowledge that government agencies can
provide to effectively manage the fisheries resources (Pomeroy et al. 2001). Therefore,
managing fisheries resources on a cooperative basis involving all the stakeholder
institutions has often proved to be a preferable alternative to government or local
level management systems (Watt 2001). A good institutional framework would bring
about institutional collaboration and participation of stakeholders that would lead to
the good governance of capture fisheries.
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework on how to build strong partnerships for sustainable
development. Source: Own illustration.
Government involvement in fisheries management has the benefit of contributing
unbiased views and opinions concerning fisheries management issues, whereas
fisheries resource users are more likely to be capable of making more equitable
regulations than (ECA 2007). The local fishers and other resource users are intimately
involved in the industry, and they are in a better position to respond to the special
needs, demands and interests of individual fishers and other user groups. Therefore,
there is little chance that fisheries regulations will succeed, unless the fishers and
other fisheries resource users actively support them (Donda and Njaya 2007; Ostrom
2010). If government regulations are not supported by the fishers and resource
user, they will find ways to bypass them, and the government will incur costs in
monitoring and law enforcement. The fishers and resource users are more likely to
respect the rules and regulations if they are involved when making them (Watt 2001;
Ogwang et al. 2009).
53
In terms of the appropriateness of the fisheries policy and legislation, the fisheries
policy, management rules and regulation need to be suitable for the local conditions.
The policy and legislation are only appropriate if they promote accountability,
transparency and equity between all stakeholders (Donda and Njaya 2007). In this
case, it would be accepted and supported by the stakeholders, and is considered as a
form of good governance. In this chapter, the appropriateness of the fisheries policy
refers to the perception of user groups over the suitability of the fisheries policy
in terms of management rules and regulation for the sustainable management of
fisheries resources. This is measured in terms of its provisions for accountability on
decision makers, transparency through communication and equitability of rules and
regulations between stakeholders.
There is need for fruitful dialogue between stakeholders (Pomeroy et al. 2001),
a strong political will in support of co-management, effective fisheries management
rules, stakeholder involvement in decision making, and either decentralization,
deconcentration or devolution of management authority and responsibility to local
communities. According to Armitage et al. (2007), the distribution of authority and
responsibilities among the various partners in fisheries management needs to be
understood for the governance of capture fisheries to be effective. The participation
of all stakeholders during the implantation of co-management helps to empower
local communities with some authority and responsibilities (Arthur 2005). For it to
work effectively, the Traditional Authorities should also be empowered with some
authority and responsibilities. There must be a clear conflict resolution mechanism
(Pomeroy 2007). Regular communication between stakeholders is vital during the
implementation stage, as it helps to show transparency and bring about the mutual
understanding of issues between stakeholders. A sustainable fisheries management
system ought to be able to generate its own funds, plan for its activities, implement
them, monitor and control fishing activities for the benefit of all stakeholders
(Njaya 2007). However, those preparing the appropriate laws to manage a fisheries
rights system must be prepared for a process of ongoing change and consequent
amendment, as the system requirements are continuously evolving (Stewart 2004).
Responsibilities and power can be shared between central government and
local communities in the form of co-management. The sharing of governance
responsibilities through stakeholder participation and ability to learn from experience
are among the growing trends in environmental management (Berkes 2010). However,
experiences from a number of African countries highlight challenges that relate
to transparency and accountability, initiation processes, membership, scale, and
power struggles (Njaya 2007). The approach to achieve good governance of fisheries
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resources must be open and transparent, coherent and integrative, inclusive and
communicative, as well as equitable and ethical. Transparency can greatly contribute
to the legitimacy and acceptance of decisions and therefore compliance (Arthur 2005).
The implementers of such arrangements must be accountable, efficient and responsive
(Uhlendahl et al. 2011). Overall, co-management should be self-sustainable, as it is
part of a broader worldwide trend of indigenous people making contributions of
their knowledge and methods to environmental governance (Norman 2011).
3. Materials and Method
3.1. Location of Research Area
The study was undertaken from fishing communities around Bangweulu fishery
in the Samfya district of Luapula province. Bangweulu is a complex lake found in
the northern part of Zambia (10◦15′–12◦30′ S and 29◦30′–30◦30′ E), made up of five
inter-connected lakes; Chifunabuli, Walilupe, Kampolombo, Kangwena and the main
Lake Bangweulu. The Chambeshi River, which is the supplier of water to the lake,
enters Lake Bangweulu through the swamps in Nsamba area from the north-eastern
direction, while Luapula River outflows the Bangweulu in the southern direction.
The permanent swamp on the eastern part of the lake is one of the largest in Africa,
covering over 5000 km2, taking up 16% of the Bangweulu, which reduces to 10%
in the dry season. Figure 2 shows the location of Lake Bangweulu on the map of
Zambia and the location of chiefdoms sampled.
The major economic activities around the Bangweulu area were fishing and
arable farming (Central Statistics Office 2013). Over 2/3 of the Bangweulu fishery falls
under Samfya district, which has a population of 174,906 (Central Statistics Office
2013), with over 15,000 people either directly or indirectly connected to fishing and
the fish trade (Mbewe 2007b). There are 13 taxonomic families of fish species, of which
more than 10 species are commercially exploited (Kolding et al. 2003). There have
been general concerns that the fish stocks are heavily exploited (Til and Banda 2002).
55
Figure 2. Map of Zambia showing the location of Lake Bangweulu (bottom right),
and main map showing the location of chiefdoms that were sampled. Source:
Own illustration.
3.2. Study Design
In order to understand the institutional framework and explore the appropriateness
of the fisheries policy in poor communities, the researcher made a case study for
the Bangweulu fishery. The research took a qualitative and quantitative approach
to explore the institutional frameworks and the appropriateness of the fisheries
policy for co-management. Interviews were conducted with traditional authorities,
government officials from the Department of Fisheries (DoF) and local government,
officials from an NGO involved in the management of capture fisheries Programme
for Luapula Agricultural and Rural Development (PLARD) and household heads
within the fishing communities in the study area. A purposive sampling design,
which adapted stratified systematic sampling, was used to select respondents.
This sampling approach was used in order to only target major players in fisheries
management for every stakeholder group. According to Oliver (2014), purposive
sampling is a form of non-probability sampling, with which decisions concerning
the entities to be sampled are made by the researcher, based upon a variety of
criteria that may need specialist knowledge of the research issue, their capacity
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and willingness to participate in the research. In this case, the researcher chose the
institutions to be sampled, the officials to be targeted for interviews, and traditional
leaders to be interviewed, based on their knowledge and influence over the issue
being studied. A stratified sampling approach was used to ensure that there is
proportional distribution of the samples within the sample frame. According to
Bryman (2004), stratification helps to avoid the overrepresentation of some groups
being sampled. The proportional stratified sampling method helped to distribute the
samples according to the number of individuals in every sub group. Groups with
a larger sample such as community groups had a larger sample compared to DoF,
while DoF also had a larger sample compared to PLARD. A systematic sampling
design was used at community level, in order to avoid biasness by the researcher
who might end up sampling more fishers at the expense of a randomly distributed
community sample approach. It helped to bring about a true distribution of the
community members (local stakeholders). Systematic sampling ensures that there is
no overrepresentation of large or small groups in the sample, but rather distributes
the groups of all sizes in a generally uniform manner as it is in the sampling frame
(Bhattacherjee 2012). The secondary sources used included book reviews of journal
articles, reports, books and legislative documents.
3.3. Target Population
The target population was that of traditional leaders, government officials,
officials from PLARD, and heads of households within the fishing communities.
Data were collected through interviews, observations and focused group discussions
(FGDs) with the Village Fisheries Management Committee (VFMC) members and
fishers. The collected data were then coded and analysed using SPSS version 15.
The qualitative information from interviews and FDGs was arranged in themes and
analyzed using NVivo 10. The research was carried out in the Samfya district of
Luapula Province, a district covering the largest area of the lake fishery.
3.4. Sampling Design
The sample was divided into five (5) groups made up of; (i) institutions of
government (DoF and local government), (ii) an NGO involved fisheries management
in the study area PLARD, (iii) traditional authorities, (iv) members of the VFMCs and
(v) individual household heads and fishers in communities around the lake fishery.
The sample was divided as shown in Table 1.
The target communities were chosen according to Village Fisheries Management
Committee (VFMC) zones formed by the DoF. The VFMCs were composed of
57
12–17 villages per VFMC. These divisions were based on the argument that some
villages were too small to form a representative VFMC. Some villages were as small
as two households. Ten (10) communities that were VFMCs were sampled in this
research, out of 51 VFMCs on the fishery. This was because the researcher was
informed that over 20 VFMC areas were hostile towards outsiders enquiring on
fisheries management, due to lack of trust in the facilitators, to a point where two
communities even violently chased some officials involved in the introduction of
co-management. For safety reasons, the researcher only managed to sample two (2)
communities where the introduction of co-management was rejected. The sampled
communities were evenly spread across four chiefdoms; Kasoma Bangweulu,
Chitembo, Mwewa and Mulongwe chiefdoms. VFMCs have only been formed on
fishing communities around the lake. Purposive sampling was used in order to cover
communities close to the lake, where most locals depend on fishing and stakeholders
directly involved in local governance. Three (3) communities were sampled per
chiefdom, with 10 households per VFMC area, making a total of 30 respondents per
chiefdom. A total of 120 household interviews were successfully conducted.
Table 1. Summary of stakeholders sampled.
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Data from traditional leaders and officers from DoF, Local Government and
PLARD were collected through one-on-one SSIs. Data from community members
were collected through SSI, and focus group discussions (FGDs) with VFMCs and
fishers; four (4) FGDs involving VFMCs members and two (2) involving migrant
fishers who were excluded from the co-management arrangement, as there were
no VFMCs formed on their fishing camps. One FGD was conducted in each of the
four chiefdoms. These were as follows; 2 FGD with VFMC members from Mundubi
Village Fisheries Management Committee (VFMC) in Chitembo village and Musumba
VFMC in Kasoma Bangweulu chiefdom, and the other 2 with local fishers in Masanta
area under Mwewa chiefdom and with migrant fishers in Isenga Fishing Camp on
Mbabala Island in Mulongwe chiefdom. Data were collected from their localities in
both cases. Field data were collected between November 2012 and February 2013
and the experiences learnt from the research are valuable in the transformation to
strong partnerships for sustainable development, in line with SDG 17. The failure to
form strong partnerships has continued to be a challenge in fisheries management in
poor communities worldwide and the analysis of experiences would help draw a
solution to this problem.
3.6. Data Analysis and Interpretation
The collected data were subject to content analysis through coding. All data
collected using the various research methods were transcribed and typed up for
analysis. Qualitative data collected through FGDs and SSI were entered into the QRS
NVivo 10 application, which arranged them in themes to show which method was
used to obtain them and clearly labelled their origin. They were then interrogated
and divided according to the formation, implementation and outcome phases of
partnerships. Because the interview was also structured around questions that
asked about institutional frameworks, policy and challenges at each partnership
phase, answers were interrogated for content. Within each partnership phase,
patterns were identified between respondents and their responses, and codes were
assigned to these patterns. Relevant pieces of data were then placed under these
codes and assimilated to gain a full picture of partnerships. Where conflicts arose
in the data, these were noted and treated as data in itself. Each conflict was
considered in terms of its origin and the phase of the partnership that is being
discussed when it arises. Conflicts were used to highlight issues such as breakdowns
between partners or differences in opinions, and understand their role in partnership
success. Frequencies and percentages of responses were tabulated and used to
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make conclusions. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used
for computation.
3.7. Data Validity and Reliability
The validity of data conveys how adequately a measure used in research
captures the phenomenon under investigation (Bryman 2004). Both reliability and
validity are needed to assure adequate measurement of the constructs of interest
(Bhattacherjee 2012). Reliability of data reflects the consistency of results across
different measurements, and this was used to test how reliable the outcomes were.
Validity concerns in this study were addressed through the refining of all data
collection tools to the best possible standards. Extrapolations based on rough
estimates were avoided, hence preferring not to provide quantitative data in cases
where the reliability of figures left much to be desired. Observed differences in
results should be due to a genuine difference in the sample and not because of the
unreliability of the data collection techniques or the researcher. The study used was
valid and reliable, as it targeted all the stakeholders who were identified as being
part of the fisheries management in the area, whether active or inactive. The use of a
combination of data collection methods helped to ensure reliability.
3.8. Limitations of the Study
The researcher faced limitations in terms of finances. The Bangweulu fishery
is vast, and the transport costs were high. This limited the area covered by the
researcher, but the data still gave a true representation of the situation on the ground.
Some household respondents were against fisheries management, and hence refused
to be interviewed. Fisheries management system was a contentious issue in the
Bangweulu fishery, especially on the control of the size of fishing gears. Some of
the communities were hostile and did not welcome the researcher. As mentioned
by Mbewe (2007b), there is a lot of resentment and suspicion from fishers towards
researchers or anyone they think is associated with DoF. Therefore, the researcher
had to be skillful in order to overcome these limitations.
4. Results
The household interviews composed of 84 men and 36 women, bring the total
to 120 respondents. The majority of participants were fishers (69%), as shown in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Distribution of sampled population through household interviews.
Source: Own illustration.
Data collected revealed that some fishers practiced small scale farming during
the rainy season when the fish ban is in effect, bringing the total number of farmers
interviewed to 11%. Only eight percent (8%) of the respondents depended on other
sources of income, such as tailoring, selling groceries and carpentry. Twelve percent
(12%) of household respondents were members of the VFMCs in their area. All the
participants showed profound dependence on the fishery in one way or another.
Four chiefs were interviewed and 6 officials from PLARD, DoF and the local
government, plus 3 VFMC community facilitators. Four FGDs conducted involved
the following groups; local fishers, migrant fishers and VFMCs. The FGD with local
fisher had 8 participants; the one for migrant fishers had 10 participants, while the
FGD with Mundubi VFMC had 9 participants. The FGD with Musumba VFMC had
6 participants. Data collection was carried out as it was planned in the methodology.
4.1. Institutional Frameworks
Generally, there were no local community level institutions for the governance
of capture fisheries operating in the Bangweulu fisheries, apart from VFMCs formed
by DoF. Although DoF offices are there at district level, it had no representation
at chiefdom and village community levels. According to the Provincial Fisheries
Officer, there has been an effort to form and use VFMCs in the management of the
fishery, and DoF had an upper hand. The co-management promoters (DoF and
PLARD) planned for 81 VFMCs, but only managed to form 51 VFMCs. VFMCs were
formed as a partnership link between the promoter of co-management and the local
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communities. Once active, VFMCs were to work with other stakeholders in sensitizing
local communities on fisheries management, and participate in fish ban patrols.
4.2. Stakeholder’s Engagement and Involvement
As a starting point for co-management, DoF identified the stakeholders
and invited them for a stakeholder workshop in Samfya in 2010, to form the
co-management partnership. The stakeholder identification and invitation process
was entirely done by the DoF and other stakeholders did not participate in
policy formulation for co-management. The stakeholders identified were PLARD,
local government, traditional authorities and local fishing community members.
The introduction of co-management at community level started with the engagement
of community facilitators, who were trained for 5 days in public relations, facilitation
techniques, fisheries co-management, and familiarized with the Fisheries Act of 2011.
The facilitators were recruited from the local fishing communities and assigned to
work in the same communities they came from. At community level, the promoters
(DoF and PLARD) started with the introduction of co-management to the chiefs,
then the sensitization of the headman after approval from the chiefs. The headmen
then organized for community meetings in their villages. The mobilization of
local communities was also done with the help of the area’s political councilors.
The headman introduced the community co-management facilitators during the
first village meetings, where no officials from PLARD or DoF and chiefs were
present. The meetings focused on the introduction of co-management facilitators.
This was then followed by the first sensitization meeting by DoF and PLARD officials,
and VFMCs were formed during the first or second sensitization meetings if the
community accepted it. Most of the respondents felt that the formation of VFMCs
was too quick as it did not allow for the locals to fully understand what was being
introduced. A one- or two-days meeting was not enough. Moreover, a number of
fishers missed the meetings, as it was during the fishing period when some fishers
were out fishing.
Some of the chiefs were of the view that co-management was not well introduced.
According to 75% of chiefs, co-management should have started with first making the
laws and by-laws that support stakeholder participation, followed by the sensitization
of stakeholders to help them better understand co-management. This should then
be followed by a consultative meeting involving all stakeholders, starting with
the leaders before the communities are even involved. The next step should have
been the sensitization of local communities and the formation of VFMCs to help
fisheries management once they have understood. According to some of the fishers,
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local communities were threatened with a prolonged fish ban period of 3–5 years.
They were of the view that the promoters should have taken a friendlier approach
when introducing co-management.
4.3. Institutional Collaborations, Trust and Accountability
As a way of incorporating local communities in fisheries management, VFMCs
were formed in some communities. The involvement of partnership formation for
fisheries co-management proved to be a challenge based on the local community’s
perception of the roles played by each given stakeholder in the partnership, as shown
in Table 2.






















DoF 100% - - - - - - -
PLARD 2% 2% - 3% 69% 9% 7% 8%
Local
Government 2% 95% 3% - - - - -
Traditional
Authorities 12% 73% - - 15% - - -
VFMC - - - - 100% - - -
The information presented in Table 2 shows that all the household heads perceive
the DoF as only playing the role of fish ban enforcement. In the case of PLARD,
the majority (69%) perceived PLARD as mainly being involved in promoting fisheries
management through VFMCs and working in close partnership with DoF. In the case
of local government, the majority (95%) of respondents perceived local government
as the promoter of local development through the area councilor, with none of
the respondents perceiving them as partners in fisheries management. Most of
the respondents (73%) considered traditional authorities mainly as promotors of
local development, and only a few associated them with fisheries management.
All respondents perceived VFMCs’ as promoters in fisheries management. The role
played by each institution had an influence on the quality of relationship with local
communities, as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. The quality of relationship between DoF, PLARD, Local Government,
Traditional Authorities and VFMCs with Local Communities.
Good Neutral Bad No Idea
DoF 13% 24% 63% -
PLARD 21% 31% 39% 9%
Local Government 91% 7% 2% -
Traditional Authorities 87% 13% - -
VFMC 20% 39% 17% 14%
The majority of respondents (63%) indicated that the relationship between DoF
and the local communities was bad, as DoF is just there to enforce the fish ban,
and especially visible during the fish ban period when DoF is enforcing the ban.
In the case of PLARD, 39% of respondents indicated that the local community’s
relationship with PLARD was bad, due to its association with DoF; 31% indicated
that it was neutral, while the remaining 21% indicated that it was good. However,
the majority (91%) perceived their relationship with local government as good, while
the relationship with traditional authorities was very good. The relation with VFMCs
was neutral, as they were seen as being more a part of the community compared to
the others.
4.4. Appropriateness of the Fisheries Policies and Legislation
The views of DoF, PLARD, traditional authorities and local government on the
appropriateness of the policy varied, as these institutions enjoy different powers,
responsibilities and privileges. Appropriateness refers to what is being considered
as accountable, transparent and equitable by the partners involved, as well as the
wellbeing of the fishery. Their responses on whether the policies and legislation were
appropriate for effective fisheries management are shown in Table 4.
As presented in Table 4, most of the respondents from DoF, PLARD and local
government (83%) were of the view that the policies and legislation were appropriate
for the effective management of the fishery; what was lacking was implementation.
On the part of the traditional leadership, 50% of chiefs were of the view that the
policies and legislation were inappropriate, as there was no role given to traditional
leaders who govern these communities. They were not even involved in the policy
formulation process. As for the community members, the majority were of the
view that the policy and legislation was inappropriate, as it had no provision for
community development, but was just meant to conserve fish.
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Table 4. Views of key stakeholders on the appropriateness of the fisheries’ policies
and legislation.
Group Interviewed Appropriate Inappropriate No knowledge ofPolicies and Legislation
DoF 83% 17% -
PLARD 100% - -
Traditional Leaders 25% 50% 25%
Local Government 100% - -
Local Communities 7% 68% 25%
4.5. Fisheries Management System
The respondents from each stratum presented their views on who manages the
lake, and these were categorized in order to see if co-management was taking place.
The percentages on responses from respondents were then obtained. The percentages
of key institution respondents for each category are presented in Table 5.










Local Government 67% - - - 33%
The Chiefs 75% - 25% - -
Community
Household Heads 42% 4% 51% 3% -
The results showed that 67% of respondents from DoF, local government and
PLARD indicated that the lake fishery was being managed by DoF alone. In the case
of traditional leaders, the majority of chiefs (75%) indicated that the DoF manages
the lake alone, and only 25% indicated that traditional authorities were involved
in fisheries management. The majority of household heads (51%) were of the view
that the fishery was managed by both the DoF and traditional leaders; 42% indicated
that DoF is managing the fishery alone. However, findings also revealed that some
traditional leaders have had an influence on the implementation of management
rules, as indicated by 51% of house hold respondents.
The management rules and regulations were created by central government
with no participation of the local communities. The locals expressed the view that the
rules were not fair to them, as they were meant to oppress them. Their main concern
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was that the size of fishing gears declared legal on the fishery would reduce their
catches and income levels. They further indicated that even the strict enforcement of
rules would not stop them from practicing illegal fishing activities.
4.6. Communication between Stakeholders
All the respondents from DoF stated that meetings with local communities
were irregular. Stakeholder meetings have not been arranged, as the institutional
structures (Zone Fisheries Management Committees and the Fisheries Management
Committee at district level) have not yet been formed. As a result, there were
no scheduled communication arrangements between DoF and other stakeholders,
except for PLARD. Communication only took place when need arose. The local
government indicated that the only communication on fisheries management with
DoF was through the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC)
meetings. However, a respondent from DoF indicated that they were supposed
to be having periodic meetings with the traditional leaders, but that was not the
case. They were only scheduled meetings between the VFMCs and the community
facilitators. The household heads were asked to state the channel of communication
that was used to present their views and concerns to the promoters of the fisheries
co-management system. The results of their responses are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Channels for the presentation of community views and concerns about
co-management. Source: Own illustration.
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Most of the household head’s respondents (74%) were of the view that the
presentation of local community views and concerns was only done once, during the
co-management sensitization meetings.
According to 50% of the chiefs, they captured the views and concerns of the
local people through the headmen, and presented them to the government through
the area councilor. The headmen collected the information through interaction with
their subjects and not through community meetings. The other 50% of traditional
leaders stated that they have been excluded from co-management; hence, they do
not play any role in fisheries management. There was no direct connection with DoF
for them to present these views and concerns.
5. Discussion
5.1. Overview of the Institutional Framework
It was found that the DoF is in charge of all fisheries management activities,
and responsible for the formulation of all fisheries management policies, with very
little involvement from other stakeholders. At community level, the traditional
authorities were not empowered to actively participate in fisheries management.
The institutional framework created by the Bangweulu fisheries co-management
promoters was limited to a small number of actors. These included the DoF, PLARD
and VFMCs. The migrant fishers were left out, despite the fact that the whole
process was designed to control their activities. Moreover, the seasonal migration
of fishers is the most common source for conflicts on fisheries and need to be
controlled (Wilson 2003; Allison and Badjeck 2004). There were no VFMCs in fishing
camps, where migrant fishers spend most of their time. The exclusion of key
stakeholders such as traditional authorities and fishers in fisheries co-management
has often resulted in the weak co-management practice that lacks transparency and
legitimacy (Arthur 2005; Pomeroy 2007). As argued by Njaya (2007), this leads to
general non-compliance to rules and regulations by resource users, such as by lack of
adherence during the fish ban period, continuous use of illegal fishing gears and mesh,
as well as fishing without licenses. Therefore, the exclusion of some stakeholders led
to a weak partnership, with no support for the arrangement. Communities whose
VFMCs were left out need to be included as they could play an important role in
fisheries management. Their exclusion could lead to co-management failure and lack
of sustainable fisheries management (Malasha 2007).
Managing fisheries resources on a cooperative basis in partnership with other
stakeholders has often proved to be a preferable alternative to government managed
systems (Watt 2001; Carlsson and Berkes 2005; IUCN 1996). Partnerships and
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stakeholder involvement in fisheries management has the benefit of contributing
unbiased views and opinions concerning fisheries management issues, whereas
fisheries resource users are more likely to be capable of making more equitable
regulations than the government (ECA 2007). The local fishers and other resource
users are intimately involved in the industry, and they are in a better position
to respond to the special needs, demands and interests of individual fishers and
other user groups. Therefore, there is little chance that fisheries regulations will
succeed unless the fishers and other fisheries resource users actively support them
(Donda and Njaya 2007). If government regulations are not supported by the fishers
and other resource users, they will find ways to bypass them, and the government
will incur costs in monitoring and law enforcement. The fishers and other resource
users are more likely to respect the rules and regulations if they are involved when
making and implementing them (Watt 2001). This calls for the inclusion of the
migrant fishers in the co-management partnership.
5.2. Stakeholder Engagement and Involvement in Partnerships
The stakeholder engagement and involvement process should be transparent,
in order to have a well-represented stakeholder distribution (Arthur 2005).
Although DoF identified the stakeholders, the process was not transparent and seen as
equitable by some stakeholders. None of the stakeholders knew how that identification
and inclusion process was undertaken. As a result, some stakeholders, such as
traditional authorities, fish traders and migrant fishers were left out. This negatively
affected their support and lowered the chances of partnering with them. According to
Haambiya et al. (2015, p. 83), “the Zambian government has underestimated the
capacities of fishing communities to manage local fisheries resource systems to meet
their needs”. The key stakeholders such as fishers and traditional authorities should
have participated in the formation of the policy that supports co-management so that
their concerns are considered from the beginning. This could have led to a policy
that is inclusive and fair for them. The key stakeholders should have had an input
at policy formulation, planning and implementation levels. This would bring about
transparency, equity and accountability, and all parties would be held accountable
for the decisions made (Arthur 2005; Berkes and Doubleday 2007; Pomeroy 2007).
Furthermore, consultation should be done after the sensitization of stakeholder on
the whole co-management arrangement. This is because they cannot make valuable
contributions over something they do not understand well.
Experience has shown that local users have no interest in the success of
management initiatives when they are not involved in any aspect of the planning
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for a new project or initiative, and worse when they can directly or indirectly act to
undermine it (Ostrom 2010; COFAD 2002). The co-management participant must
feel that the rules in place are equitable, and there must be the sharing of costs
and benefits in a manner that the benefits outweigh the costs (Pomeroy et al. 2001).
The fishers must understand, recognize an incentive and agree to the co-management
arrangements before the process begins so as to support the initiative throughout.
Co-management cannot work unless the fishers and other fisheries resource users
actively support it (Donda and Njaya 2007). Therefore, the failure to identify and
involve some stakeholders at an early stage contributed to a weak partnership
arrangement on the fisheries, as well as a lack of support from some stakeholders.
5.3. Institutional Collaborations, Trust and Accountability
Since the late 1980s, various forms of fisheries co-management initiatives
have been implemented in some of the major fisheries, in many developing
countries including Zambia. The initiatives have mostly been funded by international
organizations such as SNV, from Netherlands and PLARD, an NGO funded by
the Finnish government. These are global partnerships meant to help developing
countries to develop. However, most of these initiatives have not been successful,
as there has been no continuity and progress on the output and outcome of such
programs and projects. Once the project and programs’ funding ends, so does
the progression and implementation of the co-management operations in most
communities. This has been the case for co-management in the poor fishing
communities of Zambia such as the Bangweulu fisheries, and can be considered as
an ‘aborted devolution’ (Malasha 2007). For co-management to work, the sharing
of authority and responsibilities should be accompanied with matching resources
(Pomeroy et al. 2001). It was observed that, while institutional frameworks may be
established, effective collaboration should be there in order to build capacity among
stakeholders, while at the same time, develop trust and accountability between them.
It is important to note that there is a difference between stakeholder involvement
and partnership. A stakeholder may be involved just for approval or consultation
purposes, while the partnership is an agreement to work together. The institutions
involved in co-management should form partnerships where they agree on the roles
of each partner in the arrangement, as well as establish the rules and regulation of
their operations in accordance with the law. In this case, an institutional framework
would be established where the leaving of a partner can be filled or replaced by
other partners.
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The involvement of VFMCs in fisheries co-management has proved to be a
challenge in some fisheries, because of the type and quality of relationship between
the local communities and the promoters of co-management, as was the case with
Lake Bangweulu fisheries. The local communities perceive the DoF as just being fish
ban enforcers, and this affected the relationship between DoF and local communities.
As a result, the quality of relationship between them was generally bad, especially
during the fish ban period. The fishers viewed DoF as:
“An enemy who is just there to deny the locals access to a resource that is
God given”. (Statement recorded during FGDs, February 2013)
With this notion, local communities cannot trust DoF, as an enemy cannot
work to improve their living standards. With such a bad relationship between
them, it was not easy for the local communities to trust DoF, and that is why
the actions of DoF were looked upon with suspicion. Hence, the locals viewed
co-management as a move by DoF to effectively enforce the rules on the fishery
and not help local communities. This is not far from the truth, as the Bangweulu
co-management arrangement was mainly designed to help DoF enforce the rule, and
local communities would only benefit from the increase in fish stocks, which would
not happen immediately. The local communities expect to see immediate benefits
if they are to actively participate in fisheries management (Berkes 2010). Therefore,
the DoF should consider directing its management efforts towards establishing and
improving the working relationship with the fishing community, to be able to give
advice based on sound scientific investigations.
Although the traditional authorities and local government supported the
introduction of co-management through the mobilization of fishing communities,
they had no role apart from giving DoF permission for co-management activities,
meaning that there was no partnership between DoF, traditional authorities and local
government. The governance system did not hold DoF accountable for its action to
the traditional authorities, local communities and other stakeholders, except PLARD
as the cofounder and funders of the co-management initiative. Therefore, it is not
just a matter of involving the stakeholder in co-management, but establishing strong
relationships of mutual trust if sustainability is to be achieved. The facilitators should
also be held accountable to all stakeholders including the weak ones, if they are to be
supported. As alluded to by Wilson et al. (2010), co-management programs will be
stronger and more likely to succeed if partnerships are made between stakeholders
that are seen to be trustworthy, transparent in their operations, and operating
cooperatively and equitably.
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The study attributes the failure of these initiatives to weak partnerships
resulting from the following; weak institutional frameworks, inappropriate policies,
lack of collaborations, trust and accountability among stakeholders. Only a few
countries have formal frameworks for enabling and ensuring effective partnerships
(Beisheim 2007; Horan 2019). Otherwise, most countries rely on a voluntary,
bottom-up ad hoc approach to partnership formation (Horan 2019; Martens 2007).
Therefore, understanding the experiences on fisheries such a Lake Bangweulu would
help in developing a strong partnership for effective co-management, which would
lead to sustainable development.
5.4. Appropriateness of the Policies and Legislation
Fifty percent (50%) of the chiefs (traditional authorities) on the Bangweulu
fishery indicated that the fisheries policy and legislation were inappropriate, as they
have failed to define the roles that traditional authorities should play in fisheries
management. The policy was silent on the role of traditional authorities and other
stakeholders in a decentralized set-up. It has been argued that traditional authorities
can play a major role in fisheries management (Mbewe 2007a; Wilson et al. 2003).
However, the role of traditional authorities in the Bangweulu fishery was found
to be ambiguous. This contributed to the ineffectiveness of the co-management
arrangement on the fishery. As suggested by Malasha (2007), there is a need to
clearly spell out the role that the traditional authorities are going to play in fisheries
management for the fishery to be effectively governed. However, this should be
done with caution, as traditional authorities can sometimes take advantage of the
system for their own benefit at the expense of other stakeholders (Béné et al. 2008).
For the co-management initiatives to be successful, initiators should not only establish
supportive legislation, policies and structures, but should clearly spell out jurisdictions
and controls that would define and clarify the rights and responsibilities of partners
(Pomeroy et al. 2001). This would support local enforcement and setup accountability
mechanisms that would provide local communities with the legal right to organize
and make arrangements related to their needs.
Decentralization is normally perceived as one possible solution for the
improvement of rural population livelihoods, and as a mean of poverty alleviation
(Béné et al. 2008). Although the decentralization of fisheries governance and
management was adopted in practice where the resource users would be more directly
responsible for the resources in their administrative areas, the fisheries policy and
Act of 2011 did not state the decentralization levels and functions of DoF at national,
provincial and district levels. One of the objectives of the decentralization policy
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was to empower local communities by devolving decision making and functions
with matching resources from the center to the lower levels, in order to improve
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services (Government of the Republic
of Zambia 2002). However, this part was lacking in the Fisheries Policy and Act of
2011, hence leaving a situation where fisheries governance and management were
still centralized. While decentralization transfers some authority and responsibility
to lower levels and subordinates, the arrangement still concentrated authority in
the hands of higher authorities, and thus accountability was still left with central
government (Government of the Republic of Zambia 2002).
Despite the fisheries policy being in support of participatory management,
it failed to address the issue of sustainability. Funding is very critical to the success
of any institution and its sustainability. However, VFMCs had no well-defined
arrangements for income generation. Although DoF expressed the view that local
government was not cooperative in terms of willingness to share fisheries levy
with local communities, the local government was working in accordance with the
Local Government Act, which had no provision for the sharing of revenues with
local communities. Hence, there was no basis for sharing the local government’s
revenue from fish levy with VFMCs or DoF. This has been the experience in many
African countries, where there has been no effective integration of the small-scale
fisheries in the agenda of the local authorities, apart from the taxes levied by the local
governments (Béné et al. 2008). The policies and legislation should explicitly state
how the co-management institutions would raise funds for their operations, and how
revenues generated by the fishery would contribute to both local development and
fisheries management. There is the need to come up with legal prescriptions for
benefit sharing for co-management participants. The revenues collected from fish
levies and fishing licenses should be shared with local communities, so that the fishery
would have a way of generating funds for its own development. The community’s
share of the benefit can be used for community development projects, which would,
in turn, uplift the living standards of the locals and reduce their dependence on the
fishing. Therefore, the fisheries policy and legislation should clearly prescribe the
benefit sharing mechanism from co-management.
The failure to define the role of local government in the fisheries policy
and legislation makes it difficult for DoF to govern fisheries at district level.
Local government is one of the key stakeholders for enhancing governance,
development and poverty alleviation at local community level (Ministry of Local
Government and Housing 2009). The local government has the responsibility to
mobilize and allocate public resources, in order to effectively meet local development
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objectives, as well as support the implementation of national programs (ibid.)
It is therefore inappropriate for the fisheries policy to give authority to DoF, minus
explicitly stating how power and responsibilities will be shared with other stakeholder
actors in order to promote accountability among them.
The research showed that the main problem faced in the management of fisheries
in poor communities is the lack of alternative livelihood and incentive to help fishing
communities to adapt to the new management arrangement and develop their
communities. The fisheries policy should provide for incentives that would help gain
the support of local communities, while at the same time promote the performance
of community structures for fisheries management, and ensure their sustainability.
Hutton and Nigel (2003) introduced the term “incentive-driven conservation”, as a
way to motivate local communities to conserve wild living species. The Fisheries
policy lacked a benefit sharing arrangement from fish levy that would give local
communities some incentives. The incentive can be obtained from the fisheries levy,
fishing licenses and boat registration fees.
5.5. Fisheries Management Systems
The co-management arrangement was inactive, as controls on the fisheries were
only there for three (3) months, which was the official fish ban period on the recently
identified fish breeding areas. After that, no permission is required for the use of the
fishery, except on fish breeding areas where breeding was prohibited. This led to
an open access fishery, with no permission required for users. Most of the fishers
did not obtain fishing licenses and DoF could not enforce this law. The law on the
acquisition of fishing license for commercial fishers has been there for a very long
time, but not effective on the Bangweulu, just about 4 fishers obtained fishing licenses
out of over 15,000 fishers in 2011 (Department of Fisheries 2011).
The management rules for the lake fisheries were entirely made by the DoF, and
VFMCs would only help to enforce these. The rules included restrictions on the size
of fishing gears and mesh, as well as fishing methods. However, the restrictions on
some fishing methods and size of fishing gears and meshes were hardly followed by
the fishers, who disagree with most of them (Kolding et al. 2003). Just about one fifth
of the fishing gears used were technically legal (Kolding 2011). There has a lot of
under-reporting or concealment of those using illegal fishing gears (Mbewe 2007a).
According to Kolding (2011), the fishing methods and gears used on the Bangweulu
appear not to have changed much in recorded history. Therefore, the fishers are
adapted to catching a high variety of predominantly small fish, which have been
declared illegal by DoF. The fishers prefer to use the small sized mesh nets, which
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have been declared illegal than the legal large sized nets, as the smaller varieties of
fish were more commercially viable and easier to catch. As indicated by Kolding
(2011), the most viable fish varieties on the Bangweulu fishery are small and caught
using illegal gears. The Department of Fisheries (2011) also indicated that the smaller
mesh sized nets (illegal nets) were more effective than the larger (legal) mesh sized
nets on the Bangweulu fishery. However, the DoF argued that the predominant use
of smaller mesh size nets on the fishery was dangerous on the fish stock, as more
juvenile fish are captured before breeding (Department of Fisheries 2011). If not
controlled, this can lead to overfishing. Hence, management strategies need to be
found based on regulating mesh size for the fishing nets while, at the same time,
benefitting all stakeholders. It is important to note that many fishermen and their
families rely on fishing for their income, with no alternative, and are ready to ignore
a government-mandated ban. Hence, there is a need for partnership between the
government and local fishing communities, along with other agencies that can work
with the communities to develop alternative livelihoods, as this would result in a
holistic, implementable and viable solution (Darian et al. 2018).
Rule breakers were punished through the confiscation of fishing materials,
payment of a fine or imprisonment. The use of stiff punishment on law breakers by
the government when one is found guilty failed to deter fishers from engaging in
illegal fishing activities. Instead of discouraging illegal fishing activities, this approach
encouraged some fishers to do more illegal fishing. According to Mbewe (2007a),
most fishers on the Bangweulu mainly use hired labor in their fishing activities
compared to self-employment, or using family members without necessarily hiring
them. Most fishers in the area hired fishing materials and equipment like boats,
fishing nets and bicycles for transportation. Once a fisher is arrested and the fishing
materials confiscated, the owners of the items continue counting the days and
charging the fisher until these items are returned. In a case where the confiscated
items are auctioned, the fisher is expected to pay the owner for the number of days
that the items were not returned, plus the cost of the items. This punishment then puts
the fisher in a position where he is indebted to the owner of the items confiscated, and
hence needs to do more illegal fishing in order to payback the owner. According to
Pomeroy et al. (2001), the rules should be simple so that those affected by them can
easily understand and comply. Compliance is determined by the individual fisher’s
perspective of fairness and appropriateness of the law and its institutions.
A fair strategy would only be met with the participation of all the stakeholders
and a focus on community development. As argued by Kolding (2011), it is very
unlikely that the strong enforcement of the legislation would yield any positive
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results for either the fishers or the fishery. While the DoF is busy looking for ways to
effectively enforce the law, the fishers strongly resist them, and claim that the rules
and regulations would reduce, and not improve their catches, and that the majority of
the fish targeted will not be caught using legal fishing gears. The strong enforcement
of these restrictions would decrease pressure on the heavily exploited fish species
on the fishery. Therefore, the fishers are not ready to support the co-management
initiative, as it would enforce these rules and regulations, thereby reducing their
catches (Ostrom 2010).
The fisheries policy and legislation should be revised to leave room for
differentiation between the various fisheries within the country. In this way, specific
regulations, adapted to the prevailing conditions in each individual fishery, can be
designed. For the Bangweulu fisheries, some illegal fishing gears such as seine nets
can be legalized, until further analysis is done on the effects of the small mesh sizes
on the fishery, as most fish species are too small for the prescribed meshes, hence the
DoF should tolerate these methods. This can only be amicably resolved through a
co-management partnership involving various key stakeholders.
5.6. Communication between Stakeholders
Regular communication and dialogue between partners are critical for the
successful governance of capture fisheries, as they bring about transparency in
the implementation process (Pomeroy et al. 2001). Regular communication also
helps to monitor and control activities, as it gives the implementers an opportunity
to make informed decision. However, the Bangweulu fishery co-management
partners lacked regular communication arrangements. There were no scheduled
communication arrangements between institutions that have a stake in the fishery.
Since DoF was the only active member involved in the management of the fishery,
the lack of arrangements to communicate with other partners shows that DoF was
not accountable to these the partners over its actions. According to Uhlendahl et al.
(2011), the implementers of such arrangements must be accountable, efficient and
responsive. This led to a situation where there was no formal channel for the
presentation of views and concerns of the local people. As indicated by 74% of
household heads, the local community’s views and concerns were only presented to
DoF during the co-management sensitization meetings, and this was one of the rare
meetings between DoF and local communities. Hence, the local communities had no
say on the management of the fishery. The DoF only informed the communities on
the fish ban enforcement, mainly at the beginning of the fish ban period. This was
being done through posters, and the use of the Zambia Information Service AV
announcers who would go around the communities announcing the same.
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Although some of the chiefs captured the views and concerns of the local people
through the headmen and presented them to government through the area councilors,
the views may not give a full reflection of the community’s views and concerns,
as the community members were not aware that they should report their concerns
through their traditional leaders. The local community’s views and concerns were
only captured informally by the headmen (traditional leaders), mainly through
interactions, and not through community meetings. There was also disconnect in
communication between chiefs and DoF as chiefs report to area councilors, who
have no direct communication with the DoF. Local government was not actively
involved in fisheries management, unless if bylaws were to be made. Hence, local
government had no communication arrangements with other stakeholders in the
fishery. They only communicated with other stakeholders through the District
Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC) meetings. However, the DDCC was
ineffective because it was a composition of various ministry personnel operating at
district level with diverse interest.
Effective co-management calls for continuous dialogue and understanding
between stakeholders (Donda and Njaya 2007). Since the VFMCs were not having
meetings with the local communities, they were not a channel of communication
that could represent the local people, as they were not having the local people’s
views and concerns, but their own personal views and concerns. Therefore, poor
communication can be a recipe for weak partners or mare stakeholder participation.
6. Conclusions
Achieving SDG 17 is an interesting task at both a national and international
level, particularly as the successful implementation of this goal transforms
the implementation of the entire SDGs. It is placed at the center of SDG
implementation, and emphasizes building a multi-stakeholder partnership for the
SDGs. There has been a mismatch between the types of partnerships required
for transformation to achieve SDGs and the voluntary partnership approach in
management. Therefore, achieving the implementation of SDG 17 as framed requires
strong institutional frameworks with deliberate policy strategies that strengthen
nationally focused partnerships as the case of co-management. It was found that a
well-defined institutional framework should be set up to guide the operations of the
co-management initiative, which has to be supported by the policy and legislation.
Each partner should have well defined roles and responsibility owed to other partners.
Partners should be able to incur costs and derive benefit from the initiative if it is to
be sustainable. As is the case for local governments, they should be able to see the
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benefits of sharing revenue from the fish levy with the co-management group. It was
observed that there should be a high level of corporation and transparency between
partners, in order to develop support from other stakeholders. The fisheries policy and
legislation are inappropriate for effective governance in poor communities if it lacks
consideration of local community needs. The main objective of the fisheries policy in
Zambia was to conserve fisheries resources and promote sustainable fishing practice.
The initiative was not meant to uplift the living conditions of the fishing communities;
hence the arrangement has failed to attract the support of local fishers and proved to
be a weak link in the partnership. Although the local communities would benefit
when fish stocks increase in the long run, they need to be helped with alternative
livelihoods for them to support and effectively participate in fisheries co-management.
There can be no effective co-management in poor fishing communities if alternative
livelihoods are not provided. Co-management should be designed in such a way that
it should be able to uplift the living standards of the local communities and benefit
all the stakeholders. Both the policy and co-management arrangements lack a benefit
sharing mechanism to promote local community development. Fishers would not
support new restrictions on the fishery as such a move would deepen their poverty
levels. There is a need to change the policy focus to a more community development
centered approach as it could be more sustainable than that with a conservation focus.
The critical importance of strong partnerships cannot be emphasized enough to
enable collective action with the full participation of all relevant stakeholders. It is
important to note that having a greater mixture of stakeholders’ representation in
fisheries management committees will lead to stronger co-management partnerships.
Co-management programs should involve various stakeholders that are seen to be
trustworthy, transparent, operating cooperatively and equitably. This would lead to
stronger partnerships that would ensure sustainability of such an initiative.
A good partnership approach for the successful implementation of
co-management in poor communities should ensure the following;
• The institutional framework should promote strong partnerships with well-defined
roles among partners, as this goes beyond the involvement of stakeholders.
• The partnerships should be made in such a way that all partners should be able
to derive mutual benefits acceptable by each given partner.
• The policy on fisheries management should focus on uplifting the livelihood of
local communities, while at the same time conserving fish.
• The promoters of co-management should involve the local fishing communities in
identifying alternative livelihoods, so that the locals can support co-management.
This does not necessarily mean providing incentives in the form of handouts,
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but supporting different avenues like rural entrepreneurship, market linkages,
agricultural development, formation of some business development association,
capacity building in local development ventures and the provision of capital,
using credit facilities.
These measures can be used to develop sustainable co-management partnerships
that would contribute to the successful attainment of SDG 17. The strong arrangement
would help erase hunger and eliminate poverty in poor fishing communities.
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Reflecting on the Role of Academia–Private
Sector Partnerships in Moving Forward with
the SDGs
Annmarie Ryan and Christian Hauser
1. Introduction
Partnerships are central to realizing the United Nations Agenda 2030, and thus
have received their own focus within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Specifically, in SDG 17, “Partnerships to Achieve the Goals”, partnerships are
enshrined as an integral mechanism for the achievement of the other 16 goals. Central
to the SDG agenda is the notion of strengthening global solidarity. Solidarity comes
with connotations of collective action and the recognition that we can do more
together than on our own. This is set against the backdrop that the challenges
we face, and hence the issues that the SDGs seek to address, are wicked in nature.
This implies that individual solutions are not easy to find and, where problems are
codependent on one another, there is interdependency in the problem. This means we
must take a broader holistic view when attempting to address the SDGs. However,
despite the apparent prominence and importance of partnerships in the SDGs, it is
interesting to note that in SDG 17 only two of the 19 sub-targets, targets 17.16 and
17.17, correspond to the interaction between partners. Cross sector partnerships are
regarded as an important vehicle to achieve broad-scale change for sustainability
(Clarke and Crane 2018), enabling parties from different sectors to come together,
share skills and resources, and ultimately achieve more together than they could
on their own (Gray and Wood 1991; Glasbergen 2007; Googins and Rochlin 2000).
From over 40 years of research in business relationships, public–private partnerships,
cross-sector partnerships, and, more recently, multi-stakeholder partnerships, it has
been shown that the quality of interaction between parties is crucial in order to
achieve major positive societal and/or environmental outcomes. To this end, extant
literature has adopted a process perspective that considers how actors interact with
one another and the impact that the mode of interaction has on the achieved outcome
of the partnership (Seitanidi and Ryan 2007; Barroso-Méndez et al. 2016).
In this essay, we advocate a process perspective and describe how higher
education institutions (HEIs) can engage in partnerships for sustainable development
in which knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources are mobilized
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and shared. Central to a process perspective is the question: What does each of
the involved parties have to give to the relationship, or indeed sacrifice, to make
the partnership succeed? For example, Håkansson and Snehota (1998) described
the inherent costs of partnerships, including a loss of control, a recognition of the
indeterminate nature of long-term relationships, the degree of investments required,
and the ‘stickiness’ of relationships, which refers to the situation in developing close
relationships with key counterparts where one also becomes connected to a wider
network of organizations, in both a direct and indirect way. Therefore, the focal
organization becomes subject to third-party relations, which they do not control directly.
A special focus of this essay is on partnerships of HEIs of the UN-backed
initiative Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME) and on how the
activities of schools from the PRME Champions network can inspire SDG-related
partnerships of other universities and business schools. PRME is a principles-based
global platform for HEIs to advance responsible management and the SDGs (Hauser
2019). Launched in 2007, the initiative aims to foster sustainability and corporate
social responsibility through educating future professionals at HEIs. As of 2020,
PRME had 820 signatory HEIs globally who have committed to integrating the
six PRME principles throughout their organizational functions. Of the 820 PRME
signatories, the PRME Champion network consists of 37 business schools globally
who are actively committed and highly engaged in fostering the PRME and the SDG
agenda. In the context of this essay, two key principles of the PRME are vital. Principle
5 focuses on partnerships and calls on HEIs to collaborate with key stakeholders,
and share knowledge and skills in meeting stakeholders’ social and environmental
responsibilities. The emphasis here is to work collaboratively rather than through
dogma or preaching. This brings us to Principle 6, which focuses on dialogue and,
again, brings with it the notion of listening to other stakeholders to understand and
empathize with their position, and bring different stakeholders together to foster
collaboration and collective action.
Even where HEIs have established an SDG-related agenda, they will face
challenges and issues trying to collaborate with their stakeholders on SDG-related
topics. These challenges are associated with bringing together multiple stakeholders
on common issues, mobilizing financial resources and securing affective commitment
within the organization. After all, it is usually the organizations’ agenda and their
specific needs that determine the definition of the issues at stake, and with whom
to collaborate, that will lead to the desired results. However, this is different with
SDG-related partnerships because the issues do not have to be defined by the
agendas and needs of the individual organizations, but by the SDGs (Hauser and
84
Ryan forthcoming). Furthermore, in the context of HEIs, not only the role of the
institution but also the role of the individual faculty members needs to be considered,
considering the unique aspect of academic freedom in higher education. In many
countries, academic freedom is a fundamental right and part of the self-conception
of universities, whether private or publicly owned. Scholars are free to decide
how to use the resources available to them and which topics they wish to focus on.
Furthermore, in many countries, the confines of faculty member engagement and
cooperation with stakeholders other than students are unclear and controversial.
In addition, partnerships with stakeholders often run up against the reward system
in the academic setting, because the rewards of promotion and tenure are based
essentially on peer-reviewed publications, while teaching and other activities, such as
facilitating society-oriented partnerships, rarely enter the equation for rewards
(cf. Schmandt and Wilson 2018).
2. Working towards the Partnership Sweet Spot
In an effort to scrutinize contemporary SDG-related partnerships between HEIs
and other sectors, the authors of this chapter recently proposed a three-dimensional
model (Hauser and Ryan forthcoming). The first dimension aims to address the
intended outcome of the partnership, whether the partnership is driven to serve
the basic organizational functions of the educational institution, or whether the
intended end benefit is for the practitioners and wider society. The second dimension
describes the degree of material commitment by the HEI towards the partnership.
This ranges on a continuum from low to high. At the lower end of the scale, little,
if any, support at the university level for the partnership would be provided. In this
case, human resources may be reallocated to allow for the partnership to occur,
or facilities may be made available for use for the partnership. The higher end of the
scale is characterized by great material commitment at the university level. Here,
funds may be provided explicitly for the partnership, or a new position specifically
created. The third dimension seeks to explain the level of affective commitment by
the university and is presented on a continuum from low to high, whereby both
top-level management and individual faculty members at HEIs who actively seek
SDG-related partnerships can be considered as having a high degree of affective
commitment, and those who are more passive and dormant in obtaining SDG-related
partnership are considered to have a low level.
For the purpose of this essay, we simplified dimensions two and three to consider
whether HEI partnerships are primarily faculty- or management-led. We offer
the following model as a method for HEIs to situate their current partnership
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activities and consider how they might achieve the partnership sweet spot (PSS).
The PSS, developed by the authors and introduced in this essay, integrates key
insights from the cross sector and inter-organizational research literature and is
offered as a parsimonious framework for HEIs to situate and strategically develop
their partnership portfolio. In the framework (see Figure 1), we suggest that HEI
partnerships will be primarily management- or faculty-led (horizontal axis) and
driven by their institutional agenda or in response to broader societal goals (vertical
axis). As we will see from the exemplars below, many institutions will have examples
of activities of partnership-related programs that fall into more than one category.
We suggest that the sweet spot is where, rather than viewing partnerships as isolated
activities driven by multiple logics, institutions attempt to work towards a more
central position, exemplified in the PSS. This PSS is where faculties are engaged and
are driving partnerships that align with their teaching and research interests, but are
supported, enabled and equipped by management. Furthermore, we identify that,
while the individual school agenda must be served, this should be done in a manner
that meaningfully addresses the SDG 17 challenges of the wider society, and the school
should provide a framework to measure or reflect on the impact of their partnership
activities. We understand that this is an ongoing process and, therefore, the model
presented should be regarded as dynamic in nature (see return arrows and broken
line circles), where the sweet spot is regarded as an overarching ‘direction of travel’
in building sustainable, SDG-responsive academia–private sector partnerships.
Figure 1. The academia–private sector partnership sweet spot (PPS). Source:
Own illustration.
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3. Examples of SDG-Related Academia–Private Sector Partnerships
To learn more about existing partnerships between academia and other sectors,
the 37 business schools of the PRME Champion network were contacted in September
2019 and asked to provide some examples of their partnership activities. A total
of 13 business schools responded to the request and provided written examples.
The following section draws on these examples to illustrate the PSS framework.
Depending on whether the partnership is initiated by individual faculty members
(right side of the horizontal axis) or by the university’s management (left side of
the horizontal axis), and on the level of material resources made available for the
activities by the university, the following examples illustrate how PRME Champion
schools acted in such circumstances to establish fruitful SDG-related partnerships.
The first exemplary scenarios refer to SDG-related partnerships that are primarily
oriented towards the domains of the university’s main business, i.e., teaching and
research (top of the vertical axis), whereas the examples that follow are oriented more
toward the SDG-related needs of the wider society (bottom of the vertical axis).
3.1. Examples of Faculty-Led Partnership Activities
As an individual faculty member, there are many opportunities to develop
partnerships with key stakeholders for teaching or research purposes. For example,
the faculty at Zeta University, located in northern Europe, actively searches for
partnerships for guest lecturers, for example, in their project course in Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR). Furthermore, faculty members of Zeta University collaborated
with colleagues of three other HEIs to create open-access online learning material on
all 17 SDGs, thus addressing the teaching aspects of the core business of the university.
All of the videos highlight local examples of contributions to the SDGs. They have
been created under the creative commons license and, thus, can be shared freely by
providing appropriate credit and can be built upon, as well, for non-commercial
purposes. Furthermore, this project forms the groundwork for a massive open online
course (MOOC) on the SDGs to be launched in 2020 on an e-learning platform with
over 8 million active users. Another example is partnerships, which are developed
to enable students to connect with the local community and offer and build their
expertise. In this regard, Australian Alpha University collaborates with the city
council and local businesses to offer internships to students alongside their studies to
enhance their learning.
When considering a cooperation that has a research orientation, the faculty at
Zeta University engage in partnerships for research projects and collaborations for
individual publications, which could then be further disseminated into additional
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research projects, or into educating the public at stakeholder events. At Lambda
Business School, another university located in northern Europe, many collaborative
research projects are positioned around the SDGs, particularly relating to CSR in
different companies, circular economy, sustainable industry networks, migration
and sustainable finance. In such applied research-oriented collaborative projects,
researchers mainly provide systematic approaches to develop CSR activities, reporting
and indicators (e.g., environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors) or
benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of policies or programs. Accordingly,
their partners provide data for researchers to analyze within such frameworks—often
in the interview format but sometimes also detailed data from operations. For example,
in a PhD project on the circular economy, several big manufacturers unveil their
logistics and supply chains for the student to include them in a model to evaluate the
environmental versus economic impacts of different business model alternatives.
Faculty members of the Kappa Business School in Western Europe collaborated
with colleagues of other HEIs in an effort to show how popular music can be used as
a way to discuss climate change and climate action, as well as to show that young
people have a voice on the subject. In this collaborative effort, a workshop was
conducted with international students and staff of the university, who were each
asked to write a paragraph about what climate change means to them, what the
environment means to them, and what the future looks like to them. From these
responses, a senior lecturer shaped them into lyrics, wrote the music, and then brought
it to the university’s recording studios where it was sung by a university graduate,
and played by members of staff. The song was then used in higher education as
both a template of how to engage students from different countries, subject areas,
and universities in a proactive discussion about climate change or as a conversation
starter to help elicit new ideas or projects. It is especially suited to discuss actions
related to SDG 7 and SDG 13 but, as it tries to ‘shake up’ students into keeping our
world as beautiful as it is, it can be used to prompt behavioral changes with regards
to any of the SDGs.
In a further initiative, Kappa Business School also engaged in partnerships to
develop a training program on carbon literacy. Here, they invited academics with
relevant expertise or those with tools to contribute to the development and rolling
out of training to contribute. The training consists of three hours of the science of
climate change and business impacts. The training program is one way to move the
discussions of climate change to the forefront as business school academics teach their
students, conduct their research, and engage with business leaders. Parallel to this
package, a train-the-trainer version is also in the process of being developed, the idea
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being that interested business schools could invite one of the certified trainers to do a
full day of training and pass the knowledge on to the academics they want to train in
their business school.
In another direction, the examples provided by PRME Champion schools also
illustrated a more direct alignment of faculty-led partnerships with the SDG-related
needs and requirements of their partners. For instance, faculty members of Iota
Business School located in Western Europe created a module, which actively engages
students with local non-profits and community organizations to help them deliver
on the SDGs relevant to their particular missions using social media. Additionally,
the faculty engage with local disadvantaged schools in the vicinity to encourage
the children to consider university as an option. In a similar way, the faculty of Mu
University engage in several societal-oriented initiatives. For instance, the university
created and participates in a program that aims to reduce the proportion of youth
unemployment as well as reduce the amount of young people who do not study nor
receive training. Here, the faculty contribute to the development of competencies in
neighboring communities to access employment and invite neighboring communities
to participate. Additionally, they also engage in a faculty-run program that aims
to contribute to the full and effective participation of women at decisive levels
in economic life. Moreover, in order to support and facilitate the access of small
businesses and other companies to financial services, the faculty at Mu University
in Latin America collaborate with financial institutions in designing educational
materials and carrying out academic programs that contribute to the financial
inclusion of small businesses and farmers.
In addition to seeking and conducting SDG-related partnerships, it is also
important to consider the impact of these faculty driven engagements. For example,
to evaluate the success and synergistic benefits of guest lecturer partnerships, Zeta
University conducts a feedback survey with the organizations involved as well as
the students.
Faculty-led partnerships are a vital component of any HEI partnership agenda
in the sense that individual or groups of faculty can mobilize engagement with
stakeholders, community organizations and local businesses, and are well placed to
design and develop initiatives related to sustainable development. However, without
broader institutional support, these initiatives might remain isolated and singular,
and lose impact over time. Thus, even if different institutions have varying levels
of resources available to support partnerships, it is, nevertheless, vital that senior
management supports such initiatives and initiates SDG-related partnerships.
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3.2. Examples of Management-Led Partnership Activities
Business schools have a key role to play in enabling partnership formation
amongst stakeholders and providing leadership in their local communities on specific
issues. The examples provided by the PRME Champion schools highlight that driving
forces of partnerships differ case by case. In this regard, management-led partnerships
can be driven primarily in line with the priorities and agenda of the HEI. For example,
management can play a key role in enabling partnerships by explicitly investing
and offering resources to facilitate the initiation of research-oriented partnerships
with institutions of the private and public sectors. For example, the faculty at Beta
University in Western Europe can apply to the university’s research council for
an initial financing grant. These funds are intended to help attract and build up
partnerships and research consortia. Whilst the grant does not have an exclusive SDG
focus, sustainable development is one of the three strategic areas of the university.
Therefore, many of the applications and subsequent partnerships relate to topics from
this area. After the faculty have been sponsored with the initial capital, the subsequent
partnerships and research projects must be self-sustained and externally funded.
Alpha University partnered with another HEI to form an SME Research Centre.
This center conducts multidisciplinary research on small and medium-size private
businesses and not-for-profit enterprises, bringing together practitioner insights with
world-class analysis, to enable policy development. The work of the research center
provides a model of applied research leading the world in delivering critical reform
to the SME sector backed up with tangible policy announcements.
A further example of the leadership that management can show is to listen to
their faculty and stakeholders in devising their sustainability or partnership strategies.
For example, through partnerships, Theta Business School in Latin America used their
stakeholders’ perception of the SDGs as a guideline for their sustainability strategy,
which in turn helped them define future partnerships and collaborations. To do
so, the business school invited internal, as well as external, stakeholders, such as
suppliers, to a focus group to discuss the university’s positive and negative impacts,
the ways in which they could improve their institution and concrete goals for the
future. Additionally, Theta Business School used an online questionnaire to reach out
to thousands of students and alumni as well as professors and employees of their
different campuses. The questions focused on the stakeholders’ perception of the SDG
and the SDG’s individual importance to the business school, while providing leeway
for feedback and suggestions. The results were analyzed and put into the materiality
matrix the business school uses as a guideline for its sustainability strategy.
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Systemic-level change becomes possible when the HEI moves beyond
its institutional boundaries to enable the formation of SDG-related networks.
For example, Zeta University organizes an annual stakeholder conference where
they try to initiate matchmaking with different partners for potential collaborations
in research and education on themes related to sustainability, CSR and the SDGs.
Kappa Business School collaborates with a voluntary initiative that works closely
with organizations across the region to run networking events and interactive
workshops focusing on issues surrounding employee engagement. The group consists
of members interested in employee engagement from a variety of organizations.
Improving employee engagement and productivity is challenging for all organizations,
especially SMEs who often lack the time and resources to implement engagement
initiatives. By connecting organizations through the regional group, members can
share problems and support each other in developing solutions. The business school
noted that feedback from the events has been extremely positive, with members
stating that they appreciated the opportunity to share thoughts and take ideas back
to their organizations to implement.
Nu University in Asia had the opportunity to focus on the SDGs when redesigning
its campus. Collaborating with the government and other industry players was a key
strategic goal for the university, which used these partnerships to help lead the way
towards a sustainable future. As a result of the university’s top-down commitment
to having a strong partnership with the local chamber of commerce, a sustainable
campus was built with a gold certification of a green building certification system.
It became a benchmark as a green campus since the entire campus operates at higher
standards of energy conservation at all levels, while generating solar energy aiming
to be self-sufficient. With the green building of Nu University, various benefits were
targeted, including significant financial savings, better occupant satisfaction, reduced
levels of pollution and global publicity.
The management of the North American Epsilon Business School states that
it values authentic and meaningful partnerships and recognizes the importance
of collaboration and community outreach. In its endeavors, the business school
provided financial support to create a center for business and student enterprise that
offers experiential learning opportunities, community engagement initiatives and
incubation for student and alumni start-ups. The center specializes in problem solving
for industry and innovative processes designed to bring new ideas to life. The center’s
incubator program provides space, mentorship, and funding for entrepreneurs to
bring their new venture ideas to life. The start-ups are evaluated by whether they
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provide a social benefit along with a sound business model to highlight that a
successful business focuses on both profitability and social impact.
An example of a partnership in this scenario, at the Western European Delta
University, is the multi-stakeholder Delta Club. The club is a widening participation
and community engagement initiative, working across the university’s local
communities. In order to tackle below average progression rates into higher education,
the Delta Club challenges perceived barriers to progression, providing positive and
rewarding experiences within a higher education setting. This partnership has won
multiple awards for its innovative approach to working with local communities.
Senior management support for SDG-related partnerships is vital in bringing
about higher-level change and impact on the local, regional, or national level.
However, without the contribution of passionate and expert faculties, there is reason
to fear that senior-management-driven partnership agendas may prove to be futile
and unsustainable. The key lesson from the above examples is the value of having
institutions listen to their faculty when developing their partnership strategies, and of
using faculties’ expertise, their social capital and their network of relations as an
important input in the HEI’s future partnerships.
4. Conclusions
Partnerships are central to realizing the SDGs. Thus, HEIs globally are trying
to find ways to build partnerships that address the SDGs. In an effort to inspire
other HEIs to collaborate with their stakeholders, we asked members of the PRME
Champion group about their SDG-related partnerships. The examples from PRME
Champion HEIs show that, on the one hand, some SDG-related partnerships are
led by faculty initiatives, whereas, on the other hand, other partnerships are
led by the management of the HEI. This can also have a level of impact on the
resource commitment provided by the HEI for initiating, establishing and sustaining
partnerships. Moreover, looking at the examples, it can be observed that the HEIs also
tend to want to achieve different aims with their SDG-related partnerships. In this
regard, some partnerships are primarily oriented towards the different domains
of the university’s main business, i.e., teaching and research. Conversely, other
partnerships focus more directly on the SDG-related needs of the wider society.
While we agree that partnerships should serve both society and the organization,
we would like to acknowledge that this is not always the case. This has been
addressed in the literature on cross-sector partnering in discussions on partnerships
and their societal impact, where Van Tulder et al. (2016, p. 18) argue that “research
on the impact of partnerships i.e., looking whether partnerships make a difference to
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society (‘so what’ questions) is mainly grounded on anecdotal evidence employing
prescriptive and ‘best-practice’ reasoning”. In this essay, we do not present individual
school exemplars as falling into one of the quadrants of the partnership sweet spot
model presented. Rather than prescribing individual examples as ‘best practice’,
we suggest that HEIs use the model as a guideline to locate the positioning of their
current or desired partnership activities. By gaining a greater understanding of the
status quo of the partnerships, we suggest that HEIs can use this information to work
towards the partnership sweet spot located at the center of the framework. In this
situation, ideally, the faculty would be engaged and driving partnerships that align
with their teaching and research interests and serve the SDG-related needs of the
wider community, but are supported, enabled and equipped by management to do
so. The model can further offer inspiration on the future direction of travel for HEIs
in developing and pushing their partnership agenda. Thus, depending on the point
of departure, the individual examples can serve the reader as inspiration for their
future partnerships.
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Achieving the Global 2030 Agenda:
What Role for Voluntary
Sustainability Standards?
Axel Marx and Charline Depoorter
1. Introduction
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) is a plan of action for “people, planet and prosperity”. The 17 goals
cover all crucial policy areas to secure a sustainable future, including education,
health, economic development, social protection, environmental protection, and
natural resources governance. The 17 goals are operationalised in 169 targets
which need to be reached by 2030 or earlier. The SDGs build on the Millennium
Development Goals. A crucial difference between the Millennium Development
Goals and Sustainable Development Goals is that the former were mainly targeted
to governments, while the latter target many different stakeholders, including the
private sector and voluntary sustainability standards. Indeed, a shift in approach
between the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals
is the recognition that policy objectives are best achieved by involving and integrating
different stakeholders in the policy process. This is explicitly recognised in SDG
17, which aims to foster partnerships for these goals (see Georg von Schnurbein’s
introduction to this volume). As a result, the 2030 Agenda carves out an important
role for private actors in governing for sustainable development.
Among private (understood as “non-state”) actors, Voluntary Sustainability
Standards (VSS) can play an especially important role for the SDGs and for SDG 17
in particular, as they can both serve as implementation means and help revitalise the
partnerships for these goals. First, VSS can act as enforcement mechanisms for these
goals, since they share similar objectives with the SDGs (WWF 2017). Although the
language of the SDGs distinguishes between “goals”, “targets”, and “indicators”,
the generic term “objectives” is used in this chapter to refer to the fact that complying
with specific standards of a VSS can contribute to achieving specific targets of an SDG.
Second, VSS contribute to foster partnerships, since they operate globally and connect
the Global South to the Global North through values chains (Ponte 2019). In a world
characterised by an exponential growth in international trade and, more importantly,
a change in the nature of trade, VSS can potentially play a crucial role to contribute
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to sustainable development. Products we buy and consume on a daily basis rely on
the functioning of global value chains, meaning that the production process of most
goods takes place in more than one country. Changes in information technology
“have permitted firms to geographically splinter their ‘production lines’, designing
international supply chains that allocate different parts of the production process to
firms in different countries” (Hoekman 2014; see also Hamilton et al. 2012; Cattaneo
et al. 2010). The importance of trade is also recognised under SDG 17 and is singled
out as an important implementation mechanism to achieve sustainable development.
The objective of this chapter is to present how VSS can potentially make a
contribution to achieving the SDGs if they overcome some main challenges. We first
introduce VSS, briefly describe how they operate, and provide leading examples of
VSS. Next, we discuss how they are linked to the SDGs. In a third section, some of the
main developments in the landscape of VSS are identified. The fourth part discusses
the challenges which VSS are confronted with. We end with a short conclusion.
2. What Are VSS and How Do They Operate?
The United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS) defines VSS
as “standards specifying requirements that producers, traders, manufacturers,
retailers or service providers may be asked to meet, relating to a wide range of
sustainability metrics, including respect for basic human rights, worker health and
safety, the environmental impacts of production, community relations, land use
planning and others” (UNFSS 2013, p. 3). In this chapter, the term “VSS” refers to the
organisations that set, enforce, and monitor such standards. While they often emanate
from a joint initiative between the private sector and civil society organisations,
VSS are considered as private (i.e., non-state) governance actors.
All VSS initiatives differ in how they set and enforce rules, although there
are some commonalities. In a stylised way, one could say that they aim to
achieve sustainable development in three distinct steps. First, they develop
standards, often embedding them in existing national and international laws
by, for example, including international legal commitments in their foundational
principles. In this way, they integrate public rules and standards in a private set of
procedures. These standards try to cover all dimensions of sustainability. Second,
they translate these principles and standards into measurable indicators and actions.
VSS operationalise international norms and principles in specific standards and
benchmarks, which makes compliance assessment possible. Often, VSS initiatives
start with defining general principles as noted earlier, and delegate the formulation
of specific standards to working groups or committees which can take local
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conditions into account. These general principles are, hence, translated into specific
“compliance benchmarks”. These benchmarks contain more specific criteria which
are related to each of the broad principles. Each of these benchmarks is, in turn,
further defined and operationalised into measurable indicators. Third, they develop a
comprehensive institutional framework to monitor compliance with these standards.
After operationalising international norms into specific standards, VSS put systems
in place to monitor compliance with standards by VSS adopters. Monitoring allows
for the assessment of compliance with specific standards. Monitoring in VSS is a
function of two interrelated components, namely audit-based systems and complaint
systems (Marx and Wouters 2015). The former refer to the assessment of conformity,
with standards and rules by independent third parties through a set of standardised
procedures, primarily based on audit procedures. The latter, complaint systems,
allow different stakeholders to constantly monitor compliance with commitments
and, in cases of non-compliance, file a complaint. These systems empower external
stakeholders by allowing them to raise issues relevant for the functioning of VSS.
Although the idea of voluntary standards is quite old (Marx and Wouters 2015),
their proliferation is of a more recent nature. Two databases map out all existing
VSS: the International Trade Centre (ITC) Standards Map currently counts over
260 VSS (ITC 2020) and the Ecolabel Index more than 460 (Ecolabel Index 2020).
To recognise them better, we give several leading examples of VSS so as to cover
different commodities and economic sectors.
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is a global, not-for-profit organisation
that sets standards to make forest management environmentally responsible, socially
beneficial, and economically viable in the long term. It was founded in 1993 by
several environmental NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the National
Wildlife Federation and Friends of the Earth, along with profit-making firms such
as Home Depot, B&Q, and IKEA. The emergence of the FSC is a result of strong
public demands for forestry industry regulation in the 1980s, and of a perceived
governance gap in the matter (Klooster 2010; Cashore et al. 2007; Bloomfield 2012).
The FSC, as a third-party certification scheme, is considered by several scholars as
the most advanced example of VSS due to its scope and structure (Gulbrandsen 2004;
Bell and Hindmoor 2012; Schepers 2010). Indeed, about 200 million hectares of forests
are FSC-certified in a total of 90 countries, mostly in Europe and North America
(Forest Stewardship Council 2019a). Besides, the FSC is a truly multi-stakeholder
VSS, not only as it was created by environmental NGOs and profit-making firms
together, but also since its membership includes individuals such as academics,
students, and activists, as well as organisations such as NGOs and profit-making
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firms. Its General Assembly is composed of independent members and delegates of
member organisations that represent environmental, social, and economic interests.
Decision-making power between these interests, as well as between Northern and
Southern countries’ interests, is equally distributed (Forest Stewardship Council
2019b; Pattberg 2005; Marx and Cuypers 2010; Marx et al. 2012; Moog et al. 2015).
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) was created in 1997 by the WWF
and Unilever, a profit-making firm and the largest seafood buyer in the mid-1990s.
It emerged as a response to the collapse of Grand Banks cod fishery off Newfoundland
in the early 1990s and to the inability of governments to efficiently tackle overfishing
practices and protect working conditions in the fishery industry (Marine Stewardship
Counci 2019a; Gulbrandsen 2009). The MSC, therefore, sets standards on fishery
practices in order to protect oceans and safeguard seafood supplies. It has certified
15 percent of global marine catch and aims to reach 30 percent by 2030. Altogether,
361 fisheries are MSC-certified in a total of 41 countries, mostly in North American
and European waters, which makes the MSC the largest VSS in the fishery industry
(Marine Stewardship Council 2019b). The MSC is a multi-stakeholder organisation,
as its council includes representatives from the seafood industry, the environmental
NGO community, the market sector, and scientists and academia. These members
are divided into two categories, representing public interests on the one hand and
commercial and socioeconomic interests on the other hand (Foley 2013; Ponte 2012;
Gulbrandsen 2009).
The Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) is an independent organisation that works
with garment brands, workers, and industry influencers in order to improve labour
conditions in the garment industry. It was established in 1999 when a Dutch trade
union, the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV), and the Clean Clothes
Campaign, an advocacy group for garment workers, joined together to improve labour
conditions in the garment industry. The FWF developed a Code of Labour Practices
made up of eight labour standards derived from International Labour Organization
(ILO) Conventions and the UN Declaration on Human Rights. Member organisations
commit to this code’s principles and are required to take action to fully implement
them and to monitor their progress (Marx and Wouters 2016, 2017). The FWF currently
counts 187 member brands across 11 countries, mostly in Asia (Fair Wear Foundation
2019). Besides, the organisation is governed by a bipartite board composed of business
associations and trade unions and NGOs, which share equal power. The FWF also
encourages consultation of and collaboration between brands, trade unions, NGOs,
governments, and international organisations.
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The Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) was founded in 2009 following a WWF-led
round table initiative, and was supported by major organisations such as Adidas,
Gap Inc., H&M, ICCO, IFAP, IFC, IKEA, Organic Exchange, Oxfam, and PAN UK.
The BCI aims to make cotton a sustainable mainstream commodity by reducing
the environmental impacts of cotton production and by improving the livelihoods
and economic development of cotton producing areas (Zulfiqar and Thapa 2018).
The BCI is the largest cotton sustainability programme in the world, with more than
two million licensed BCI farmers in 21 countries, mostly in Asia, Brazil, and Africa.
This makes up 19 percent of the global cotton production (Better Cotton Initiative
2019a). In order to be licensed, farmers need to comply with defined minimum
standards on pesticide use, water management, decent work, record keeping, training,
and other factors, but they are nonetheless encouraged to further improve their
practices. To attain its missions, the BCI works with a wide range of stakeholders
across the cotton supply chain. Besides, its council includes member organisations
ranging from civil society organisations, producers, and retailers, to brands, suppliers
and manufacturers as well as independent members (Better Cotton Initiative 2019b).
The Rainforest Alliance was founded in 1987 as a non-governmental organisation
that promotes responsible business. It provides certifications for sustainable forestry
and agriculture, more particularly in the coffee, cocoa, tea, hazelnut, and banana
sectors, but also for sustainable tourism. In 1989, the Rainforest Alliance became
the first certification scheme to target forestry practices. It merged with UTZ in
2018 as both VSS were carrying similar work to address deforestation, climate
change, systemic poverty, and social inequality. The organisation is active in more
than 60 countries and counts over 2 million certified farmers, particularly in South
America, Africa, Asia, and the US (Rainforest Alliance 2019). The Rainforest Alliance
operates against standards that have been developed by the Sustainable Agriculture
Network (SAN), which revolve around ten principles: social and environmental
management system; ecosystem conservation; wildlife protection; water conservation;
fair treatment and good working conditions for workers; occupational health and
safety; community relations; integrated crop management; soil management and
conservation; integrated waste management (Ochieng et al. 2013). The Rainforest
Alliance General Assembly has a tripartite structure balancing economic, social,
and environmental interests in dedicated chambers with equal voting power
(Rainforest Alliance 2017). It also promotes collaboration with producers, workers
organisations, traders, retailers, governments, NGOs, civil society organisations,
academia, and research institutions.
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3. To Which SDGs Do VSS Contribute?
VSS can serve as implementation means for these goals, since they share similar
objectives. This makes VSS relevant not only to SDG 17, but to the other SDGs as
well. This section describes the contribution that VSS make to the SDGs, which is
summarized in Figure 1.
Intuitively, one understands that VSS can directly contribute to the achievement
of SDG 12 on sustainable consumption and production. VSS, by essence, aim to
entrench more sustainable and transparent practices among actors at all levels of
global value chains, which contributes to making global production more sustainable
(WWF 2017; DIE 2015). In addition, VSS contribute to achieving sustainable
consumption, as they provide end-consumers with information on the sustainability
of production processes and value chains through labels, which can raise awareness
and shift consumption towards sustainable products. Yet, VSS can contribute to other
SDGs as well.
A broad study conducted by the UNFSS compares the requirements of 122 VSS
with 10 preselected SDGs, their targets, and their indicators. Results show that there
are strong complementarities between VSS requirements and SDG 8 on decent work
and economic growth, in particular, with 102 VSS requirements being relevant to
SDG 8. Among these 102 relevant requirements, the ones with the highest coverage
among the 122 VSS under study all relate to decent work (UNFSS 2018). Half of those
are directly linked to ILO standards, confirming that VSS have complementarities
not only with SDG 8, and more particularly, with target 8 on labour rights and safe
working conditions, but also with the international labour rights regime more broadly
(Marx et al. 2017). Second, the study finds that 78 VSS requirements match with SDG
12 on sustainable consumption and production, and more particularly, with targets
4, 5, and 6 on issues of waste management, use of chemicals, training of staff on
sustainability issues, and development of environmental and social management
systems. Third, 60 VSS requirements are found relevant to SDG 15 on life on land,
mostly in relation to targets 2, 3, 5, and 7 on biodiversity, on quality, contamination
and erosion of soils, on sustainable use and management of forests and nature
resources or ecosystems, and on protection of wildlife (UNFSS 2018).
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Figure 1. Contribution of Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS) to the
Sustainable Development Goals. Source: Own illustration.
Although the UNFSS study shows that VSS have the most complementarities
with SDGs 8, 12, and 15, they also share similar requirements with other
SDGs. For example, VSS can contribute to SDG 2 on zero hunger, food security,
and sustainable agriculture as they aim to improve agricultural productivity, increase
farmers’ incomes, and ensure access to natural resources. VSS also participate
in achieving SDG 3 on good health and wellbeing, as some VSS requirements
are targeted at improving health and safety at work, as well as ensuring water
and air quality. SDG 5 on gender equality is also tackled in many VSS schemes,
as they promote equal income and opportunities and seek to prevent violence and
harassment. Moreover, VSS can contribute to SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation,
as they aim to improve water use in production, prevent water pollution, and protect
freshwater ecosystems. VSS schemes also include requirements linked to SDG 13
on climate action, more particularly, on measuring and reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, on increasing carbon sequestration, and on improving energy efficiency
and promoting renewable energy use. Besides, VSS contribute to the achievement
of SDG 14 on life below water, as some include requirements on maintaining and
rebuilding fish stocks and on protecting marine and coastal ecosystems. Lastly,
VSS can also help achieve SDG 17 on partnerships for these goals, since they promote
multi-stakeholder participation, transparency, knowledge exchange, public–private
partnerships, and sustainable investments (WWF 2017). VSS taken as a whole,
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therefore, directly contribute to many SDGs. Yet, if taken individually, some VSS
can contribute more to the achievement of some SDGs than others. For example,
the MSC will evidently contribute more to SDG 14 on life below water than to SDG
15 on life on land, which the FSC addresses better.
Moreover, VSS can be, in some cases, indicators of progress in some SDGs. This is
the case for SDG 15 on life on land, target 2 on sustainable management of forests.
This target is monitored by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which uses,
among other indicators, the amount of certified forests to measure progress in SDG
15.2 (FAO 2019). This synergy involves that increased uptake of and compliance with
VSS goes hand in hand with progress in some SDG indicators.
Lastly, VSS can less directly but still positively participate in the achievement
of other SDGs such as SDG 1 on no poverty, SDG 4 on quality education, SDG 7
on affordable and clean energy, SDG 9 on industry, innovation, and infrastructure,
SDG 10 on reduced inequalities, SDG 11 on sustainable cities and communities,
and SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions. This is mainly due to the
interlinked nature of the SDGs, meaning that progress in one SDG can impact the
achievement of other SDGs. For example, the FWF aims at improving working
conditions in garment factories. Upon completion of its missions, workers would be
better paid and treated. This, in turn, could improve their financial ability to send
their children to school, for example, thus contributing to the achievement of SDG 4
on quality education. Therefore, VSS can both directly and indirectly contribute to
achieving the SDGs.
4. Developments
A first major development in VSS is their proliferation. The ITC Standards
Map and the Ecolabel Index are two datasets which allow researchers to track the
evolution of VSS over time. As aforementioned, the ITC Standards Map counts
approximately 260 VSS, and the Ecolabel Index, which is more comprehensive in
scope, currently counts 463 VSS. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of VSS
from 1940 to 2019 based on the Ecolabel Index Database. The figure shows a strong
increase in the number of initiatives between 2000 and 2010, then, a slowdown in
growth, and finally, stagnation in the last 3–4 years.
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Figure 2. Evolution in the number of existing VSS (1940-2020). Source: Ecolabel
Index Database—own calculation.
A second major development is that many of these VSS are integrated in
more traditional public policies, such as public procurement or trade policies.
This complementarity between public and private governance instruments is
being increasingly recognised in the academic literature. In a recent paper,
Lambin and Thorlakson (2018) show how new partnerships between governments,
private companies, and VSS are reshaping global environmental governance. They focus
specifically on the role of VSS in these new public–private partnerships. They argue
that contrary to widely held views, interactions between governments, NGOs,
and private companies surrounding the adoption of sustainable practices are not
generally antagonistic, and public and private environmental governance regimes rarely
operate independently, but rather reinforce each other (see also Lambin et al. 2014).
Eberlein et al. (2014) also demonstrate the importance of interactions in transnational
business governance. As they show, the number of schemes applying private authority
to govern business conduct across borders has vastly expanded in numerous issue areas.
Eberlein et al. (2014) argue that as these initiatives proliferate, they increasingly interact
with one another and with state-based regimes.
This interaction can happen in at least three ways. First, an increasing number
of bilateral trade agreements refer to the relevance of private initiatives. This is an
approach taken by the European Union in its trade policy. All recent bilateral trade
agreements signed by the European Union contain a commitment between the parties
to work together in the area of voluntary standards and eco-labels. For example,
the first of the “new generation” of trade agreements—that of the European Union
with South Korea applied since 2011—mentioned that parties will cooperate in
the area of fair and ethical trade, private and public certification, and labelling
schemes, including eco-labelling. All subsequent FTAs of the EU contain similar
language. Second, VSS and other private initiatives are increasingly integrated in
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public policy. For example, the European Union’s Directive on Renewable Energy
requires biofuels to be certified by a recognised certification scheme in order to
be considered a sustainable biofuel and count for the targets on renewable energy
(Schleifer 2013). The recent revision of the Act on the Sustainable Use of Timber in
South Korea explicitly recognises some VSS as proof of verification that timber and
timber products are legal. The revision of this Act, which has been implemented
since 1 October 2018, made South Korea one of the first East Asian countries to
issue mandatory legislation that regulates the legality of imported and domestically
produced timber and timber products. According to the revised Act, unverified
timber cannot be sold in South Korea and has to be returned to the country of
origin or destroyed. Third, governments worldwide are using their purchasing
power to pursue sustainable development through sustainable public procurement.
In sustainable public procurement, VSS are increasingly used as a shortcut to facilitate
sustainable buying (Marx 2019; D’Hollander and Marx 2014).
5. Challenges
VSS are also confronted with significant challenges, which will determine the
degree to which they can contribute to achieving the SDGs.
A first challenge has to do with credibility. VSS have been confronted with
claims that they are not credible. Marx (2013) shows, on the basis of an analysis of
426 VSS, that many VSS differ in how they are designed and that quite a number of
them lack any credible enforcement architecture. This is confirmed by an analysis on
a smaller sample by Fiorini et al. (2016). Both studies suggest that several VSS are
pure “greenwashing” instruments rather than mechanisms to achieve sustainability.
However, many VSS also include stringent standards and elaborated enforcement
procedures, which are detailed by many case studies on VSS. Even for these credible
VSS, concerns have been raised on how legitimate they are and which interests they
do represent. Although there is evidence that some VSS are more dominated by
industry, several of these claims also have been countered in the literature, with some
authors arguing that the way VSS operate is sometimes remarkably democratic and
representative (Dingwerth 2007).
A second challenge has to do with increasing the effectiveness of these initiatives.
This has two dimensions. First, VSS need to create sufficient impact on the ground to
be a genuine governance tool. There are quite a few studies analysing the impact
of VSS and the degree to which they contribute to sustainable development along
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different socioeconomic and environmental metrics1. Yet, these studies show mixed
results. Some show positive impact, whereas others show little or sometimes even
negative impact (Oya et al. 2018; Mitiku et al. 2017; Loconto and Dankers 2014).
Results are often very context specific. However, one result, which is quite consistent,
is that it is difficult for VSS to perform equally well on all dimensions of sustainability,
probably because it is also too much to expect standards to deliver on all dimensions
of sustainability, even if that is the stated goal. Standards typically have a strong
impact on some sustainable development indicators but less on others (Brandi 2017).
For example, in relation to labour rights protection, VSS can have a positive impact
on some labour rights, such as working hours, wage, and safety requirements,
but less on others, such as freedom of association. A second dimension related to
effectiveness focuses on the degree to which standards are adopted. Some scholars
focus on adoption by companies and other organisations, while other scholars look
at adoption at the country level. Concerning the latter, one can observe that in some
countries, only a few VSS or public–private initiatives are active, while in others,
many more are active. Westerwinter (2020) finds this for Transnational Governance
Initiatives (TGIs), and the UNFSS (2020) find this for VSS. In relation to specific VSS,
Marx and Cuypers (2010) and Marx and Wouters (2016) find a “stuck to the bottom”
problem for some least developed countries which are not involved in any way in
VSS dynamics. This creates a challenge of exclusion and limited adoption of these
transnational governance initiatives. In order to have a significant impact, the use of
many of these governance systems should be scaled up.
A third main challenge which emerges has to do with coordination and
cooperation between the many existing initiatives. Due to the proliferation of
initiatives, the policy or governance space is currently very crowded and there is only
a limited degree of cooperation between different initiatives. In relation to private
and public private initiatives, the lack of cooperation is very outspoken and creates
different types of problems. Marx and Wouters (2015) aimed to capture the degree of
cooperation between VSS by looking at the use of mutual recognition as a mechanism
to coordinate between different initiatives. They found that mutual recognition
between VSS is very low. This creates two types of problems. For consumers
wanting to use these VSS as a means to buy sustainably, it creates confusion.
For producers who need to comply with VSS requirements, it creates additional costs,
1 Many of the leading impact studies are brought together on Evidensia, an online library aiming to
provide credible research on the sustainability impacts and effectiveness of supply chain initiatives
such as VSS. See https://www.evidensia.eco/ (accessed on 29 July 2020).
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since they sometimes need to comply with multiple VSS. The lack of cooperation
between systems is due to several factors such as different strategies and objectives,
different procedures to assess conformity with VSS, or plain competition.
6. Conclusions
This chapter presented how VSS can contribute to achieving the SDGs. VSS have
emerged and developed into a significant governance instrument which operates
globally. They feed into SDG 17 by acting as implementation means for the 2030
Agenda, as compliance with their sustainability standards can contribute to achieving
many SDGs’ targets. Besides, VSS exemplify the multi-stakeholder approach and
partnerships that SDG 17 aims to foster, as they link the Global South and the
Global North through global value chains. VSS are, therefore, natural allies to pursue
the SDGs.
However, VSS face significant challenges in terms of credibility, effectiveness,
and cooperation. In particular, the potential for VSS to contribute to the achievement
of the SDGs depends on their level of adoption, as well as on their sustainability
impact on the ground (WWF 2017). Indeed, the more actors adopt VSS, the more the
practices of these actors will shift to more sustainable ones and the more progress
will be made towards the achievement of the SDGs. In addition, some VSS have
more stringent requirements than others, and even within a single VSS scheme,
some requirements might be more rigorous than others. More stringent VSS might
create bigger impacts on the ground, and hence, contribute more significantly towards
sustainability, but their stringency might also drive their adoption levels down. As a
consequence, the level of adoption and the level of rigour of VSS requirements
determine the scale of the impact of VSS on the achievement of the SDGs.
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Working Together: A Logical Thing?
Alice Hengevoss and Nicholas Arnold
1. Introduction
This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity [ . . . ] all
stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan.
(UN General Assembly 2015, p. 1)
The preamble to the resolution “Transforming our World: The Agenda 2030 for
Sustainable Development”, adopted on 25 September 2015 by the United Nations
General Assembly, clearly shows that the United Nations views partnerships
between different sectors as essential for achieving sustainable economic, social
and environmental development (UN General Assembly 2015). The importance the
United Nations ascribes to multi-stakeholder partnerships is affirmed by Goals 17.16
and 17.17 of the Agenda 2030 (UN General Assembly 2015, p. 27).
Both before and after the adoption of the Agenda 2030, many authors have
sounded the same horn. Time and again, cross-sector social partnerships (CSSP) have
been viewed as inevitable when finding solutions to socio-economic problems that
are growing both in number and complexity and transcending the problem-solving
capacity of individual organizations and sectors (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a;
Berger et al. 2004; Bryson et al. 2006; Clarke and Crane 2018; Reed and Reed 2009;
Selsky and Parker 2005).
However, not all scholars agree with this positive view regarding
the problem-solving capacity of such cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs)
(Hardy and Phillips 1998; Moog et al. 2015; Selsky and Parker 2005, 2010; Poncelet 2001).
Even if one assumes that they have significant potential to do so, successfully
implementing such partnerships is a challenging endeavor. For example, different
sectors focus on different dimensions inherent in the concept of sustainability.
Reconciling the economic, the environmental and the social is by no means an easy
task, as conflicts between these three dimensions are prone to arise (Boström 2012;
Wojewnik-Filipkowska and Węgrzyn 2019). More importantly in the context of this
chapter, different sectors adhere to varying logics, which often compete with one another.
For example, considering social and environmental concerns can challenge notions of
corporate efficiency, while a focus on economic efficiency and profitability can eclipse
concerns for social and environmental sustainability (Saz-Carranza and Longo 2012).
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However, the existence of varying logics and the focus of distinct actors
on different sustainability dimensions can also be the actual drivers of CSSPs.
By acknowledging their own and others’ strengths and weaknesses and by
subsequently combining their unique resources and competencies, actors from
different sectors might be able to generate value for society that could not be achieved
by the individual efforts of organizations or sectors (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a;
Selsky and Parker 2005).
How, then, does the existence of different institutional logics encourage and
challenge the emergence and functioning of cross-sector social partnerships? In this
chapter, we address this question by presenting a discussion on the most important
drivers for, challenges to, and solution-mechanisms within CSSPs. We review
and combine the literature on institutional logics and on cross-sector social
partnerships to reflect on these aspects, in order to investigate how the existence
of institutional logics influences cross-sector social partnerships. We illustrate
our discussion by including a literature-based case study on one particular
example of such a cross-sectoral endeavor: The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).
The FSC is a multi-stakeholder organization established in 1993 that—by means of
standard setting and the accreditation of certifying organizations—aims to promote
sustainable management of forests around the globe (Boström 2012; Malets 2017;
Moog et al. 2015; Pattberg 2005; Taylor 2005). In the context of this chapter, the FSC
is an interesting example for a number of reasons. First, since its establishment,
it has included a diverse group of stakeholders from civil society and business,
such as environmental and social NPOs, indigenous interest groups, trade unions,
and timber traders and retailers (Auld et al. 2008; Moog et al. 2015; Pattberg 2005;
Taylor 2005), which often have contending or even conflicting priorities and demands
(Moog et al. 2015). Second, with its standards and principles, the FSC attends to all
three dimensions of sustainability in that it aims to promote forest management that is
environmentally appropriate (e.g., maintaining forest biodiversity), socially beneficial
(e.g., incentivizing communities to sustain forest resources and enjoy their benefits
in the long-term) and economically viable (e.g., ensure sufficiently profitable forest
management) (Auld et al. 2008; Klooster 2005). Third, the FSC is often highlighted as
a model of non-state governance with carefully elaborated governance mechanisms,
aimed at ensuring, for example, balance of interests and power (Auld et al. 2008;
Chan and Pattberg 2008; Moog et al. 2015). Fourth, in the course of its existence,
the FSC experienced both considerable success and significant difficulties with
respect to its objectives. Looking more closely at the Forest Stewardship Council thus
offers the chance to investigate both the opportunities and challenges of cross-sector
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endeavors, and shine a light on potential mechanisms to address such challenges.
By applying an institutional logics approach to CSSPs, we add a novel theoretical lens
to the literature that seeks to explore the positive as well as the challenging aspects of
such partnerships.
In the following section, we will briefly introduce the notions of cross-sector
social partnerships and institutional logics. We then move on to discuss how different
institutional logics can be drivers of and provide opportunities for cross-sector
endeavors. Next, we will discuss challenges to partnerships stemming from different
institutional logics before discussing some mechanisms, which offer potential for
overcoming such difficulties. The last section concludes. Throughout the chapter,
we insert sections on the Forest Stewardship Council in order to illustrate our
theoretical thoughts with elements from the case-study.
2. Cross-Sector Social Partnerships and Institutional Logics
Cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs) have been defined as longer-term and
rather intensive interactions between organizations from different sectors that are
formed to address economic, social and/or environmental issues. Many scholars
view them as a powerful approach to complex socio-economic problems that are
growing both in number and complexity, and transcend the problem-solving capacity
of individual organizations and sectors. When actors from different sectors come
together in collaborative endeavors, the argument goes, value is generated not only
for individual organizations, but for society as a whole by means of different sectors
combining their distinctive resources and competencies (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a;
Berger et al. 2004; Bryson et al. 2006; Clarke and Crane 2018; Gray and Wood 1991;
Reed and Reed 2009; Selsky and Parker 2005; Waddock 1991).
Institutional logics have been described as taken for granted rules
(Hedberg et al. 1976), which are usually implicit and influence how actors interpret
organizational reality and what they deem to be appropriate and legitimate behavior
(Powell and DiMaggio 2012; March and Olsen 1989). Institutional logics consist of
assumptions, values, beliefs and rules. They shape the way in which organizations
are structured and what practices they adhere to (Van Huijstee et al. 2011), and they
determine what answers and solutions are available and deemed appropriate by
organizations in specific situations (Thornton and Ocasio 1999). By pointing out which
issues, contingencies, or problems have to be considered relevant, institutional logics
provide organizations with socially constructed categories for action (DiMaggio 1997;
Thornton 2004) and help explain the appearance of a sense of common purpose and
unity within an organizational field (Reay and Hinings 2009).
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State actors, companies and nonprofits (NPOs)—all of whom are called upon to
collaborate by Goal 17 of the Agenda 2030—each have their own logic1. While this
should not be interpreted as meaning that all organizations within a sector are
identical, paying attention to institutional logics still makes it possible to differentiate
sectors along certain core characteristics they adhere to (Van Huijstee et al. 2011).
Since the Forest Stewardship Council, which serves as a case study throughout this
chapter, is composed of actors from the market and the civil society sector, in the
following we will focus on the logics of these two sectors, and, more specifically,
on the institutional logics of companies and nonprofits.
Companies can be assigned to market sector logics, i.e., they adhere to an
economic rationale. According to this, the main objective of companies is to make
profits by selling goods and services on the market. The underlying norms of
decision-making are self-interest and increased efficiency. Among others, this can
be ascribed to the fact that owners with economic interest (e.g., shareholders) hold
the authority for decisions made by companies. The power of the market sector
stems from its monetary resources, and companies can bring economic assets and
profound knowledge of the workings of the market into collaborative endeavors
(McMullin and Skelcher 2018; Thornton 2004; Van Huijstee et al. 2011).
NPOs, in contrast, can generally be assigned to civil society sector logics, adhering
to a social rationale. They are usually associated with notions of altruism, the provision
of public goods, and a strong commitment to social issues. Among others, this is due
to the fact that the central unit of decision is often the organization’s members, who
represent wider community interests. The power of NPOs derives from collective
group membership and a high degree of social trust. NPOs can bring, for example,
environmental or social expertise and—as a result of public trust—legitimacy into
cross-sector social partnerships (Kravchenko and Moskvina 2018; Thornton 2004;
Van Huijstee et al. 2011).
As the comparison of market sector and civil society sector logics above shows,
collaborative arrangements between companies and NPOs involve many challenges,
as different logics can be hard to reconcile. Diverging interests, for example NPOs’
altruistic versus companies’ self-interested motivations, varying interpretations of
what major societal challenges are and how these should be addressed, or different
1 While it has been shown that it is not always the case that different sectors have different logics
(e.g., (Ordonez Ponce 2018)), in this chapter we focus more strongly on competing sector logics.
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preferences regarding decision-making processes, can generate tensions. In this sense,
the existence of different institutional logics can act as an impediment to CSSPs.
On the other hand, in parts as a result of the adherence to core institutional
logics, actors from different sectors develop specific resources and competencies.
By acknowledging their own and others’ strengths and limitations and combining their
unique material and immaterial resources, actors from different sectors might find that
they can create value for society that could not be achieved by the individual efforts
of organizations or sectors (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a; Selsky and Parker 2005).
Applying an institutional logics approach to cross-sector social partnerships
helps in investigating how competing logics can co-exist (Reay and Hinings 2009;
Saz-Carranza and Longo 2012), to what extent shared logics can emerge
(Bryson et al. 2006), and how a certain logic can come to dominate (Scott 2008;
Thornton and Ocasio 1999). In sum, applying an institutional logics lens to cross-sector
social partnerships offers a valuable approach to analyze how the existence of
institutional logics can positively and negatively influence CSSPs in the field of
sustainable development, i.e., to what extent they can act as drivers of such endeavors,
how they can challenge such efforts, and what mechanisms can help ensure that
different logics can be reconciled and integrated.
3. Different Institutional Logics as Drivers and Opportunities
On first sight, it would appear that the competing institutional logics of different
sectors are difficult to overcome. Diverging assumptions, values, beliefs and rules
would seem to act as a significant impediment to partnerships between different
institutional actors forming and functioning. However, the existence of competing
institutional logics does not preclude CSSPs from happening. Competing logics
can co-exist (Reay and Hinings 2009; Saz-Carranza and Longo 2012) and shared
logics can emerge (Bryson et al. 2006). Actors from different sectors that think about
certain issues in different ways, envision different approaches to tackle societal
issues and have different objectives in mind when doing so, can act as drivers and
a source of strength for cross-sector social partnerships. In effect, they are lauded
by various scholars for their unique ability to generate value exactly by integrating
different sector logics. By combining distinct resources, expertise and competencies,
it is argued, organizations from different sectors can create value jointly that they
could not create on their own (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a; Selsky and Parker 2005).
For example, through joint activities, technical and sector knowledge is shared,
leading to broader perspectives on how to address societal problems (Austin and
Seitanidi 2012a; Reed and Reed 2009; Vurro et al. 2010). In this way, NPOs might
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increase their ability and effectiveness in pursuing their mission, for example by
improving their market intelligence. Companies might gain awareness of social
issues and forces that they were not aware of before (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a).
Collaborative interactions can thus support organizations in more clearly recognizing
the causes of socio-economic challenges, in creating broader societal awareness of
the urgency to act on these challenges and improve their capacity of addressing such
challenges more effectively (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a; Selsky and Parker 2010).
4. Drivers and Opportunities: The Case of the FSC
The emergence of the FSC can be explained by a combination of factors,
which led some companies and NPOs to realize that their interests might be
best served by setting-up a joint approach for credible forest certification in
order to curb global deforestation and forest degradation (Auld et al. 2008,
p. 189; Chan and Pattberg 2008; Malets 2017; Pattberg 2005). During the 1980s,
environmental organizations and other stakeholders became increasingly concerned
with forest degradation (Auld et al. 2008) and started using campaigning tactics
(e.g., boycotts) to put pressure on timber producers and retailers (Bartley 2003).
Companies’ reaction to such campaigns—such as labelling their own products to
“prove” that forest products were sustainable—were harshly criticized by NPOs
and negatively received by the wider public (Bartley 2003; Chan and Pattberg 2008).
This led some companies to realize that their reputation was increasingly threatened,
as they could, in effect, in many instances not account for the origin of their timber
(Auld et al. 2008; Chan and Pattberg 2008), and might thus be well served with a
credible certification scheme (Auld et al. 2008; Klooster 2005). At the same time,
boycott strategies by NPOs were also increasingly criticized, as they were perceived as
hurting forest-dependent populations in developing countries and as being ineffective
with regards to addressing deforestation (Bartley 2003). Consequently, environmental
groups—including some who were endorsing boycotts—began experimenting with
alternative approaches, for example certification and monitoring efforts such as
publishing guides on timber from sustainable sources (Bartley 2003). However,
they had to recognize that tracking timber through complex supply chains was
beyond their capacity. These factors—combined with the failure of states and
inter-governmental organizations to effectively respond to the problem of global
forest degradation—opened up a space for a closer partnership between civil
society and market-sector interests and paved the way for the development of
a private, market-based forest certification initiative (Auld et al. 2008; Bartley 2003;
Chan and Pattberg 2008; Moog et al. 2015; Pattberg 2005).
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The FSC is generally viewed as a rather successful endeavor in achieving
sustainable forest management on a global scale. It has managed to include
a significant amount of forest area and a large number of companies into its
certification program (Garrelts and Flitner 2011; Moog et al. 2015). Furthermore,
due to its substantive standards and principles—which make ample reference to all
three dimensions of sustainable development—it is widely regarded as the global
benchmark with regards to achieving sustainable forestry (Pattberg 2005; Malets 2017;
Taylor 2005). The FSC evidently seeks to benefit from different sectors’ strengths and
tries to combine these to achieve its intended impact (Malets 2017; Pattberg 2005).
In effect, the different sectoral members of the FSC have been able to reap substantial
benefits from partnering with one another.
Companies participating in the FSC have benefitted from partnering with NPOs
in a number of ways. As NPOs generally enjoy high legitimacy and a positive
reputation, the inclusion of a wide range of NPOs within the FSC has delivered
credibility to this particular forest certification system and, in extension, to the
companies participating in it. In this sense, the FSC functions as an important
instrument of risk-management for companies, which reduces their potential exposure
to public criticism, as it increases the credibility of their efforts to trace the origin of
their timber and avoid illegal deforestation (Klooster 2005; Taylor 2005). Furthermore,
companies have been able to add to their market-knowledge by benefitting from the
expertise concerning complex environmental and social issues of forest management
that NPOs possess (Taylor 2005).
For NPOs, this particular collaborative effort has also resulted in a range of
benefits. Through the FSC’s system of standard setting and certification accreditation,
NPOs have experienced success with regards to a number of issues that they
consider important. Within the forest areas covered by the FSC certification system,
the production process has improved both with respect to environmental and
social sustainability dimensions. With respect to the environmental dimension,
for example, biodiversity conservation has improved, and deforestation, as well as
the negative impact of logging roads, wildfire incidents and pollution have decreased
(Klooster 2005; Marx and Cuypers 2010). Regarding the social dimension, the FSC
has fostered worker safety, and has been an important instrument for indigenous
people and communities in securing land and resources (Taylor 2005). In sum, the use
of a certification mechanism has supported NPOs in communicating the importance
of and in achieving sustainable forest management (Klooster 2005).
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5. Challenges Stemming from Different Institutional Logics
Arguably more apparent on first sight is the fact that competing institutional
logics present major challenges both with respect to the formation and the functioning
of cross-sector social partnerships.
As mentioned above, many scholars see significant potential in CSSPs
to find solutions to societal issues that transcend the problem-solving
capacity of individual organizations and sectors (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a;
Berger et al. 2004; Bryson et al. 2006; Clarke and Crane 2018; Reed and Reed 2009;
Selsky and Parker 2005). Others, however, are more skeptical with regards to this.
Various authors contend that the solutions provided by such endeavors generally fail
to question and significantly change prevailing institutional arrangements and thus
fail to get to the roots of the problems underlying many major challenges that society
is faced with (Hardy and Phillips 1998; Selsky and Parker 2005, 2010; Poncelet 2001).
Designing cross-sector endeavors in such a way that the different interests of
all participants—especially minority concerns—are included and transparency and
accountability are ensured is challenging (Moog et al. 2015). Considering competing
logics and their influence on guiding the actors’ actions, major impediments to
the formation and functioning of CSSPs include, for example, diverging interests,
mismatches of power, the lack of appropriate governance mechanisms or significant
management costs (Austin and Seitanidi 2012b; Berger et al. 2004; Bryson et al. 2006).
As a result of their core logics and the concomitant focus on business or
social/environmental priorities, respectively, the interests of the market and the civil
society sector might significantly diverge (Selsky and Parker 2005). Diverging interests
can lead to struggles among participants in CSSPs (Moog et al. 2015). For example,
establishing which outcome should be achieved and how these can best be
measured has been viewed as major challenge of cross-sector social partnerships,
as the interests of companies and NPOs might significantly differ in this
regard (Selsky and Parker 2005). Furthermore, NPOs’ altruistic versus companies’
self-interested motivations can generate antagonism or tensions in that an increase in
community good can challenge an increase in corporate efficiency (Saz-Carranza and
Longo 2012; Selsky and Parker 2005).
Power issues, i.e., power imbalances, are seen as major source of conflict in
CSSPs (Bryson et al. 2006). Such power imbalances can stem, for example, from
the fact that companies often have significantly larger financial resources at their
disposal. Power imbalances can lead to situations where some partners’ interests—for
example with regard to shaping the agenda—are more strongly attended to than
other partners’ interests (Bryson et al. 2006; Selsky and Parker 2005).
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Defining governance structures in a way that suits the interests of all partners
and the needs of the collaborative endeavor can also be challenging. For example,
balancing the different preferences of decision-making, i.e., who makes a decision
and what the decision-making process looks like, can be challenging as market-logics
might prefer single-authority and, thus, fast decision-making, and civil sector
logics might prefer more democratic decision-making, which is more inclusive
but also more time-consuming (Austin and Seitanidi 2012b; Bryson et al. 2006;
Reay and Hinings 2009).
Furthermore, due to the need to negotiate different logics and interests, the more
actors are involved in a shared project, the higher the costs to manage the endeavor.
Collaborative endeavors come at costs that need to be weighed against their benefits
(Austin and Seitanidi 2012b).
6. Challenges: The Case of the FSC
Although the FSC has been considered a fairly successful cross-sectoral
endeavor (Garrelts and Flitner 2011; Moog et al. 2015), it has not been able to
challenge and shape the timber market to the degree that it originally aimed
for. The large majority of forest area certified according to FSC standards is
situated in Europe and North America (Chan and Pattberg 2008; Taylor 2005).
This, in turn, means that the FSC has not been able to tackle deforestation and
forest degradation and offer the envisioned benefits to the most disadvantaged
groups in the Global South to the extent envisioned (Garrelts and Flitner 2011;
Klooster 2005; Malets 2017; Marx and Cuypers 2010; Pattberg 2005; Taylor 2005).
While this partial failure is, in part, a result of external factors outside the influence
of the FSC—such as weak consumer demand, international trade rules, or the
existence of competing forestry eco-labels that put downward pressure on the FSC
(Auld et al. 2008; Chan and Pattberg 2008; Klooster 2005; Marx and Cuypers 2010;
Moog et al. 2015)—reasons for this can also be found in competing logics within
the FSC.
The FSC has attempted to incentivize actors from the timber industry to make
their forest management practices more sustainable by trying to create market
demand for sustainable timber and by offering certification-related price premiums
and reputation gains (Boström 2012; Klooster 2005; Malets 2017; Moog et al. 2015;
Taylor 2005). This market-based strategy, however, has meant that the FSC, from the
very beginning of its existence, has needed to juggle stakeholders’ competing demands
concerning different sustainability dimensions. Maybe the greatest challenge for
the FSC has been balancing calls for stringent environmental and social standards
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regarding certification and calls for rapidly capturing a significant share of the
timber market (Auld et al. 2008; Boström 2012; Moog et al. 2015). While many
participating companies have been interested in market share and brand reputation,
a large number of NPOs have been concerned with a possible watering-down of
environmental and social standards due to this (Malets 2017; Pattberg 2005). The fact
that the FSC allows the certification of plantations—some of which have been highly
contested regarding their environmental and social consequences—and has included
a mixed sources label, for example, has been continuously criticized by civil society
sector organizations (Moog et al. 2015). Overall, it would seem that proponents of
rapid market-share gain have asserted themselves against advocates for upmost
stringency with respect to social and environmental standards. This seems to be,
at least in part, a result of the power imbalances inherent in the FSC. Despite the
fact that the FSC evidently attaches great importance to participation and equal
representation (Malets 2017; Pattberg 2005), it has been repeatedly criticized for
the dominance of its economic chamber, which is largely controlled by industry
representatives, especially large retailers. Critics argue that the FSC has increasingly
favored large-scale commercial interests over concerns for the highest standards
regarding environmental and social sustainability (Garrelts and Flitner 2011, Klooster
2005; Taylor 2005). The power of buyers, especially retailers, has meant, for example,
that they can make certification a requirement for market access and have been able to
shift the costs of environmental management to forest managers, including small and
community forest managers, without providing a price premium for forest owners
(Garrelts and Flitner 2011; Klooster 2005). Since a clear price premium and significant
niche markets for FSC certified products have failed to surface, small-scale community
forests, for example, have found themselves at a competitive disadvantage, not least
because they have found it hard or even impossible to meet the technical standards
and cover the financial cost of certification (Boström 2012; Klooster 2005; Taylor 2005).
Furthermore, less resource-endowed actors—especially groups from the Global
South—have faced a limited ability to actively participate in the FSC standard-setting
process (Baur and Arenas 2014; Malets 2017; Moog et al. 2015).
7. Overcoming Difficulties
As becomes apparent from the sections above, the existence of different
institutional logics can challenge the formation and functioning of cross-sector
social partnerships. However, scholars have defined the factors, mechanisms, and
practices that facilitate CSSPs. For example, they have highlighted the central
role of adequate governance and accountability mechanisms; the importance of
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paying close attention to (potential) power inequalities; the relevance of effective
communication; and tolerance for conflict (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a, 2012b;
Selsky and Parker 2010). At this point, it is important to note that collaborative
endeavors are not a straightforward activity, but rather an iterative process involving
continuous and extensive negotiations during which structures and operative
process are adapted and, in the best of cases, stabilized (Austin and Seitanidi 2012b;
Malets 2017).
Partners from different institutional contexts coming together often do not
have a log of experience they can draw from and a clear-cut centralized direction
they can follow (Bryson et al. 2006). Setting up functioning management and
governance practices is thus essential to success. A clear definition of governance
structures will facilitate partnership. This includes the definition of who takes
decisions and the process of how decisions are taken, respectively (Bryson et al. 2006;
Reay and Hinings 2009). Partners will have to decide whether there is a single
authority making decisions or whether decision-making power is shared. The former
will accelerate such a process, particularly when logics of different partners
compete, and it is typically associated with market and corporate logic, where
shareholders and board members hold such a power. The latter represents a more
democratic form of decision-making and is more likely to allow for consensus
and thus for more acceptance of decisions among partners. This democratic form
of decision-making more strongly represents a nonprofit logic. With respect to
governance and accountability, it is also crucial to involve all relevant stakeholders to
make sure that all interests are considered and that all parties are heard to the same
extent (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Similarly, the specialization of tasks, and the
division of labor need to be defined (Bryson et al. 2006). Having a clear responsibility
distribution will give direction on what different actors work on. This further allows
partners to focus on their individual strength and lead to a better output. A clear
definition of tasks is particularly important when actors, whose logics compete,
work together.
Effective communication is an important tool for moving toward a functioning
co-existence of logics or even in the development of shared logics, as it allows for
learning about each other’s goals and perspectives, and avoids the misunderstanding
and conflicts that may ultimately impede partnerships (Bryson et al. 2006; Nicholls and
Huybrechts 2016; Selsky and Parker 2005). For example, functioning communication
is an important antecedent for creating trust between partners. Trust is essential
in that it allows for developing a partnership culture, recognizing linked interests,
creating joint value and perceiving the exchange of value as fair (Austin and Seitanidi
2012b; Selsky and Parker 2005).
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Despite all efforts to initiate smoothly working partnerships, conflicts due to
diverging and competing logics are likely to occur (Bryson et al. 2006). Joint tolerance
of conflict is needed on all sides (Nicholls and Huybrechts 2016). If such conflicts
are managed in a constructive way, conflict can be an opportunity for learning
and innovation.
In sum, the different logics of and potential power inequalities between
collaborating actors make a clear definition of governance structures and decision-
making processes indispensable. More democratic forms of decision-making and
effective communication come at a cost, yet a resulting consensus among different
actors can lead to more successful collaborative endeavors.
8. Overcoming Difficulties: The Case of the FSC
Based on the substantive negotiations of a broad stakeholder group, the FSC has
institutionalized a governance and accountability system that strives for inclusive
decision-making processes within the FSC and intensive documentation and audit
mechanisms to ensure legitimacy. This governance structure is widely regarded as an
exemplary set-up for a cross-sector collaborative arrangement, (Chan and Pattberg
2008; Garrelts and Flitner 2011; Klooster 2005). An institutionalized preference for
consensus and the voting rules create preconditions for FSC members to engage
in extensive negotiations and compromise building (Malets 2017). From the onset,
the FSC has emphasized a balance of power between the environmental, social
and economic interests of its members. The highest governing body of the FSC,
the General Assembly, is organized according to a tripartite structure consisting
of three chambers—an economic, an environmental and a social one—each of
which holds one-third of the votes. Additionally, within each chamber—and thus
throughout the whole organization—there is a voting parity between members
from the Global North and the Global South (Auld et al. 2008; Boström 2012;
Chan and Pattberg 2008; Garrelts and Flitner 2011). On a three-year basis, each
chamber elects three representatives that subsequently serve on the FSC board
of directors (Chan and Pattberg 2008), which is democratically accountable to its
members (Baur and Arenas 2014; Chan and Pattberg 2008) and decides on most issues
of major importance, such as the election of its executive director, the annual budget
allocation or the approval of national representatives, standards and principles
(Chan and Pattberg 2008; Garrelts and Flitner 2011; Malets 2017). The operational
work of the FSC is coordinated by its secretariat in the German city of Bonn, and
is supervised by the Executive Director (Chan and Pattberg 2008; Malets 2017) and
the FSC also has various regional and national offices (Malets 2017). The General
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Assembly—which gathers every three years—and the board decide on the general
direction (e.g., 10 main principles and their criteria) and make the most important
strategic decisions. Within the General Assembly, dominance of interest groups
is unlikely, as decisions require two thirds of the votes (Chan and Pattberg 2008;
Garrelts and Flitner 2011).
These important considerations relating to creating a level playing field also
apply to the general principles and standards of the FSC, in which economic,
social and ecological aspects are weighted equally (Auld et al. 2008; Boström 2012).
Based on these general principles and criteria, country-specific rules are developed in
a bottom-up manner within national—or even subnational—processes consisting of
consultations or roundtables, in which, again, a voting balance according to the three
chambers described above is in place (Auld et al. 2008; Boström 2012; Malets 2017).
The FSC also provides ample channels for stakeholder feedback and offers formal
complaint procedures, both of which allow members—and, to some degree, external
stakeholders—to have their say on decision and policy making and standard-setting
within the FSC, thus guaranteeing accountability (Chan and Pattberg 2008; Malets 2017).
For the most controversial or significant policy processes—such as plantation review
(Klooster 2005)—the FSC establishes inclusive working groups to prepare reviews,
collect feedback from internal and external stakeholders in public consultation and set
up separate websites to ensure information accessibility, transparency of process and
collection of feedback (Malets 2017).
Some of these elements—for example the dispute procedures—have been
implemented and refined as a response to internal and public criticism, serving
to show that the FSC is willing and capable to extensively deal with the criticism
directed at it (Chan and Pattberg 2008; Malets 2017). For example, regarding the
critique of power imbalance, the FSC was restructured to promote a better balance of
influence and interests, establishing nondiscriminatory and flexible standards for
local conditions, developing new guidelines for regional standards, implementing
group certification and channeling more support to social chamber meetings. In 2001,
the FSC outlined a social strategy to better serve the needs of local community
forest users, indigenous peoples, forest workers and small and low-intensity forest
users (Garrelts and Flitner 2011). Challenges are continuously problematized and
the FSC responds to problems by revising its rules and procedures and addressing
implementation issues in transnational and domestic venues (Malets 2017).
In sum, throughout its existence, the FSC has put emphasis on comprehensive
governance mechanisms that allow for compromise building and a power balance
among the different interests present within the scheme, and has been capable of
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reacting to criticism by refining existing or developing new governance mechanisms.
This strategy of pro-actively addressing challenges and seeing difference as
opportunity has allowed the FSC to successfully address many potential problems
arising from the fact that actors with different institutional logics are part of this
certification scheme. Table 1 summarizes the presented discussion on the drivers
and challenges of, as well as solution-mechanisms to, CSSPs, taking the FSC as
an example.
Table 1. Summary of Drivers, Challenges, and Solution-Mechanisms to cross-sector
social partnerships (CSSPs). Source: Own illustration.
Literature Review The Forest Stewardship Council
Drivers
• Sharing distinct resources,
knowledge, expertise,
and capacities;
• Better capacity to identify
causes of societal problems;
• Broader perspective on and
more effective solutions to
societal problems.
• Companies: Increased credibility and
positive reputation of certification
system, better risk management and
market intelligence, gained expertise
on forest-management;
• NPOs: more effective and wider goal





• Divergent interests, power
mismatch, lack of appropriate
governance mechanisms,
increased management costs;
• Little inclusion of interests of
minorities, weak transparency
and accountability;
• Risk of superficial solutions to
societal problems rather than
profound changes in
institutional arrangements.
• NPOs: watering down of certification
standards due to large-scale
commercial interests, focus on Europe
and North America, failure to include
and protect forestation industry in the
Global South;
• Companies: high certification costs
for small businesses, limited
participation of businesses in the
Global South in definition
of standards.
Solution-Mechanisms
• Adequate governance and
accountability systems;




clear responsibility and task
distribution, and tolerance
for conflict;
• Partnership as iterative




• Implementation of inclusive
decision-making processes and
preference for consensus;
• Emphasis on power-balance between
economic, social, and
environmental interests;
• Triparty structure of
General Assembly;
• Voting parties representing the
Global North and South;
• Bottom-up definition of standards
accounting for economic, social, and
environmental concerns;
• Feedback channels for
external stakeholders;
• Public reviews to address criticism.
124
9. Conclusions
By reviewing and combining the literature on cross-sector social partnerships and
institutional logics—and by specifically examining the case of the Forest Stewardship
Council—in this chapter we put forward the question of how the existence of
different institutional logics can both encourage and challenge the emergence and
functioning of CSSPs that, in turn, allows for successfully addressing pressing and
complex societal challenges. More specifically, we investigated how the existence
of varying institutional logics can act as drivers of and impediments to CSSPs,
and what solution-mechanisms can be put into place for ensuring the success of such
collaborative endeavors.
The FSC provides ample evidence for the fact that different institutional logics
can act as important drivers for setting up CSSPs in the first place and ensure their
long-term success. In light of increasing public concern regarding on-going forest
degradation and deforestation and widespread criticism of business-as-usual and
conventional approaches by nonprofits, in the early 1990s both market and civil
society actors recognized that they could benefit from combining their respective
resources and knowledge concerning forest management. Since the creation of the
FSC, both the market sector and civil society actors have been able to reap the benefits
of this joint initiative. For example, companies have benefitted from the positive
reputation bestowed on them by NPOs participating in the scheme and have been able
to access latter’s expertise regarding environmental and social issues surrounding
forest management. NPOs, in turn, have been able to implement their mission
more effectively, as—within FSC certified forests—forest management practices have
improved with respect to environmental and social sustainability. Today, the FSC is
widely regarded as the global benchmark with regards to achieving sustainable forestry.
An important ingredient of this success has been its comprehensive governance
structure, which allows for extensive negotiations, compromise-building and a balance
of power between the environmental, social and economic interests of its members.
Such comprehensive governance, accountability and communication mechanisms
have been identified in the literature as important prerequisites for functioning CSSPs.
Nevertheless, despite this well-thought-through governance structure, the FSC
has faced significant challenges with regards to balancing economic, social and
environmental interests. Critics argue that the FSC has increasingly favored large-scale
commercial interests over concerns for the highest standards regarding environmental
and social sustainability. It would appear that this has been an important impediment
to the FSC in more effectively tackling forest degradation and deforestation on a
global scale, as, due to dominant economic interests, especially more disadvantaged
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groups in the Global South have been partially excluded from taking part in the FSC
certification scheme, which has made it difficult for the FSC to tackle one of its major
objectives: tropical deforestation.
At the same time, the FSC has been capable of reacting to such criticism.
For example, some of the mechanisms it has introduced, such as dispute procedures
or attempts to better serve the needs of local community forest users and indigenous
people, have been implemented as a response to internal and public criticism.
In sum, as the example of the FSC shows, different institutional logics should by
no means be seen as unsurmountable obstacles for the implementation of successful
CSSPs. Rather, they are important drivers of such endeavors and an important
prerequisite for value-creation within these cross-sectoral efforts. Yet, caution with
respect to over-optimistic calls for such cross-sectoral social partnerships is advised.
Even the FSC with its comprehensive governance-mechanisms has experienced
significant challenges, and has only been able to meet its objectives to a limited degree.
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Partnership is understood as a cooperation among relevant stakeholders,
including public, public-private, private, and civil society organizations (for example,
nonprofit organizations, associations). Such a cooperation aims at improving the
relevance of projects, programs, and policies, and the sustainability of their outputs
(Audit Commission 1998, p. 43; OECD 2001). A sense of co-responsibility and
co-ownership by all partners stands behind the increased relevance and sustainability
(Iftikhar 2012). Another added value of partnership relates to enabling partners to
share a pool of resources and its better use (Audit Commission 1998, pp. 44–46).
The presence of partnership as the goal 17 among the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) underlines its importance for sustainable development.
SDGs are well covered by sub-goals (targets) and indicators to monitor their
performance. This also concerns the Sustainable Development Goal No. 17
(hereafter SDG17), to strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global
partnership for sustainable development (UN 2016), which is of our consideration.
There are 19 targets and 25 monitoring indicators under the SDG17. These targets and
indicators cover finance, technology, capacity-building, trade, and systemic issues
(UN 2015, 2016). From this perspective, it is not a methodologically difficult task to
monitor the progress in achieving the targets, but it still does not say anything about
the efficiency, effectiveness, or impact of SDG17, as this is a task for evaluators.
There is a difference in the use of monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring is a
managerial continuous activity, with the aim to keep projects on track and check
progress according to pre-defined objectives and indicators, as is also the case of the
SDG17. Moreover, it helps to make corrections if the implementation is not heading
towards the pre-defined objectives. An evaluation makes a judgement about the
projects and policies and assesses their success or failure in relation to relevance,
efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability (Morra Imas and Rist 2009, p. 108).
Evaluation is used more for learning purposes than monitoring. A project that has
not achieved its goals can be used for learning purposes, and evaluations can provide
managers and policymakers with information on how to perform better. From this
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perspective, we see that the practice is oriented towards the monitoring of SDG17,
while evaluations are rare.
Even though there exist evaluations of partnerships, they concern mainly
processes of establishing and managing of partnerships. This points out
several aspects of high relevance for constituting successful partnerships and
their impacts on the success of the policies implemented in partnerships.
These aspects include transparency, shared goals, and values (Demidov 2015;
Gazley 2010; Potluka and Liddle 2014), long-term cooperation (Gazley 2010;
Milio 2014), and trust and equality among partners (Adshead 2014; Demidov 2015;
Valerie Wildridge et al. 2004). Successes and failures of partnerships are affected
by the processes, including communication, variability of opinions, and timing
(Potluka et al. 2017; Valerie Wildridge et al. 2004). For the success of public-private
partnership projects, Węgrzyn (2016) also adds personnel and management capacities,
and the capability to solve unexpected problems.
This raises questions on whether the SDG17 targets contribute to the intended
sustainable development. For example, the goal to encourage and promote effective
public, public-private, and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and
resourcing strategies of partnerships (goal 17.17), is measured by the amount of money
spent. Thus, it is easy to monitor performance. However, it neither says anything
about the quality of partnerships established and implemented nor about their
achievements. Does this mean that partnership is a nice wording, but only a formal
issue among the SDGs? How can the partnership contribute to SDGs fulfillment?
These are the crucial questions, but they are methodologically challenging to answer.
The principle of partnership and its implementation into the formation and
decision-making processes within the development policies has been strongly
accentuated. Still, in international development policies, a systematic evaluation of the
actual implementation of partnership has been rather exceptional (Brinkerhoff 2002).
This chapter reacts to this research gap, and focuses on several cases where the
partnership principle has been evaluated. While there is a lack of evaluations under
the SDG17, other policies provide some evaluation cases, which we utilize to set
up an evaluation framework in the contribution. Together with the literature on
evaluations, the chapter provides a framework to answer why and how to evaluate
the partnership.
Our contribution aims to answer the above-stated questions, and tries to fill
the gap in our understanding of the evaluation of partnerships. The novelty of the
contribution is in the building of an evaluation framework, combined approach of
seven purposes to conduct evaluations, with standard evaluation criteria, and criteria
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for the implementation of optimal partnerships. We do that by an overview of
partnership evaluation experience from various countries, respecting their differences
in state traditions, diverse policy styles, and distinct local contexts (Sweco et al. 2016).
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2, we discuss the theme
of partnership implementation in various countries. We do that to answer the
question “why” while documenting variability and dependence of partnership on
indigenous practices and cultural differences in ways of partnership implementation.
In Section 3, we discuss the evaluation framework to answer “what” to evaluate
within the partnership and what criteria define optimal partnerships. Section 4
introduces general evaluation criteria—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts,
and sustainability when evaluating partnerships. The final Section 5 concludes.
2. Uneasy Implementation of Partnership—Why to Evaluate Partnership
Implementation of partnership relates to various aspects of publicly funded
policies and programs. The game theory theoretically explains the added-value
of partnerships in better outcomes achieved by the collaboration in comparison
to competitive approaches (see, for example, the prisoner´s dilemma game)
(McQuaid 2000). Usually, among the most credited positive effects of a partnership
are the better relevance of policies, the exchange of knowledge and learning
among partners, rising awareness about policies, and the transparency of political
decisions (Bache 2010; Leonardi 2006; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Stadtler 2015;
Sweco et al. 2016). The participation of stakeholders helps to redress democratic
deficits (Lane 2010) and improves the relevance of policies and programs (OECD
2001), as well as their effectiveness, by sharing resources (Mairate 2006) and avoiding
duplicate activities (Valerie Wildridge et al. 2004). On the other side, it is necessary to
keep in mind that the different capacities, interests and agendas of stakeholders in a
partnership can prevent successful implementation (Chang et al. 2015), and can
cause disillusionment among partners (Potluka et al. 2017). Moreover, interest
groups can influence the decisions by rent-seeking (Milio 2014), which in turn
can harm other stakeholders, especially those with insufficient skills. Thus, it
can lead to low accountability and pointing out democratic deficit (Geissel 2009;
Perron 2014; Peters and Pierre 2004; Scharpf 2007). Another problem relates to the
principal–agent relationship in EU cohesion policy (Blom-hansen 2007). Partnerships
often do not achieve the intended goals, because the agent provides the principal,
with the information on the ground that is specific to his or her own serve
interests, but do not really serve the mutually agreed goal. Such a situation leads
to low financial compliance and financial corrections (Mendez and Bachtler 2017).
133
The inconclusiveness of views on partnership calls for partnership to be evaluated
more rigorously, to know what effects partnership achieves and how to improve
its implementation.
Among the 19 of the SGD17 targets, 12 quote “developing countries” or “Global
South”, but the potential pitfalls of partnerships are also a concern in developed
countries. Hodge and Greve (2017) point out the inconclusiveness of evaluations
of public-private partnerships. Another case concerns partnership belonging to
one of the fundamental and long-term horizontal principles in the European Union
(Piattoni 2009), specifically in the EU cohesion policy (European Commission 2014b).
The need for partnerships in shaping and implementing policies and measures
is grounded, among others, in The European Code of Conduct on Partnership
(European Commission 2014b). This document intends to help the implementation
of partnerships by including a list of groups of partners potentially relevant for
partnership with the public sector in implementing EU cohesion policy funded
programs. Partners should be the relevant stakeholders, with competences and
capacities to participate actively and effectively. The broad definition covers
all relevant stakeholders from the public sector, economic and social partners,
the business sector, and civil society. The document (European Commission 2014b)
describes not only who could be the partners, but also key factors for their effective
involvement. The Code of Conduct keeps attention on the accessibility of relevant
information, sufficient time for commenting on the investment programs and
proposing communication channels.
Though the Code of Conduct on Partnership provides guidelines,
its implementation is not legally binding (Sweco et al. 2016, p. XVII). It leaves space
for the EU member states to respect their national specificities when implementing it.
The document defines principles, but it is not a technical guide on implementation.
Thus, the partnership principle applied in the framework of EU cohesion policy
is not only a tool at the level of projects’ implementation, but also a political tool
enabling the relevant social partners like nonprofit sector to participate in political
decision-making (Bache 2010). This flexible application enables national governments
to implement it according to national specifics, and avoid it when there is a lack of
willingness among the participating parties.
In Europe, the intensity and quality of partnership principle applications vary,
especially between the public and nonprofit sectors. While the partnership is well
documented and implemented in some countries (for example, in Austria or the
Netherlands, see in (Sweco et al. 2016)), in others, an extension of the partnership
principle beyond the national habits was promoted with the implementation of EU
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cohesion policy. This concerns especially countries in Central and Eastern Europe, due
to a strong central government from the times of socialism (until the end of the 1980s).
Political systems in these countries use a minimal scale of participatory methods
in political decision-making (Batory and Cartwright 2011; Baun and Marek 2008;
Cartwright and Batory 2012; Potluka and Liddle 2014). Similar situations also appear
in Greece, Portugal, and Spain (Polverari and Michie 2009). Non-participatory
approach of the public sector often resulted in non-functional, often even artificial
partnerships being established at the project level, just to have a partnership in a
project. The capacity to successfully manage the PPP projects and political willingness
to promote them is low in these countries (Mysiorski 2013). For example, Węgrzyn
(2016) points out that, in Poland, about 75% of PPP projects fail. At the policy
level, the situation was similar, due to low knowledge of the civil society, and other
stakeholders among the public sector servants, and unclear representativeness of
the delegates invited to take part in partnership (Potluka et al. 2017). In some cases,
stakeholders from the public sector set up nonprofit organizations to have a partner
formally meet the requirement of the funding schemes (Potluka and Fanta 2020).
These organizations were not real partners, as they were politically dependent on
their founding fathers.
In this relation, Kovách and Kučerová (2006) describe the emergence of the
“Project Class” in connection with the implementation of EU cohesion policy
in Central Europe. It is an entirely new social class, strongly linked to the
implementation of the funding from EU cohesion policy. This class’ main activity is
the preparation, consultancy, or implementation of projects financed from European
funds. Consultants belong to a typical example. Many consultancy companies
were set up solely to provide consultancy, with preparation of application for and
managing EU funding. These companies would not exist without EU funding
appearance. Their experience is hardly applicable beyond the system of EU funding.
Distinguishing traditional organizations from those that exist primarily through
the implementation of EU cohesion policy could provide better information on the
true nature of partnerships. In particular, for the quality of partnership, it is crucial to
know whether the organizations do their activities primarily because of their target
groups or they are rather organizations from project classes, i.e., existing solely due
to the funding. Moreover, the aspect of a potential conflict of interest has not been
monitored by evaluation. A typical example is a situation in which partners are
members in working groups or monitoring committees of programs, and at the same
time they are applicants for support.
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Results of partnership implementation differ according to political culture,
political decision making styles, and institutions (Dąbrowski et al. 2014).
This long-term situation is also confirmed by the study of Polverari and Michie
(2009), who point at two sets of factors influencing the extent of partnership. First,
formal administrative practices constitute the major factor with an impact on how
the partnership is implemented. Second, traditions and the experience of regional
and socio-economic partners make the difference in the success and failure of
partnerships. The differences in the implementation of the partnership principle
relate not only to national levels, but they also differ at regional and local levels
(Rinaldi 2016). These differences underline the importance of institutional factors,
territorial specificities, local contexts, and individual decision-makers in making
partnerships a success (Sweco et al. 2016, pp. 2–3).
Often, the capacities of partners play a crucial role. Usually, stakeholders with
the highest need of assistance are the stakeholders with the weakest capacities,
which undermines the effectiveness of the programs (Turrent and Oketch 2009).
Moreover, the lack of resources impacts the acceptance of the form of mutual
collaboration. For example, if some stakeholders do not get reimbursement for
the costs incurred by the meetings (travel costs and time spent on meetings),
they will prefer doing their primary work and not taking part on partnership.
As Polverari and Michie (2009) and Allen et al. (2017) point out, the low capacity of
partners harms their ability to take part in the programming processes efficiently.
Usually, such partners suffer from a lack of expertise, and they cannot systematically
engage with programs.
Another frequent problem in creating partnerships relates to insufficient
partners´ relationships. Especially, where societies are in a transition period,
the relationships are still not set up. In such a case, it often happens that
the collaboration is rather short-term, the partners leave and new ones enter
the partnership. In this relation, the evaluations often discussed whether the
selected representatives of the civil society were the ones representing that sector
as a whole (see, for example, the changing composition of working groups in
(Potluka et al. 2017)).
Evaluation serves various objectives. Owen (2004) sees the purpose of evaluation
in the following benefits: synthesis, clarification, improvement, rescheduling and
checking, and learning/accountability. Based on this classification, Batterbury (2006)
goes further, and defines the following seven evaluation objectives using the
example of EU cohesion policy, which can be used as evaluation criteria, including
recommended methods.
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(A) Accountability and legitimacy of policy cover evaluating whether a policy
achieved desired outcomes and impacts and is oriented towards effectiveness.
It usually applies a summative approach. Among the methods, Batterbury (2006)
recommends impact assessment, theories of change, realist evaluation,
econometric modeling of outcomes, and performance indicators.
(B) Improved quality and performance cover questions of achieving performance targets
and aims to help the evaluated policy improve its performance. Evaluators
apply performance assessment or formative approaches. This objective is
evaluated by performance indicators or a realist evaluation approach.
(C) Better planning and program design are aimed at evaluating and improving the
theory of change and the logic staying behind the policy. Together with ex-ante
evaluation, the methods used are similar, as in the case of accountability and
legitimacy (Batterbury 2006).
(D) Enhanced capacity covers criteria for assessing success, what to do to achieve better
results, and how to understand the policy better. Formative and learning-focused
approaches are used. Synthesis, meta-evaluations, and realist evaluation belong
to methods applied.
(E) Learning has an explanatory role in understanding why the policy has the
observed effects, what can be taken for other policies and what unintended
effects appeared. By learning, evaluators use formative approaches, by similar
methods, as in the case of evaluation of enhanced capacities.
(F) Increased ownership of the program and/or of the evaluation—participants play a
crucial role, as they define criteria to assess the success of the policy and needs
of change. Thus, they get control over the policy. Participatory evaluation
belongs to approaches on how to evaluate programs within this objective.
(G) Empowerment of stakeholders is a further step in the involvement of participants,
as evaluators evaluate whether the goals of participants change during the
lifetime of the policy and how the participants evaluate success. Participatory
and democratic evaluations belong to approaches on how to evaluate
this objective.
The objectives A–C are the most common use of evaluations in EU cohesion
policy, while F–G belong among the rare objectives of evaluations in this policy.
To conclude on the question of why to evaluate the partnership, variations in
partnership implementation, and problems that partners face are strong arguments
for differentiating of effects, outputs, and outcomes of partnership. It comprises
also a strong need for conducting evaluations to learn how to perform better
partnerships. We see many positive attributes of partnership, but also problems,
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at the same time, depending on whether the economic or political performance
is evaluated (Hodge and Greve 2017). The partnership has a great potential to
positively contribute to policymaking and policy implementation, but at the same
time, it is not easy to implement. Several conditions should be met to achieve a
long-term sustainable partnership with positive effects. We will discuss them in the
following section.
3. Evaluation Framework—What Criteria to Apply to Evaluate Quality
of Partnership?
Although many papers discussed evaluations of SDGs generally, the overview
of studies contributing to evaluations and SDGs shows that these evaluations
usually avoid evaluating SDG17 (Avtar et al. 2019; Zhu et al. 2018). For example,
Zhu et al. (2018) used indicators to evaluate several SDGs, but in the case of SDG17,
they concluded that, for China, the evaluation of SDG17 is not relevant. Another paper
(Avtar et al. 2019) simply skipped the evaluations of SDG16 and 17, without a
clear explanation.
Of the whole sample of papers collected for the purpose of this contribution,
only a limited number concerned the evaluation of SDG17 directly (Allen et al. 2017;
Khan et al. 2018). Even when SDG17 is part of an evaluation, the study is limited to an
overview of the fulfillment of the indicators (Allen et al. 2017) or using a descriptive
methodology (Khan et al. 2018). On the other side, we understand why the authors
chose their approach. In contrast to SDG1-15, the actual outputs of SDG17 are not a
tangible investment, but relationships; therefore, their evaluation is methodologically
more challenging.
In order to facilitate the solving of the methodological obstacle of evaluation
of partnerships, EU cohesion policy helps to define an evaluation framework.
This policy commands a budget of 351.8 billion EUR for the period 2013–2020
(European Commission 2015). This large investment aims at the core development
objectives, like economic growth, job creation, competitiveness of companies,
sustainable development, and quality of life (European Commission 2014a).
The advantage of EU cohesion policy is that it covers all EU member states, and thus
there are many options to evaluate it. Moreover, the EU cohesion policy share on
public investment plays a crucial role in many countries (all Central and Eastern
European countries, but also Portugal), where it makes half of all public investment
(European Commission 2017, p. xxii). Such funding provides an opportunity for
various evaluation exercises.
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From the perspective of evaluations, EU cohesion policy belongs to
evaluation-leading policies in Europe (Ferry 2009, p. 14). Some studies even argue
that the evaluation culture in Europe has grown up around this policy (Højlund 2014).
Because partnership is defined and recommended at all political decision-making
levels in this policy (European Commission 2014b), and some evaluations already
exist, we take the evaluation experience from this policy and build the conceptual
framework based on it.
The previous section explained the importance of partnership and why to
evaluate it. Still, we need to respond to what aspects of partnership to evaluate
and how to evaluate them. Based on studies by Gazley (2010); Milio (2014);
Potluka and Liddle (2014), who evaluated partnership implemented within EU
cohesion policy, we take the following seven characteristics of partnership to point
out the core aspects defining optimal partnership. Hodge and Greve (2017) apply a
similar approach when evaluating public-private partnerships based on risk sharing,
innovation, working together, commonness of the collaboration, and length of
the collaboration. These aspects can be used as criteria to evaluate the quality of
partnership, implemented when evaluating processes in partnerships generally.
(1) Declared and shared common goals of the partners: The objectives of the partnership
are clearly defined, and all partners understand them the same way. The goals
are published, and thus available to all relevant stakeholders. Usually, the most
time-consuming and challenging part of partnership concerns setting up and
the discussion on goals and their understanding. Moreover, goals can change
in time according to circumstances. In such a case, the partnership needs to
re-assess them again.
(2) Mutual benefits of the cooperation: Each partner gets added value out of their
taking part in a partnership. It seems to be a natural requirement, but if any
partner gets no added value, this requirement is violated, even if all other
requirements are met, and other partners get at least some added value (and the
overall added value is positive).
(3) Long-term relationship: The partnership was not set up only for a short-term
goal (for example, to apply for funding due to a formal requirement of a call
for proposals and ends with the end of a project). It is difficult to evaluate a
newly established partnership, though the sustainability of partnership is still a
relevant factor. This factor covers also trust among partners, which is pointed out
by some authors as another distinct characteristic (Valerie Wildridge et al. 2004).
Without trust, a partnership will be only of short-term duration.
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(4) Full acceptance of the content and form of cooperation by all partners: Each partner
accepts the style of work of the partnership. Thus, the format of cooperation
does not provide any advantage to any partner above the others. The same also
applies to a disadvantage.
(5) Each partner contributes to what is missing, without which results cannot be
achieved. Each partner provides added value to the partnership. Otherwise,
its membership is questionable.
(6) The synergistic effect ensures that the overall positive effect is greater than the sum
of each participant’s effects. Not only does each partner obtain an added value
(as defined in point two), but the results would not exist if the cooperation
among the partners was missing. Measuring of the synergistic effect belongs
among the most challenging task and relates to the question of what gets each
partner in the sense of input and output.
(7) Joint decision-making by which decisions comprise all opinions and are unanimous:
Achieving consent is a very timely and consuming process. Pressure on quick
decisions can easily harm the whole partnership. Moreover, the responsibilities
for political decision-making are given to politicians by the political system.
Thus, it makes this condition difficult to fulfill, and needs to define the partners’
responsibilities and the willingness of politicians to hear the voices of others.
To the literature set relating to evaluations of SDG17, we also added papers
evaluating partnerships in EU cohesion policy. We have added reports from
evaluations of partnership, of which four were conducted at the national level
(IREAS centrum et al. 2011; Navreme Boheme 2008; Potluka et al. 2017; Tima Liberec
and Morava 2008), two scientific articles using comparative international studies
(Batory and Cartwright 2011; Dąbrowski 2014), and three meta-evaluations at the
European level (Polverari and Michie 2009; Spatial Foresight 2015; Sweco et al. 2016).
Table 1 summarizes the aforementioned evaluations of the partnership principle
carried out. The table shows that individual evaluations of the partnership in EU
cohesion policy cover various objectives according to the above typology. Over time,
growing experience has emerged on how many objectives the evaluations serve.
Based on a critical analysis, these evaluations were assessed according to
which of the seven evaluation objectives they cover. From the comparison, it is
evident that accountability and legitimacy are the fundamental objectives of all
evaluations. The evaluators simply compared the planned and required processes
and results with the actual ones, through interviews, surveys, and desk research,
including investigating datasets. This evaluation objective was present in all studied
cases, while the more demanding objectives like ownership and empowerment
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appeared only in five cases, and simultaneously only in two of them. In the
cases of participatory evaluation approaches (evaluation objectives ownership and
empowerment), evaluations were done, at least partially, by interested participants
or staff of the program.



















































































√ √ √ √
IREAS centrum et al. (2011)
√ √ √ √ √
Allen et al. (2017)
√ √ √ √ √
Sweco et al. (2016)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Allen et al. (2017)
√
Khan et al. (2018)
√
Spatial Foresight (2015)
√ √ √ √ √ √
Batory and Cartwright (2011)
√ √
Dąbrowski (2014)
√ √ √ √ √
Polverari and Michie (2009)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Source: Own elaboration based on Batterbury (2006).
The comparison of the studies shows that in the same period, but in various
programs, the partnership was evaluated differently. See, for example, a Czech
evaluation done by Tima Liberec and Morava (2008), an evaluation primarily focused
on describing how partnerships were formed, and thus whether the partnerships are
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legitimate. The evaluation was predominantly of a qualitative (descriptive) nature,
without evaluating quantitative data.
On the contrary, during the same period in the Czech Republic,
Navreme Boheme (2008) pursued several evaluation objectives. In addition to
assessing the fulfillment and identification of the benefits of international partnerships,
the aim of the evaluation was, among other things, to identify the added value of
the Community Initiative Program EQUAL to existing instruments and policies in
the labor market, identify and examine appropriate practices in implementing
to create expert capacities or to enable the use of acquired knowledge in the
following programming period. At the same time, at the international level in
a meta-evaluation, Polverari and Michie (2009) applied the whole scale of evaluation
objectives to the evaluation of partnership. However, in the case of ownership,
empowerment, and building capacities, the evaluation touched these evaluation
objectives only partially.
The studies of Polverari and Michie (2009), Allen et al. (2017), Sweco et
al. (2016), Spatial Foresight (2015) and Dąbrowski (2014) belong to the most
complex studies in the sample. These evaluations also touched on the topics
of the legislative and institutional framework for fulfilling the partnership principle.
These evaluations study the legal framework, institutional settings (both by
desk research), and behavior of partners (observations, interviews, surveys, and desk
research again). The evaluation studies conclude that partnership helps the feasibility
and benefits of projects, better meeting the needs of target groups. Moreover,
they found out that partnership helps to build the capacity of beneficiaries and
partners, increasing the effectiveness of financed projects based on partnership.
A comparison of the evaluations shows that evaluators’ experience with
evaluating partnerships develops over time. It also relates to the experience of
partners with the implementation of the partnership. Thus, they can provide more
relevant information on partnership implementation. For example, Allen et al. (2017)
compared the experience with the partnership of both the public sector and the civil
society organizations between two programming periods. The authors conclude that
both sides of the partnership learned how to collaborate and develop a functioning
partnership, even with some prevailing obstacles. The knowledge of previous
evaluations also provides evaluators and the partners with some experience on which
they can build their capacities.
142
4. General Evaluation Criteria—How to Evaluate Partnership?
Evaluators do their evaluations in a complex environment. Not only factors
influencing partnership, but also factors supporting or obstructing evaluations play a
role. It concerns factors like for whom, when, with what resources do the evaluators
conduct their task, and in what political processes, and politics (King and Alkin 2018).
Although it might seem that evaluation would be an easy task when there is a set of
monitoring indicators for the SDGs in place, the actual situation is different. It relates
especially to the case of SDG17.
Generally, evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability,
and impacts are applied. Their relationship to socio-economic needs, programs and
policies can be seen on Figure 1.
Figure 1. Evaluation criteria in relation to socio-economic needs and programs.
Based on European Commission (2004, p. 7) and Potluka (2010, p. 91).
From the point of view of the evaluation of relevance, it is possible to
use the definition criteria of the optimal partnership according to the previous
studies (Gazley 2010; Milio 2014; Potluka and Liddle 2014), as mentioned above.
By evaluating the application of these criteria, evaluators can also conduct a scale of
relevance of policies and programs achieved, according to the relationships between
social needs and objectives of policies and programs. Not all of the criteria have the
same weight for the relevance of the final scope of the policies. Criteria related to
shared objectives (1) in the above-mentioned list); mutual benefits of cooperation (2);
acceptance of the format of cooperation between the partners (4); the necessity of each
of the partners (5) and the contribution of the partners to what would not otherwise
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criteria include a long-term relationship between the partners (3), especially in
situations where long-term relationships are still being formed, and the unanimity
of decisions (7). Unanimous decision-making needs a long-term culture with high
social capital, and in many countries, this requires a long process for which there is
not enough time. Therefore, taking into account local habits, the criteria 3 and 7 can
be used with a lower weight than the others.
The evaluation of effectiveness focuses on whether the planned objectives have
been achieved. In the case of SDG17, it might seem that monitoring indicators can
be used, but fulfilling the indicators is not an objective in itself for SDGs, but a
means. The long-term goal of SDG17 is to increase the capacity of target groups
through partnerships, especially in countries in need of assistance. The evaluation
of effectiveness clearly shows how important the relevance of goals and their link
to social needs is (achieving poorly defined goals will not help). An evaluation of
effectiveness can be conducted based on SMART criteria known from management
theories. If the objectives were not achieved (or achieved too easily), they must
be checked according to their (i) specificity (whether they are simple, sensible,
and significant); (ii) measurability (whether they are meaningful and motivating
enough); (iii) achievability (whether the objectives were agreed by stakeholders and
whether they are attainable); (iv) relevancy (reasonability, whether they are realistic
and covered by resources, and results-based; evaluation of relevance is part of this
task); and (v) time-bound.
The evaluation of efficiency works with what is invested in the program or policy
as inputs and what outputs were achieved by these inputs. It is like the efficiency
of a combustion engine, where a ratio of useful work done to the heat provided
is defined as efficiency. In the case of this evaluation criterion, it is appropriate to
do more tests, so that the evaluators have comparisons between different ways of
fulfilling the partnership. For example, it can be done by comparisons of different
methods of communication and negotiation between partners, or different ways
of implementing policies and programs (like grant-making or direct investment in
development assistance).
When evaluating impacts, the evaluators apply experimental and
quasi-experimental methods. Such a type of evaluation is demanding on
pre-intervention and post-intervention data (Khandker et al. 2010). Thus, they must
be planned already when designing the evaluated policy, or depend on secondary
data available independently on the evaluated policy or programs. For example,
Potluka and Fanta (2020) used the propensity score matching method to assess the
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impacts of various composition of partnerships on how attractive rural communities
are for migrants.
On the one hand, the planned impacts are evaluated as the situation when the
social problem, or need, is solved. In addition, unintended effects, both positive and
negative, may also appear during implementation. For the positive ones, no one
usually mentions their benefits, but the negative ones are not desirable. In such cases,
impact evaluation can help redefine the actual needs and, consequently, the objectives
of policies and programs.
Sustainability belongs among the most important evaluation criteria. If the
implemented program or policy is not sustainable, it will only lead to the problem
appearing again and again, or solutions will raise other problems that will require
further efforts. When evaluating sustainability, usually three criteria are assessed
(European Commission 2004, p. 49): (i) self-sufficiency in financing to avoid persistent
funding requirements. This type of sustainability can be also evaluated against the
target groups’ willingness to pay, where the private sector knows better what the
actual needs are than pure public sector projects (including those implemented with
the nonprofit organizations); (ii) systemic sustainability (sometimes referred to as
political sustainability), which assesses whether changes in the system and policy
system will not lead to the closure of activities, (iii) environmental sustainability,
which assesses whether the implemented program and policies do not burden the
environment, (iv) appropriate technology to sustain the outputs also technically,
and (v) capacity to manage the outcomes.
The question on how to evaluate partnership relates to the evaluation objectives
applied. The chapter does not go much into details on evaluation methods explicitly.
We assume that evaluators apply a standard set of evaluation methods and techniques
on how to collect data and how to analyze them. The methods applied strongly
depend on the type of evaluation and data availability. Such a description would be
applicable elsewhere when discussing evaluations. From this perspective, evaluation
criteria specific for evaluations of partnership are crucial. Interviews of all kinds,
focus groups, phone and internet-based surveys, as well as secondary data analysis
belong to them. We expect that the evaluators dispose of them and can apply them
appropriately according to the evaluation tasks and evaluation objectives.
A comparison of the evaluations in the above-mentioned studies shows that it is
important to evaluate partnerships from all the evaluation objectives, and to apply
all evaluation criteria. While this entails a complexity of problems and stakeholders’
perspectives, it also allows one to give a complete picture of how the partnership
works and what effects it brings. It follows the thoughts of Hodge and Greve
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(2017) on the economic and political performance of partnership projects. Moreover,
the current evaluation effort in partnership aims usually at the procedural aspects of
creating partnerships between the public and other stakeholders in the preparation
of programs and policies. These evaluations examine and describe the experience
from the perspective of the various actors involved.
5. Conclusions
The contribution in this chapter tries to add to the knowledge of why and how
to evaluate partnerships in SDG17. By taking examples from EU cohesion policy,
we present necessary conditions for a successful implementation of partnership and
various objectives for conducting evaluations, together with standard evaluation
criteria. Partnership has a great potential to positively contribute to policymaking
and policy implementation when it is implemented with respecting all partners and
their contribution to a partnership. On the other hand, implementing a partnership
requires respect for local and national habits, while a model “one size fits all” does
not apply. To the question on why to evaluate a partnership, we conclude that it can
maintain partnerships with positive effects and reduce negative impacts.
Concerning the question on how to evaluate partnership under the SDG17
in the future, the quality of the evaluations would benefit from the inclusion of
a broader scale of evaluation objectives, including ownership and empowerment,
and evaluating them by participatory approaches. Moreover, evaluations could not
concentrate only on processes of establishing partnerships, but also on partnerships’
efficiency, effectiveness, impacts, and sustainability. By including these aspects in the
future evaluations of the partnership principle, it is possible to improve the quality of
the studies, and make a substantial contribution to the implementation of the SDG17.
When evaluating partnerships, evaluators should always verify the fulfillment of
the seven defining characteristics of the partnership (common goals, mutual benefits;
long-term relationship; acceptance of cooperation; the contribution of each partner;
synergistic effects, and joint decision-making). In addition to the common objectives
of evaluation, which are mostly focused on evaluation studies (accountability and
legitimacy, improvement of quality and performance, better planning and capacity
building), the studies also progressed in time, to strengthen the coherence and
motivation of individual actors and target groups with interventions, and started
evaluating ownership and empowerment.
Changes and achievements cannot be attributed to the partnership without a
proper and rigorous evaluation design. If an evaluation is more or less a monitoring
exercise, we cannot confirm the positive attribution of partnerships to achieving
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SDGs. Moreover, from the perspective of evaluations, the monitoring indicators
under the SDG17 should be redefined, to better reflect the local cultural differences
and partnerships’ practices. Otherwise, SDG17 and partnership remain only a formal
issue among SDGs.
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Cross-Sector Partnerships for Implementing
Community Climate Action Plans:
Structural features, Partner Outcomes and
Plan Outcomes
Krista Wong, Amelia Clarke and Eduardo Ordonez-Ponce
1. Introduction
Local governments all over the world hold an important role in climate
protection as approximately 70% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are
from cities (UN-Habitat 2011). Municipalities can influence emissions through their
numerous roles, for example, they typically have at least partial control over land
use, transportation planning, municipal buildings, and hold a key role in waste
management (Deangelo and Harvey 1998; Demuzere et al. 2014). By partnering with
other organizations, more progress through climate action plans can be achieved at a
community-wide scale (Clarke and Ordonez-Ponce 2017; Sun et al. 2020).
A community climate action plan is a document capturing a set of strategies
that local organizations have committed to carrying out for reducing GHG emissions.
In Canada, there are more than 280 local governments committed to addressing climate
change through membership in a program called Partners for Climate Protection
Program (PCP) (FCM and ICLEI Canada n.d.). At issue is how local governments
may effectively implement community climate action plans through sound structural
features, and therefore enable reaching desirable outcomes (Clarke 2011). This study
seeks to explore cross-sector partnerships as a means of implementing community
climate action plans, both in terms of the structural features of the partnership and
the resulting plan and partner outcomes.
Environmental problems, such as climate change, that are too large for any
single organization to approach alone (Bryson et al. 2006; Gray and Stites 2013;
Waddock 1991), are being addressed through cross-sector social partnerships
(CSSPs) (Crane and Seitanidi 2014; MacDonald et al. 2018; Selsky and Parker 2005;
Waddock 1991). CSSPs undergo a collaborative strategic management process, which
begins with the partnership formation, a collaborative strategic plan formulation,
both partner and partner-level implementation, and ends with realized outcomes,
with multiple feedback loops throughout the whole process (Clarke and Fuller 2010).
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Clarke and Fuller (2010) describe six types of outcomes that can result from the
collaborative strategic management process. Two of the six types of outcomes
that can result from a collaborative strategic management process include plan-
and partner-centric outcomes (Clarke and Fuller 2010). Plan-centric outcomes are
outcomes that are related to the results around which the partnership was initially
created, whereas partner-centric outcomes are outcomes related to the learning
and adjustments in organizational behavior or structural features of the individual
partners (Clarke and Fuller 2010; Ordonez-Ponce et al. 2020).
Currently, there is a knowledge gap in the literature and practice regarding
the relationship between the structural features of the cross-sector partnerships
and the two types of outcomes from implementing community climate action
plans (World Climate Research Programme 2019). This research seeks to fill this
knowledge gap and provide new insights as a means of theoretical as well as practical
contributions. Practically, this knowledge is useful to sustainability managers,
sustainability practitioners, and also local government staff, as they can be informed
of how implementation structures can be designed to positively contribute to
addressing climate change through mitigation, and also to further comprehend
the relationship of structural features and outcomes (MacDonald et al. 2018;
MacDonald et al. forthcoming). Understanding structural features will be valuable
as many communities have decided to focus on tackling climate change issues as a
sustainable development priority (MacDonald et al. 2019). Structural features during
plan implementation also affect what outcomes can be achieved (Clarke 2011).
The questions addressed through this research are: (1) What lessons from
previous studies regarding the relationship between implementation structures and
outcomes of collaborative community sustainability plans are transferable to the
context of community climate plans? (2) What are the relationships, if any, between
the partnership structural features, and plan and partner outcomes? (3) What
collaborative implementation structures are present during the implementation
of municipal community climate action plans in Canada; and what are the
plan and partner outcomes? An overall purpose of the study is to contribute
to knowledge needed for Sustainable Development Goal 17, target 17.17 which
aims to “encourage and promote effective public, public-private, and civil society




2.1. Climate Change and Local Governments
Many countries, including Canada, have ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement, where
189 nations have come together to prevent the global temperature from rising beyond
two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (United Nations Climate Change 2020).
Local governments have significant control and influence over GHG emissions,
on the scale that can contribute to a nation’s international reduction targets
(Bulkeley and Betsill 2005), and many mitigation efforts are under municipal
jurisdiction. Bulkeley and Betsill (2005) note that local governments have a
certain influence over emissions from waste production and energy consumption
through processes such as energy management, transportation, planning, and waste
management (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005). Addressing climate change at the
scale of the city is needed since cities produce waste and consume energy
(Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Deangelo and Harvey 1998).
2.2. ICLEI and PCP Program
The Partners for Climate Protection (PCP) is a partnership between the Federation
of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) and ICLEI Canada—Local Governments for
Sustainability, and is the Canadian component of the global Cities for Climate
Protection (CCP) Campaign (FCM and ICLEI Canada n.d.). The PCP program is
a five-milestone framework that guides members in (1) creating GHG emissions
inventories, (2) setting reduction targets, (3) developing local action plans to reduce
emissions, (4) implement policies and measures, and (5) monitor and verify results
(FCM and ICLEI Canada n.d.). Steps are usually completed in order, from the
first milestone to the last, but some municipalities may begin by formulating an
action plan to begin reducing emissions immediately (ICLEI Canada and FCM 2008).
The PCP program’s milestone framework differentiates between corporate and
community-wide GHG inventories and plans (ICLEI Canada and FCM n.d.).
Community climate action plans make emissions reduction targets beyond emissions
directly controlled by the local government, such as the business and civil society
sectors (ICLEI Canada and FCM n.d.). Community-wide plans are bounded by
emissions within the geographic region (Clarke and Ordonez-Ponce 2017).
Accordingly, a global survey of urban climate change experiments in 100 cities
has shown that it is the local governments who have the main leading role
(66% versus civil society, private sector, or other governments) in urban climate
change efforts, but that other private and civil society actors also have key roles
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(Castan Broto and Bulkeley 2013) as capable partners in implementing municipal
climate responses (Aylett 2014). Local governments can facilitate actions by building
relationships with stakeholders, boosting public participation and campaigning for
this cause to national governments (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006).
2.3. Cross-Sector Social Partnerships
Cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs) can be defined as entities created
for addressing social, economic, and/or environmental issues by continually and
actively engaging partners from two or more sectors (Crane and Seitanidi 2014;
Selsky and Parker 2005; Waddock 1991). CSSPs require the partners’ commitment of
resources as well as their involvement in the planning, organizing, evaluating and
implementation of activities defined as necessary for the success of the partnership
(Waddock 1991). CSSPs are created when a large social problem needs to be addressed,
including implementation of a collaborative strategic plan (Clarke and Fuller 2010),
which community climate action plans can be categorized under as they are
collaborative and cross-sector in nature.
CSSPs are growing in numbers; their foci are getting more complex, having great
impact with important implications for learning, and studies from different academic
disciplines are proliferating (Clarke and Crane 2018). While this condition seems
expected due to its interdisciplinary characteristics (Bryson et al. 2015), it is also a
main research challenge as they exist in a variety of sizes, purposes, time frames,
voluntariness, and regional levels (Selsky and Parker 2005).
Waddock (1991) has identified three “ideal types” of CSSPs according to their
level of problem salience and organizations’ interdependence. Selsky and Parker (2005)
have classified them as transactional, integrative, or developmental, based on their
timeframe, level of openness, and interest orientation, offering different configurations
of social partnerships. One of those configurations is composed of partners from
across sectors focusing on regionally large scale projects that typically concentrate on
social, economic, and/or environmental issues (Selsky and Parker 2005).
Huxham and Vangen (2000) suggest that current public sector management
needs a formal understanding of the skills, processes, and structural features;
tools required for working inter-organizationally. A partnership approach
(collaborative approach) is a strategic management process that includes partners
in plan formation, implementation, and decision making (Clarke and Erfan 2007;
Clarke and Fuller 2010).
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2.4. Collaborative Strategic Management Process
In the partnership approach to problem solving, collaboration entails
collective decision making, and collective responsibility for actions between
stakeholders (Selin and Chevez 1995; MacDonald et al. forthcoming). Instead of
collaboration being a fixed, organized state, it can be seen as an ongoing
process (Selin and Chevez 1995). Quite typically, collaboration processes begin with
environmental antecedents, moving to problem setting, direction setting, structuring
and implementation (Gray 1985), and finally, outcomes and feedback arrows illustrate
the dynamic and circularity of collaboration (Selin and Chevez 1995).
With the widely applicable nature of collaboration processes, CSSPs have
become evidently used in different sectors globally in at least the past two
decades (Selsky and Parker 2005). However, cross-sector collaborations do not
always succeed in solving all problems they set out to solve (Bryson et al. 2006;
Gray and Stites 2013). There have been cases where what was meant as solutions
create more problems (Bryson et al. 2006). Cross-sector collaboration is not a
one-size-fits-all solution because of the complex, interconnected relationships,
and changes along the progress can cause unexpected effects in the system
(Bryson et al. 2006). The failure or success of a partnership depends on the types of
partners and their relationships, the phases in the partnering process, the structural
features of the partnership, as well as the respective environment (Glasbergen 2007).
According to Waddock (1988), the potential for failure is great if the partners have
not interacted before and may not understand what it means to partner or what the
partnership is about. In fact, some of the reasons for partnerships to fail are the lack
of commitment from the partners and gaining less than expected (Waddock 1988).
On the contrary, partnerships are more likely to succeed if they focus on areas
interdependent for the partners, so that they would all gain something which is
larger than the costs of participating (Gray 1985; Waddock 1991), when there are
leaders and sponsors, an agreement on the problem, networks exist at the moment of
initial formation of the partnership, or when the partnership possesses resources and
strategies for dealing with power imbalances among the partners (Bryson et al. 2006).
According to Clarke and Fuller (2010), a collaborative strategic management
process consists of a context describing situational considerations for forming
the partnership; a collaborative strategic plan formulation; a deliberate and
emergent collaborative plan implementation by the partnership and by the partner
organizations; the realized collaborative plan implementation outcomes including
plan, process, partner, person, outside stakeholder, and environment-centric
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outcomes; and changes in the social problem domain which may impact the
collaborative plan implementation process and/or outcomes.
Relating to changes to domain, but worded slightly differently, Bryson et al. (2006)
also credit that many collaboration academics noticeably identify that context
affects structural features, such as when government policy changes affect available
resources, rearranging structural ties of partners. At all stages of the collaboration,
trust, commitment, collaboration, understanding, and outcomes, are all important
(Ansell and Gash 2008), as are the roles each plays (Yan et al. 2018).
2.5. Key Structural Features for Implementation through a Cross-Sector Partnership
When collaborations require sustained partner commitment, structuring is
needed as a way to manage stakeholders and stakeholder interactions systematically
(Selin and Chevez 1995). Structuring is a configuration of enduring and persistent
activities, whose main characteristic is the regularity of roles and procedures, and of
processes of interactions (Ranson et al. 1980), a dynamic process due to the complexity
and uncertain nature of collaboration, where complexity derives from factors such
as changes in membership, and partners (Bryson et al. 2006; Selin and Chevez 1995).
The process of structuring includes formalizing partnerships, role delegation,
task detailing, control system creating and monitoring (Selin and Chevez 1995).
A partnership’s structural features are also in part dictated by the external context
(Bryson et al. 2006; Clarke and Fuller 2010), such as when government policy changes
take place, affecting available resources for problem solving and restructuring the
structural ties of the partners in the collaboration (Bryson et al. 2006).
Implementation structural features, understood as features that help to facilitate
the implementation process, have been known to affect partner engagement
and resultant outcomes (Clarke 2014). Structures are composed of processes,
form(s) and partners, and many variances of structural differences can take
place during implementation (Clarke and Erfan 2007). Clarke (2011, 2012)
explored the question of which structural features are important for enabling
plan outcomes, finding that partner engagement, partnership and partner level
implementation, presence of communication system, presence of monitoring system,
and collaborative oversight were important for achieving plan outcomes—findings
which are applicable to implementing plans with GHG emissions and air quality
goals (Clarke 2011). The study concluded that structural features are interrelated
(Clarke 2011). For example, if organizations are not engaged, it would not be possible
to have them implemented within their organizations; if the final goal is to achieve
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the plan outcomes of the community sustainability plan, it is not enough to have only
one or two of these features (Clarke 2011). Table 1 shows the five structural features:







The successful implementation of a community sustainability plan
needs a multi-organizational party to oversee the implementation
process while giving short-term directions for action, such as fund
allocation and staffing assignments (Clarke 2012). This collaborative
oversight body should have a secretariat to coordinate the process,
a body to make decisions and oversee the implementation processes,




Not only do key organizations from various sectors need to be engaged,
but also the right number of them, and/or there needs to be a method to
perpetually add partners to the implementation process (Clarke 2012).
One model of engagement is participation, where stakeholders are
encouraged by the municipality to provide input to the sustainable
community plan (Clarke and Erfan 2007). Another approach is the
partnership model of stakeholder engagement, used for sustainable
development, where stakeholders do more than provide input and
actually collaborate on planning, decision making, and acting for
common goals and visions (Clarke and Erfan 2007). The partnership






With each partner implementing the collaborative strategic plan,
sustainable development can happen outside of solely the
governmental jurisdiction (Clarke 2012). During the implementation by
individual organizations, tasks are more specific, and specific to the
organization (Clarke and Fuller 2010).
Monitoring
System
A monitoring system enables adjustments during the implementation
stage, and for plan renewal as required (Clarke 2012). Having both
progress and process reports works well (Clarke et al. 2019).
Communication
System
Communication activities are useful to allow networking between
partner organizations and to reach community members (Clarke 2012),
with the ability of maintaining complex organizational forms,
like CSSPs, and demonstrate value through collective agency
(Koschmann et al. 2012).
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2.6. Outcomes of Collaborative Strategy Management Process
Outcomes of collaboration may include benefits, impacts and programs
(Selin and Chevez 1995). In the cyclical process of collaboration, outcomes are shown
next to the implementation of the partners and partnership (Selin and Chevez 1995).
From the six types of outcomes described by Clarke and Fuller (2010) that can result
from the collaborative strategic management process, plan- and partner-centric
outcomes considered in this study.
Plan-Centric Outcomes—Bryson et al. (2006) posit that the point of creating and
maintaining CSSPs should be for making public value that cannot be achieved by
individual organizations alone, and for creating positive social change. This ability
to create greater public value and change comes from the partners’ collective agency
(Koschmann et al. 2012; Seitanidi et al. 2010). Plan outcomes are the background
issues for why the collaboration had initially been formed and can be found in
the strategic plan (Clarke and Fuller 2010). When assessing if the community is
progressing in its plan outcome, the trend within each region itself is most important
(Clarke 2011). For this study, plan outcomes relate to climate mitigation.
Partner-Centric Outcomes—Partner-centric outcomes are outcomes that partners
experience from the collaboration (Clarke and MacDonald 2019). Much of the
literature on inter-organizational learning from collaboration and the benefits
that arise have been centered on business partnerships, with limited research
on outcomes from private-public partnerships (Arya and Salk 2006). In CSSPs,
benefits can be realized by individuals, organizations, various sectors, and by
society (Selsky and Parker 2010). This article’s research focuses on partner
outcomes classified as physical capital: cost savings and increased capacity;
human capital: knowledge or learning; and organizational capital: innovation,
relationships, reputation, new markets and resources, and sustainability programs
(Clarke and MacDonald 2019; Ordonez-Ponce et al. 2020).
In summary, while a fair amount is known about structural features of
cross-sector social partnerships, and resulting outcomes, this article considers its
application to the context of implementing community climate action plans, and also
what might be learned from this context to further theoretical understanding in the
cross-sector partnership literature and for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17.
3. Methods and Materials
This study uses a qualitative multi-case research design (Yin 2011). Even though
case studies have been traditionally used for process evaluations, it has now been
proven through application to be suitable to analyze outcomes (Yin 2011), both of
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which are examined by this research. The research partner engaged in data collection
is ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability. As explained earlier, ICLEI Canada,
in partnership with FCM, are the organizers of the Partners for Climate Protection
(PCP) program, which is a hub for Canadian local governments that are committed
to taking action to reduce GHGs (FCM and ICLEI Canada n.d.).
Selection of the case studies was based on the following criteria:
1. They are mid-sized Canadian communities involved in the PCP program
(as small and mid-sized communities are under-studied in this context, and yet
are the majority of communities in the PCP program. These criteria were applied
by removing the top 10 Canadian cities, by population, from consideration);
2. They are members of the PCP program that have achieved milestone 51
in the community stream by July 2016 (as this ensures communities are
monitoring progress);
3. There is a dedicated community-wide GHG action plan or energy plan, and not
only part of a sustainable community plan or equivalent (as we are interested
specifically in the implementation of climate action plans);
4. Their plans have considered a GHG emissions target that extends beyond 2016,
and they have a current climate action plan or energy plan that is part of the
PCP program, or a plan developed beyond the PCP program after achievement
of Milestone 5 (as this ensures it is potentially ongoing).
5. The implementation of their plans includes 10 partners or more (as we are
interested in studying cross-sector, multi-organizational partnerships);
6. They have been implementing the plan in the most recent year (as this ensures
it is still active);
7. They were willing and able to provide relevant data in English for the study.
Sixteen communities met the first two criteria. These were assessed in more detail
against all the criteria. The communities chosen for the multi cross-case study analysis
are the District of Saanich (British Columbia), the City of Guelph (Ontario), the City
of North Vancouver (British Columbia), and the City of London (Ontario) (Table 2).
1 Milestone 5: Monitor progress and reporting results (https://fcm.ca/en/programs/partners-climate-
protection/milestone-framework).
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Table 2. Selected case studies.





33% reduction from 2007





Reduce energy use in
buildings, industry,
and transportation by
50% per capita and GHG
emissions by 60% per













Reduce emissions by 15%
below 2007 levels by 2020









by 15% from 1990 levels
by 2020; reduce 80% in
total GHG emissions
from 1990 levels by 2050




City of London 2014;
Donnelly et al. 2016)
Data collection was undertaken in collaboration with ICLEI Canada between
June and October 2016, and it involved two stages: data collection for in-depth
cases, and data collection for partner organizations. For stage 1, for each of the
four final communities the implementation structures and plan-centric outcomes
were initially collected from archival sources (websites, plans and reports) and then
informants were interviewed for further details. Semi-structured interviews were
conducted via Skype or phone, lasted between 30 and 60 min, and were recorded
and transcribed. Interview questions and how the interview was introduced can
be found in Appendix A. The key informant was the municipal staff (PCP contact)
responsible for implementing the community plan. This person was interviewed
regarding plan information, implementation structural features, plan outcomes and
partner outcomes.
Stage 2 was focused on the municipalities’ partner organizations, following a
procedure similar to that used in stage 1. All partner organizations were invited
to participate interviewing them via telephone or Skype. Interviews lasted 15 min
approximately and they were recorded and transcribed. Questions are included
in Appendix B. Core implementation partners were interviewed regarding partner
outcomes experienced from collaborative implementation. Core implementation
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partners are organizations that are involved more in implementation and/or over the
longer term.
For data analysis, interview transcripts and archival material were deductively
coded for the five structural features (Clarke 2011; Clarke 2012), for the partner
outcomes (Clarke and MacDonald 2019), and for the plan outcomes. Then,
the transcripts and archival material were inductively coded for new content.
Inductive coding allows for themes to emerge from the empirical evidence.
Tables were created with the reduced information for each case and inserted into
case write-ups. For the partner outcomes, frequency counts for each category
were determined (one count per interviewee maximum). A cross-case comparison
matrix was conducted using a process-outcomes matrix (Averill 2002) to see if any
patterns emerged between a partnership’s structural features and the partner and
plan outcomes. Cross-case conclusions were drawn. Implementation structural
feature findings were compared to the literature on CSSPs and new learnings were
determined. Partner outcome findings were compared to partner outcome findings
from the CSSP literature to validate previous research and offer findings from the new
context. Table 3 shows the number of interviews developed per type of organization.
Table 3. Interview counts and organization types.
Organization Type Saanich Guelph North Vancouver London
Government 3 1 2 1
Business 2 * 2 ˆ 1 * 1 ˆ
Business Association 0 0 0 1
Non-profit/Non-governmental organization 2 2 1 0
Total Interviews 7 5 4 3
ˆ: Denotes one common partner of Guelph and London; *: Denotes one common partner
counted between Saanich and North Vancouver.
Each of four cases is introduced in this section. The PCP programs allows a
number of plan types to be considered as community climate action plans, as long as
the plans have GHG reduction targets. Thus, some of the cases focus on community
energy plans, while others focus on community climate action plans; regardless of
their name, PCP would consider these all to be community climate action plans.
3.1. District of Saanich, British Columbia: Saanich Climate Action Plan (CAP)
Plan Purpose—Embedding climate action commitment into the Official
Community Plan, Saanich identified the opportunity to be an example for other local
governments and simultaneously transforming the municipality into a better place
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to live. Additionally, the climate action plan helps reduce the community’s carbon
footprint and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. The plan was designed to align with the
PCP program, setting reduction goals and targets for corporate and community-wide
emissions, while identifying actions to meet those targets to mitigate climate change
(Saanich 2010). Table 4 shows the five implementation structural features of the
Saanich Climate Action Plan.
Plan Outcomes. The 2012 Community Energy and Emissions Inventory (CEEI)
reports from the Province of British Columbia have not been released. There is no
data beyond 2010 for community-wide GHG emissions and energy use.
Table 4. Saanich climate action plan implementation structural features.
Structural Feature Related Content Source
Engagement Project based; ~10 “core implementation partners” Interview
Partner Actions
Municipality shares information; when opportunity
arises, discuss ideas, find projects in Saanich to interact;




Municipal staff puts together information; create




Climate action results communicated through Saanich
Strategic Plan, and the Climate Action website, as well




Social media; quarterly newsletters to public; capital
regional district—quarterly meetings, municipalities
can share work; media events
Interview
Monitoring
Public reports of progress are made to stakeholders
(Saanich n.d.). Saanich reports to residents and Council
through “Annual and Financial Reporting”, reports to
the province through the “CARIP” (Climate Action
Revenue Incentive Program), and reports





Annual reporting part of whole organization;
CARIP reporting; 2012 CEEI (Community Energy and
Emissions Inventory) report not officially launched;
will create own estimates
Interview
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3.2. City of Guelph, Ontario: Community Energy Initiative (CEI)
In 2006, the Consortium decided to formalize a long-term Community
Energy Plan (CEP) which would guide the city’s energy future for years to come
(Garforth International llc 2007). The name of the plan changed from CEP to
the current Community Energy Initiative (CEI), reflecting its entrance into the
implementation phase (City Council Agenda n.d.). Guelph’s goals under the plan
are to use less energy in 25 years than they do today, consume less energy per capita
than comparable Canadian cities, and produce less GHG per capita than the current
global average (City Council Agenda 2016b).
Plan Purpose: Guelph has a population of 140,000 people including an additional
of 20,000 students during the school year (City Council Agenda 2016d), and is
situated in a region near enough to Toronto that it attracts population growth
(Garforth International llc 2007). Guelph’s population is expected to grow to 170,000
within the city by 2031 (City Council Agenda 2016d), supported by commercial
and industrial development activities. This translates to an addition of homes plus
industrial growth. The City has committed to implementing an energy plan that can
support the population growth and help with competitiveness and environmental
performance (Garforth International llc 2007). Table 5 shows the five implementation
structural features of Guelph’s Community Energy Initiative.
CEI Update: An upcoming CEI update was expected to be provided to Council in
Spring 2017, with progress reports given to Council regularly (City Council Agenda 2016c).
Of the three main scopes, two are closely related to this study. One is to re-focus the CEI
as a community-led initiative, by empowering stakeholders to decide on the priorities
and lead initiatives, and another, to develop progress metrics and compare to other
municipalities by coordinating reporting protocols (City Council Agenda 2016c).
Some closely relevant principles of a CEI update include, “Community-based
governance, oversight and reporting; improved community engagement with local
stakeholders; clarity on the role of the Local Government, Agencies and stakeholders;
partnering with external third party advocacy and support groups; rigorous analysis,
reporting and oversight in support of developing acceptable baseline targets and
communicating measurable results” (City Council Agenda 2016a, p. 149).
Plan Outcomes: The CEI was adopted in 2007. From 2006–2012, energy usage
has decreased 17.6% per capita, and GHG emissions decreased by 26.3% per capita
since 2006, while the total population increase was 21.7% (Guelph Hydro Inc. 2013).
A staff report mentions, “Energy and Emission per capita fell in early stages but
remained stalled” (City Council Agenda 2016a, p. 117). GHGs and energy use per
capita have been “roughly at the same level” (City Council Agenda 2016a, p. 140)
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since 2009. A decrease in fossil fuel based electricity supplied to Guelph contributed
the early decreases while the stabled indicators are the result of ongoing overall
improvements in efficiency offset by growth (City Council Agenda 2016a). Currently,
an update of the CEI is in progress at the time of study.
Table 5. Community energy initiative implementation structural features.
Structural Feature Plan Source
Engagement
Informal engagement; ad-hoc; task force ended 2012;




Defining the role of local governments in CEI update;
The city provides leadership and planning; major
project—district energy system involved utility, local
customers, development community, public input;




Municipal oversight; Future task force—oversight role;
Manager, Community Energy Interview
Communication
Webpage; social media; CEI update to Council results in
communication to community; council meetings
publicly presented and activities related to CEI results
in communication and outreach
Interview
Monitoring
To monitor progress towards targets an Energy and
Emissions Monitoring Report is prepared every year by
The City of Guelph, assisted by Guelph Hydro Inc.
(Guelph Hydro Inc. 2013).
Currently refreshing Community Energy Initiative;






3.3. City of North Vancouver, British Columbia: Community Energy and Emissions
Plan (CEEP)
Plan Purpose: The City of North Vancouver has relatively low per capita
emissions, the CEEP is fundamentally about deepening actions around land use,
development, waste management and other activities to deepen emissions reductions
(HB Lanarc 2010). The CEEP is also the analysis document to support the Amendment
of the Official Community Plan (OCP) in order for North Vancouver to comply with
the Local Government Act which requires local governments to have GHG reduction
targets, policies and actions (HB Lanarc 2010).
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The Community Energy and Emissions Plan’s objectives are to “develop a
climate and energy vision that supports core City priorities; develop a high level
framework that builds on and guides existing City activity, with new sector-specific
policies and actions; estimate the near-term costs of climate and energy-related
policies and actions; develop defensible and meaningful greenhouse gas reduction
target(s)” (HB Lanarc 2010, p. 5). Table 6 presents the five implementation structural
features of North Vancouver’s Community Energy and Emissions Plan.
Table 6. Community energy and emissions plan implementation structural features.
Structural Feature Plan Source
Engagement
No formalized structural feature; ~5 “core
implementation partners”; known organizations added
as appropriate
Interview
Partner Actions City collaborates with organizations toimplement programs Interview
Collaborative
Oversight
Council is the decision-making body; staff committee




Meetings; emails; no formal network Interview
Webpage; CARIP (Climate Action Revenue Incentive
Program) reporting (City of North Vancouver n.d.a.)
Monitoring
Council and staff committee monitors progress of plan;
meetings to review progress of implementation and
provides update to Council; partners—roundtable
sharing of work; monitors emissions (transportation);
make adjustments as progress; 2020—due for renewal;
no data past 2010 (CEEI); look at programs being
implemented; working on data for inventory
Interview
Plan Outcomes: There is no data beyond 2010 for community-wide GHG
emissions and energy use due to a delay in the CEEI reports. However, the City
is looking at programs being implemented and measuring available emissions
(transportation). Overall, North Vancouver’s implementation of the Community
Energy and Emissions Plan involves all five implementation structural features,
and partner outcomes of each capital type were found. However, monitoring for
community-wide GHG emissions and energy is not at a frequency which allows for
recent community-wide energy and emissions to be known. This occurs because the
CEEI is delayed.
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3.4. City of London, Ontario: Community Energy Action Plan (2014–2018) (CEAP)
Overall Goals of the London Energy Connections Program:
• “Increase the local economic benefit of sustainable energy use through” cost
savings from energy conservation and energy efficiency, revenue from local
production of clean and green energy products, and job creation associated with
product and service providers engaged in these activities (Corporation of the
City of London 2014, p. 6).
• Reduce the environmental impact associated with energy use, through GHG
reduction targets consistent with the Province of Ontario’s goals, namely: 15%
reduction from 1990 levels by 2020, 37% reduction from 1990 levels by 2030,
and 80% reduction from 1990 levels by 2050 (City of London 2019).
Plan Purpose: The plan’s goal is for the City to meet the provincial GHG targets using
ways that generate financial payback or at minimum financially break even within a 10-year
time frame (Corporation of the City of London 2014). In the past 15 years, the City has
been concerned with energy use mainly for environmental reasons (Donnelly et al. 2016).
The residents of London have been contributing to smog-forming emissions, mainly from
fossil fuel energy use (Donnelly et al. 2016). As prices for energy increase, the community
is becoming more aware of the financial costs of energy consumption, leading many
people to become aware of their own consumption and seeking ways to conserve energy
(Donnelly et al. 2016). Table 7 shows the five implementation structural features of the
Community Energy Action Plan.
Table 7. Community energy action plan implementation structural features.
Structural Feature Plan Source
Engagement
Identify the “influencers” in the community
(individuals, organizations, neighborhoods etc.),
and develop engagement and enlisting strategies
(Donnelly et al. 2016); ~22 key stakeholders in action plan
elements (Corporation of the City of London 2014);
local businesses, local institutions and the local community
are key community energy stakeholders
(Corporation of the City of London 2014); “explore interest
bringing Sustainability CoLab’s ‘Regional Carbon Initiative’




Reach Londoners through community associations and
employers; Ad-hoc relationships, work with stakeholders
on specific activities; key stakeholders’ activities are in the





Structural Feature Plan Source
Partner Actions
Role in playing “connect the dots” between key community
stakeholders, their activities, and roles stakeholders can
have in the CEAP (Donnelly et al. 2016)
City staff participated in steering committee that
established the London Environmental Network, including
groups with an energy focus (Donnelly et al. 2016)
City staff are influencers through Active and Green
Communities (Donnelly et al. 2016)
City staff co-hosted the “Corporate Leadership for a
Greener London” business engagement event with Labatt






Municipal staff oversees plan progress, reports back to
community and Council; Manager, Air Quality Interview
Communication
In public education materials, easily comprehensible
infographics are used, and are well received
(Donnelly et al. 2016) Ongoing conversations,
implementation and collaborations an essential component
of the London Energy Connections Program




‘Reduce Impact’ website, encourage Londoners and
stakeholders to post projects Interview
Monitoring
London Hydro and Union Gas provided utility data
between 2011–15 (Donnelly et al. 2016)
Annual Community and GHG Emissions Inventory reports
for 2013, 2014, and 2015 (Donnelly et al. 2016)
The CEAP is a dynamic document, when actions are added
from new opportunities, it will be included in progress
reports (Corporation of the City of London 2014)
Publish reports on city-led plan actions annually
(Corporation of the City of London 2014).
Some stakeholders provided information about their own
actions for the plan, and it is proposed a next step is to
contact stakeholders that provided information about their
actions for the plan for an update of partner actions




Future plans to reach out to stakeholders (that provided
information for action) for updates; London Energy
Connections Program— An ongoing program for
developing, implementing and tracking the current




• Total community energy use in 2015 was 16% above 1990 levels (City of London
2016), down from 18% above 1990 levels in 2014 (City of London 2015) but
is below “business as usual” forecast in 1990, demonstrating impact of recent
energy conservation activities (City of London 2016);
• Per capita energy use in 2015 was 6% below 1990 levels (City of London 2016),
compared with 4% below 1990 levels in 2014 (City of London 2015).
Biggest improvement in residential energy use per capita, attributing to energy
efficient appliances, retrofits and new home construction (City of London 2016);
• Total GHGs in 2015 were 8% lower than 1990 levels (City of London 2016),
compared with 6% below 1990 levels in 2014 (City of London 2015);
• Per capita GHG emissions in 2015 was 25% lower than 1990 levels (City of London
2016) compared with 24% lower than 1990 levels in 1990 (City of London 2015).
Examples of Plan Outcomes Context:
• Cold winter of 2015 influenced space heating and process heating needs for
industrial, commercial and institutional buildings (City of London 2016);
• 6% energy use in 2015 from 1990 levels related to industrial, commercial and
institution sector partially due to aftermath of the 2008–2009 recession, but efforts
have been increased by local utilities to promote energy conservation and demand
management (City of London 2016);
• Cold winter of 2014 increased demand for natural gas which was reflected in
energy use especially residential sector, but there were still improvements in
residential sector possibly due to energy efficiency of consumer appliances,
home retrofits, space heating and cooling systems and new home construction
(City of London 2016). Residential energy per capita 5% lower than 1990 in 2014
(City of London 2015) compared with 13% lower in 2015 (City of London 2016).
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Cross-Case Comparisons
Table 8 summarizes the presence of the five implementation structural
features and plan outcomes, and Table 9 presents partner outcomes across the
four communities.
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Saanich Guelph NorthVancouver London
Engagement Present Present Present Present













































2015: per capita energy
below 1990 levels and
total energy above
1990 levels
2015: total and per
capita GHGs lower than
1990 levels, decreased
from 2014
Table 9. Partner outcomes across municipalities.









Partners are specialists; increase understanding, awareness; input into
best practices; more opinions, options; creating awareness of programs,




Bring awareness to program; larger audience reach from outreach




Progress made with organizations; motivating people for mitigating
climate change; accelerating to low carbon economy x 2; achieve
mission and vision; better solution for community; opportunity to
benefit the residents—double incentives; reduce GHG emissions
through communities x 2; drive energy efficiency; helping advance
projects; successful on mitigation work; plan continuation; availability









Opportunities Funding; grant 2
Influence Increase support; common voice to provincial government; influence;ensure support 4
Innovation Awareness and ideas—innovation 2
New Resources Local governments have tools 1
Relationships
Relationship building; strengthened relationships with provincial
government; bring together business and community; introduced to
stakeholders; connect community together; building stronger
relationships; access to relationships
7
Reputation
Seen as leaders; benefit to reputation; reputation improved; identify





Project implementation; creating programs; launching program;
expand programs 4
Physical
Capital Increased Capacity Additional funding; pool resources to do projects 2
4.2. Implementation Structural Features
In all the municipalities, communication systems, individual partner
organizations implementing actions, and key partner engagement were present,
validating the collaborative strategic management literature (e.g., Clarke 2011;
Selin and Chevez 1995). The empirical and literature differences are related to
oversight, and to the monitoring structural features. Currently, it is the municipalities
who are entirely responsible for the oversight of the community plan, thus
there are no collaborative oversight entities, which Clarke (2011) identified as an
important structural feature for partnerships. However, Guelph’s plan is undergoing
an update where a principle for the update is “Community-based governance,
oversight and reporting; improved community engagement with local stakeholders”
(City Council Agenda 2016a, p. 149).
Guelph’s Community Energy Initiative in 2010 had engaged stakeholders
on a Task Force, but the mandate expired in 2012 (City Council Agenda 2016a).
The terms of reference for the upcoming Task Force states that the Task Force is
for providing “a forum for community-based stakeholder guidance, oversight and
reporting to the community and to Council during the update of the Community
Energy Initiative” (City Council Agenda n.d., p. 1). Collaborative governance is
useful for connecting cross-sector stakeholders together, giving them a chance to
interact (Ansell and Gash 2008). Guelph is putting this structural feature in place
in comparison with other case communities because one of the plan’s scope is to
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focus the plan as a community-led initiative (City Council Agenda 2016c). Even with
collaborative governance, local authorities have a key role in coordinating partner
actions and getting the community involved with policy programs (Aylett 2014;
Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Castan Broto and Bulkeley 2013).
In terms of monitoring, all of the cases have monitoring structural features
that include reporting and opportunities for renewal. However, monitoring of
GHG and energy use in both British Columbia-based municipalities (Saanich and
North Vancouver) are delayed due to delays in the provincial reporting. In these
cases, instead of the local government or partnership undertaking the reporting, it is
undertaken by the province (i.e., state-level government). This raises the question
regarding to what extent an implementation structural feature should be in place,
and which entity should be responsible for it.
What was also found was that for partner engagement, core partners are
engaged on an ad-hoc, and activities bases, similar to partner engagement for
climate adaptation, partners were also found to be engaged on an ad-hoc basis
(Hughes 2015). As this was generally similar across the municipalities, this may
be a context-specific characteristic of the engagement structural feature, rather
than the size of the partnerships. Yet, local sustainability partnerships can reach
800+ partners (Clarke and Ordonez-Ponce 2017), so it seems Canadian municipalities
are under-utilizing this collective action opportunity.
4.3. Plan and Partner Outcomes
For plan outcomes of the municipalities, looking at GHG and energy targets,
both North Vancouver and Saanich have uncertain GHG and energy outcomes due
to delays in monitoring and reporting. Both Ontario municipalities (Guelph and
London) have had an overall decrease of GHG levels and energy use since the
adoption of the plans studied. However, even though Guelph’s plan outcomes have
leveled off, its key informant provided an important reminder that outcomes for
long-term strategic plans may not be linear, and that methodologies for assessment
may also be a consideration. For example, emissions calculations for transportation
can be derived from calculating fuel consumed citywide, while kilometers travelled
for vehicles may also be used (The World Bank 2011). Similarly, London’s reports
provide important insight into the external factors that can influence energy use and
GHG emissions including seasonal climates, population change, economic factors,
and provincial energy decisions. Overall, these municipalities may be considered
to be quite successful as they have achieved milestone 5 of the PCP program in the
community stream. Equally important, these municipalities continue to implement
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and have programs ongoing to mitigate climate change, renewing plans even after
having achieved milestone 5. That said, these communities are likely not on track
for their longer-term deep decarbonization targets unless they revise their approach.
This raises questions about partnerships failing (e.g., Bryson et al. 2006), and what
factors might be responsible for that failure. Is it external factors, such as the
leadership from other levels of government (Glasbergen 2007; Gray and Stites 2013),
or will a renewal of the partnership structure and implementation efforts (Clarke 2014)
enable success?
Partner outcomes were collected from core implementation partner
organizations, and it was found that they are identical to the previous
sustainable community plan findings in the capital types and resources gained
(Clarke and MacDonald 2019). A new partner outcome captured in two instances
may be grouped together as moral support, as part of human capital. Collaborative
implementation can provide guidance, motivation and verification of efforts. This
new partner outcome finding—which is different from the context of community
sustainability plans—may be because the partnerships created for community-wide
climate and energy purposes are relatively newer. Comparatively, not many
communities have reached milestone 5 of the PCP program in the community
stream, and the communities studied are leaders in this regard. Therefore, it may
be for these reasons that moral support in this emerging space was discovered as a
partner outcome from collaboration. Two outcomes, in relation to those elaborated
by Clarke and MacDonald (2019), were not found in this context—increased capacity
due to a new engagement mechanism and cost savings. This may be due, in general,
to the size of the partnerships and/or the partners’ functions.
4.4. Implementation Partners
Another important discussion is the concept of implementation partners.
This study began with the definition of implementation partners as organizations that
are implementing or helping to implement the plan. However, using this broad notion,
there was some difficulty in quantifying the number of implementation partners in
some interviews, as results show the partnerships are not yet formal entities in this
context. Core implementation partners tend to be organizations that are involved more
in implementation and/or over the longer term, which in this context will include the
natural gas utilities. These core implementation partners were the organizations that
were engaged in the interviews of this research. It is important for core implementation
partners to be identified, engaged and have positive relationships to be sustained
for the long-term implementation (Ansell and Gash 2008; Waddock 1988) of GHG
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and energy plans. A key concept to revisit is key partners which are major users,
and emitters of GHG and energy (such as natural gas utilities). Ideally, key partners
are engaged as core implementation partners with a commitment to decarbonization.
This challenge seems to be implicitly reflected in the literature, since a scan of the
literature does not seem to reveal a definition of partners which must specifically
be for implementation, for social problems of this nature (sustainability/climate
change), therefore making quantification difficult, especially since a broader sense
was used. It is important to distinguish implementation partners since, for example,
in climate adaptation planning, partnerships for the planning phase do not always
carry through to the implementation phase (Hughes 2015) and new partners can be
added in the implementation phase (Clarke 2014).
4.5. Relationship between Structural Features and Plan Outcomes
CSSPs create public value, beyond what is possible from a single organization
(Bryson et al. 2006; Gray and Stites 2013; Waddock 1991). Overall, for the relationship
between structural features and plan outcomes, it is that partnership structural
features during plan implementation are important for enabling the achievement
of plan outcomes (GHG emissions and energy use). The structural features are
interrelated and inherently, if individual partners do not take action within their own
organizations, there would be less progress (Clarke 2011). Ideally, completing these
actions and making progress, will help a community to reach its ultimate plan goals
of GHG and energy use reduction that can also bring along to the community a wide
range of benefits.
Revisiting Saanich and North Vancouver in the cross-case comparison table
(Table 7), it can be seen that the “absence” of a structural feature affects the plan
outcome, specifically for the implementation structural feature of monitoring to make
plan outcomes uncertain in these municipalities. At the same time, the presence
of all the implementation structural features (i.e., London and Guelph) helps to
show that these implementation structural features are important for enabling the
achievement of plan outcomes. From the patterns shown in a cross-case presentation
of the case studies, where these five implementation structural features (Clarke 2012)
are present for the implementation of the plan, then plan outcomes are in the
direction that is desired for achieving plan goals. Both Guelph and London
have an overall decrease of GHG levels and energy use since the adoption of
the plans studied. The context of climate and economy are also influencers of GHG
and energy usage levels, which is consistent with the literature (Glasbergen 2007;
Selin and Chevez 1995; The World Bank 2011). In addition to the GHG and energy
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decrease, it is evident that collaborative implementation has led to an increase in
community sustainability as mentioned by interviewees and captured as part of
partner outcomes. Partner action and partner engagement are particularly essential
to have achieved community-wide impacts.
As contextual factors influence GHG emissions and energy use, it needs to be
considered and it may be beneficial to explore project-level impacts of the plan (such as
project-level quantification of GHG reductions) to complement the information found
in an overall community inventory for assessing interventions, since community-wide
inventories capture both interventions and contextual factors. As mentioned
in London’s 2015 Community Energy and GHG Inventory, “Whether emissions
continue to decrease depends upon the impact of energy and fuel conservation efforts,
Ontario’s upcoming Climate Change Action Plan, climate trends, economic growth,
and consumer choices” (City of London 2016, p. iv).
4.6. Relationship between Structural Features and Partner Outcomes
In CSSPs, benefits can be experienced by individuals, organizations,
various sectors and by society (Clarke and Fuller 2010; Selsky and Parker 2010;
van Tulder et al. 2016). Generally, partnership design, including structural features,
determine value generation for partners (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Clarke 2014).
For partner outcomes, when organizations are involved as core partners, benefits
are expected to be experienced by the partners (Clarke and MacDonald 2019).
The relationship between implementation structural features and partner outcomes
validates the literature. While it is partnership design in general that can
determine value for the partners, for the partner outcomes (Austin and Seitanidi 2012;
Clarke 2014), partner action, partner engagement, and communication may be
particularly important structural features to enable this. Through partner
taking actions, they are enabled to experience partner outcomes. For example,
partner outcomes such as increasing community sustainability, increasing capacity,
and gaining reputation would not be enabled if organizations did not act. Partners
also need to be engaged, for example to enable partner outcomes such as influence
and relationships (Ansell and Gash 2008; Waddock 1988). Further, communication
activities are useful for commending progress, engaging partners and disseminating
best practices (Clarke 2012), which helps to achieve outcomes such as knowledge
and learning and relationships. All structural features are interrelated (Clarke 2011)
and it is likely that partnership design as a whole that determines partner outcomes.
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5. Conclusions
The first research question is about the applicability of research done on
collaborative community sustainability partnerships to the context of community
climate action plans. Overall, this study helps to show that the five implementation
structural features (Clarke 2011; Clarke 2012) are important for helping to achieve plan
outcomes and partner outcomes in the context of local climate action. The majority
of partner outcomes were also validated, with one new addition and two not found
in this context. Specifically, it was found that partners can experience moral support
as a human capital outcome from collaborative implementation, an outcome that
is unique when compared with partner outcomes from implementing community
sustainability plans (Clarke and MacDonald 2019).
The second research question is about the relationships between partnership
structural features and plan and partner outcomes. This was discussed in Sections 4.5
and 4.6, where the findings indicate that relationships are likely present in these cases.
Further studies are needed to validate this with a large statistical analysis.
The third research question is about what collaborative structures, plan outcomes
and partner outcomes are present. This empirical question is best seen in Tables 8
and 9. These are discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. These findings provide insights to
those interested in climate mitigation and designing partnerships.
Additionally, conducting the study showed the need for better clarity on defining
partners, which is discussed in Section 4.4. Thus, this chapter also explores the
concept of core implementation partners and the possibility of various formality
of partners during the implementation of collaborative sustainability strategies.
Core implementation partners are organizations that tend to be involved more in
implementation and/or over the longer term, which in this context includes utilities.
One limitation of this research is that it uses qualitative techniques when
examining relationships. However, this study benefitted from an analysis that
was based on interviewing knowledgeable informants, sound theory, as well as
documents and archival data that contained a wealth of information. Now that the
variables have been validated and improved through this qualitative work, a larger
quantitative study could be conducted to consider the relationships more accurately.
Another limitation is that it is unsure whether all partner outcomes are applicable
to all municipalities outside of those studied. This is, in part, due to the small
number of partners interviewed, and as there are varying ratios in the mix of types
of partners in each sector in different municipalities. Further, another limitation is
that it is unknown how completely transferable learnings from this research may
be to municipalities outside of those in either British Columbia or Ontario with
177
comparable or less population size, and different regional contexts. These research
design limitations offer opportunities for future research directions.
Future research could ask the question of the extent implementation structural
features should be in place. This question of extent stems from the monitoring
structural feature studied in this research. In two municipalities, monitoring energy
and emissions through the province is present, but it has not been released for some
time. In addition, implementation partners, or levels of, need to be defined for
social partnerships. If a quantitative version of this study were to be conducted,
project-level quantification of GHGs could be explored to complement the information
with an overall community inventory, since community-wide inventories capture
both interventions and contextual factors.
For SDG 17, this study shows the importance of cross-sector partnerships at the
local scale, and not just at the international scale. Localizing the SDGs and local action
is critical for global progress on most of the Global Goals (MacDonald et al. 2018).
Cross-sector partnerships will be an important mechanism to achieve progress at the
local level, so it is useful to consider target 17.17 at this scale. For climate mitigation
in particular, it is clear that cross-sector partnerships will need to be well designed to
support communities to achieve the newer, more ambitious goal of carbon neutrality
by 2050 (IPCC 2018).
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Appendix A. Municipal Informant Interview Guide
Introduction2
Read: The purpose of this research is to provide insights into designing cross-sector
partnerships effective for achieving community-wide GHG emissions targets by
examining implementation structures and outcomes in community climate action
plans. Through this interview I hope to learn more about your community climate
action plan implementation structures, as well as plan and partner outcomes. Some
questions will have additional information beside it, such as definitions and examples.
Read: Do you have any questions before we begin?
Note in case of more info requested: Key structural features for implementation of a plan
are structures in place that help to facilitate the implementation of a plan. For example,
communication systems, partner engagement and attraction mechanisms, collaborative
oversight arrangements, monitoring systems, and individual partner actions.
Interview Questions
Q1: What is your role or position in the climate action plan?
Q2: When was the community-wide climate action plan adopted?
Began implementation?
Q3: How many partners are taking part in the implementation phase of the
community-wide climate action plan, either implementing or helping to implement?
(More info: Partners are anyone or organization who is helping to implement the community
plan. Partners can be found in various sectors such as NGOs, regional governments, electric
utility, schools, school boards, gas utility, higher education institutions, business improvement
areas, citizen groups, financial institutions, large companies, conservation authorities etc.)
Q4: Can you provide a list of the partners who are implementing your community’s
climate action plan at the end of this interview?
Q5: Does your plan engage key organizations from different sectors and have a way
to identify and add them?
If so, how?
(ex. engaged as formal/ informal partners, task forces, partner committees etc.)
Q6: Does the plan have a collaborative oversight body to oversee implementation
and for decision making?
Who is involved in the collaborative oversight?
2 The interview guide is attached, showing script and questions presented to the interviewees.
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More info: Collaborative arrangement in place to oversee strategy formulation and
implementation. (for example, committee or board, or staff coordinator, an NGO that
oversees this? A decision making body? Etc.)
Q7: Do the individual partner organizations implement within their
own organizations?
(ex. partners delegated tasks, partners voluntarily commit to actions within
organization aligning with plan etc.)
Q8: Are there examples of joint implementation efforts by the partnership as a whole?
Q9: What communication system is used to allow communication to, and between
partners relating to the plan?
More info: Communication—A communication system to maintain networking and
knowledge sharing (ex. to reach citizens, to network? Partners provide updates annually,
a communications plan, e-mails, galas, newsletters, secretariat manages website etc.)
Q10: What are the monitoring processes in place?
More info: allows progress to be assessed, adjustments made, plan renewal (ex. partners
provide progress reports, secretariat monitors, committee decides on renewal etc.)
Q11: How does the current monitoring system allow for progress assessment,
plan adjustment and plan renewal?
Q12: What progress has been made towards the emissions reductions target?
Q13: What collaborative actions have been implemented by the municipality?
(ex. coordinate tasks, provide community-wide budget, leading tasks and initiatives etc.)
Q14: What has been the experience (ex. benefits or disadvantages) to the municipality
from collaborative implementation with partners?
More info: Partner outcomes are outcomes that partners experience from the collaboration.
(Ex. improved networking and learning, improved reputation, community cohesiveness,
progress towards goals, financial savings, relationships etc.)
Q15: Would there be another person in your organization who may have a perspective
on this?
Q16: Do you have any questions for me?
Appendix B. Partner Interview Guide
Introduction
Read: The purpose of this research is to provide insights into designing cross-sector
partnerships effective for achieving community-wide greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions targets. One main component is examining outcomes that partners
experience as a result of acting to help decrease GHGs. Through this interview I
hope to learn more about your organization’s actions and outcomes as it relates
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to contributing to progressing towards GHG emissions targets in the municipality.
Some questions will have additional information beside it, such as definitions
and examples.
Read: Do you have any questions before we begin?
Interview Questions
Q1: What is your role as it relates to the climate action plan?
Q2: Has your organization been implementing?
Q3: If so, what is your organization doing and/or has accomplished?
Q4: What have been the outcomes to the organization as a result of
the implementation?
More information: Partner outcomes are outcomes that partners experience from the
collaboration. (Ex. benefits, disadvantages, improved networking and learning, improved
reputation, financial savings, etc.)
Q5: Do you have any questions for me?
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